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Introduction
This thesis consists of four independent chapters. Each chapter contributes experi-
mental evidence to our knowledge on economic preferences. Chapter one shows that
a preference for truth-telling per se is even more prevalent than previous research
suggests. Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between economic preferences and
psychological personality measures and arrives at the conclusion that the degree of as-
sociation between the two concepts is rather small and that they are complementary
in explaining heterogeneity in life outcomes. Chapter 3 validates non-incentivized
survey measures for key economic preferences, i.e. risk taking, time discounting and
social preferences, by examining their predictive power for behavior in incentivized
economic choice experiments. Chapter 4 shows that the variation in preferences
across countries as documented in Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde
(2015) has deep cultural origins.
Chapter 11 attends to what is often called a non-standard preference: a prefer-
ence for truth-telling per se.2 We implement a truth-telling experiment, in which
misreporting cannot be detected and participants have a strong monetary incentive
to misreport, with a representative population sample which we call at home. We
find that aggregate reporting behavior closely resembles the distribution that would
result if everyone reported truthfully. This contrasts previous evidence from labo-
ratory experiments which also documented substantial levels of truthful reporting
as well, but consistently found considerable degrees of cheating. Since our partici-
1This chapter is joint work with Johannes Abeler and Armin Falk. It has been published in the
Journal of Public Economics, see Abeler, Becker, and Falk (2014).
2Such a preference is ”non-standard” in the sense that a selfish and rational agent would not
exhibit it.
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pants made their reports via the phone while participants in laboratory experiments
typically entered their reports into the computer, we conduct an additional labora-
tory experiment to rule out the possibility that the difference between behavior in
our study and previous research is mainly driven by the difference in communication
modes. Similarly, we can rule out that it is the difference in the subject pools - a rep-
resentative sample versus the typical student participants in laboratory experiments
- that explains the much higher level of truth-telling in our study: the behavior of
the students in our representative sample does not differ from the behavior of the
rest of the sample.
Chapter 23 examines the relationship between economic preferences and psycho-
logical personality measures. Using data from incentivized laboratory experiments
and representative samples of the German population it shows that the association
between the two concepts is rather low and that the two concepts are complementary
in explaining heterogeneity in life outcomes.
Chapter 34 validates survey measures for the six key economic preferences - risk
taking, time discounting, trust, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity - by as-
sessing their (joint) explanatory power in explaining behavior in incentivized choice
experiments. This results in a preference module consisting of two items per pref-
erence - one typically being a hypothetical version of the incentivized experiment
and the other one being a subjective self-assessment. Next, we adjust the module by
reducing complexity and excluding culturally loaded wording to allow implementabil-
ity across heterogeneous participants, e.g. in terms of cultural or educational back-
ground, and across survey modes. We test this ”streamlined” module in the field in
22 countries of diverse cultural backgrounds. The resulting feedback calls for only
minor adjustments and overall confirms a good implementability of our preference
module.
Chapter 45 explores whether differences in culture can explain part of the varia-
3This chapter is joint work with Thomas Deckers, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk and Fabian
Kosse. It has been published in the Annual Review of Economics, see Becker, Deckers, Dohmen,
Falk, and Kosse (2012).
4This chapter is joint work with Armin Falk, Thomas Dohmen, David Huffman and Uwe Sunde,
see Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde (2016)
5This chapter is part of joint work with Armin Falk, Thomas Dohmen, Benjamin Enke, David
Huffman and Uwe Sunde, which is currently invited for resubmission at the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, see Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2015).
2
tion in economic preferences we see across countries around the globe as documented
in Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2015) by using a specific fea-
ture of languages as a proxy for culture. Speakers of languages which require the
speaker to grammatically mark the future when talking about future events are less
patient and less prosocial than speakers of languages which lack such a grammatical
requirement. Heterogeneity in preferences across countries and cultures seems to be
partly driven by deep cultural differences.
3
Chapter1
Representative Evidence on Lying Costs
1.1 Introduction
Situations with asymmetric information are ubiquitous. Most of economic theory
assumes that people misreport their private information if this is to their material
benefit; behavior is only determined by the trade-off between financial gains from
misreporting and monetary fines when misreporting is detected.1 In contrast, many
recent models in various domains of Public Economics (and in Economics more gen-
erally) rely on the assumption that people can experience a psychological disutility
which holds them back from misreporting, at least to some extent. These models in-
voke different underlying motives. Kartik, Tercieux, and Holden (2014), for instance,
assume that people face an intrinsic lying cost and show that in this case the social
planner can fully implement a much wider range of social choice rules compared to
the standard Maskin (1977) case without lying costs (see, e.g., Matsushima (2008)
and Dutta and Sen (2011) for similar assumptions). Many studies about incentive
systems for doctors assume that doctors are altruistic towards their patients and
thus do not always state the profit-maximizing diagnosis but rather treat patients
honestly (e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). The large
literature on “tax morale” (e.g., Lewis, 1982; Cowell, 1990; Andreoni, Erard, and
Feinstein, 1998; Slemrod, 2007; Torgler, 2007), demonstrates that many tax payers
misreport their income only a little bit or not at all. This literature is usually ag-
1See, e.g., Allingham and Sandmo (1972) on tax evasion, Falkinger (1991) on public good
provision, Pitchik and Schotter (1987) on credence goods, along with the seminal Becker (1968) on
crime.
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nostic about the exact underlying motives but some studies cite efficiency concerns
(e.g., Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992), patriotism (Konrad and Qari, 2012), reli-
giosity (Torgler, 2006), fairness (Bordignon, 1993), conditional cooperation (Traxler,
2010) or honesty (Erard and Feinstein, 1994).
To further improve these models and to provide an empirically-validated mi-
crofoundation, it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential
motives. Additionally, understanding these motives could inform the design of more
psychologically-realistic policies, e.g., in the area of tax enforcement, that have a
higher potential of being successful. In this paper, we focus on intrinsic lying costs
and investigate how widespread and how large lying costs are. The ideal data set to
answer these questions would allow studying lying costs for a representative sample
of the population and in an environment without the confounding effects of strategic
interaction (including the levy of fines), reputational or efficiency concerns, or altru-
ism. So far, the best evidence on lying costs comes from experiments conducted in
tightly controlled laboratory situations. A robust result is that many subjects misre-
port their private information to their own advantage but that a substantial share of
subjects refrains from reporting the payoff-maximizing type and that some are fully
honest (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-
Heusi, 2013; de Haan, Offerman, and Sloof, 2015; Houser, Vetter, and Winter, 2012;
Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, and De Dreu, 2011; Wibral, Dohmen, Klingmu¨ller, Weber,
and Falk, 2012; Serra-Garcia, van Damme, and Potters, 2013). These studies are a
strong first indicator that lying costs influence behavior. However, lab experiments
do not allow for inferences with respect to the prevalence of lying costs in the overall
population since they have been conducted almost exclusively with student samples
(DellaVigna, 2009; Falk and Heckman, 2009). Also, decision making took place in
an austere laboratory environment which might trigger behavior representative only
of certain non-lab situations. It could thus be that there are systematic differences
between behavior of students in the laboratory and behavior of non-student subjects
outside the lab.
To circumvent these limitations, we measure how people report their private in-
formation outside the laboratory by calling participants on the phone at their home.
Participants were drawn randomly from the German population, yielding a repre-
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sentative sample. An incentivized experiment was embedded in the interview. The
experimental setup is related to the design of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013)
and is extremely simple: participants were asked to toss a coin and report their
type, i.e., either “heads” or “tails”. Reporting tails yielded a payoff of 15 euros,
which participants could choose to receive in cash or as an Amazon gift certificate,
while reporting heads yielded a payoff of zero. Participants thus had a clear mone-
tary incentive to report tails regardless of their true type. It was obvious that the
true outcome was only known to the participants, as they tossed the coin privately
at home. In this setup, we cannot draw reliable conclusions about the truthfulness
of any individual report. But we can learn about aggregate behavior by comparing
the distribution of reports to the true distribution of a fair coin (50 percent tails)
and to the payoff-maximizing distribution (100 percent tails). This indirect obser-
vation therefore allows us to study the behavior of subjects in a situation in which
private information is kept truly private and in which subjects do not face any risk
of detection.2 Moreover, the decision is non-strategic; altruism does not play a role
as the money is not taken from any individual person; and reputational concerns are
minimized since the interviewer is a stranger with whom no future interaction can
be expected.
If all our participants were rational money maximizers, we would expect that all
of them reported tails. If behavior on the phone was similar to previous, comparable
laboratory experiments (e.g., Houser, Vetter, and Winter, 2012), we would expect
about 75 percent of subjects reporting tails.
In contrast to these predictions, observed behavior does not statistically differ
from everybody reporting honestly. If anything, participants report the payoff maxi-
mizing outcome less often than expected under truthful reporting. This latter effect,
however, is small and disappears in a second treatment in which participants were
2In other studies concerning how people report their private information (e.g., Gneezy, 2005;
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) the experimenter knows or will later know the subject’s true type
(and the subject is aware of this) and can thus judge whether an individual was honest or not.
In our experiment, only the participant knows his or her private information. Our setup is thus
closer to situations in which information is truly private and only known by the individual, while
Gneezy’s and Charness & Dufwenberg’s setup is more representative of situations in which the
private information is known by more than one person, e.g., when filing a joint tax declaration.
These papers are also interested in the interaction between sender and receiver, from which we
abstract. (See, however, the recent paper by Deck, Serva´tka, and Tucker (2013) who do not find
an additional effect of promises on cooperation in single-blind and double-blind conditions.)
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asked to report the total number of tails in four consecutive coin tosses and received
5 euros times the number of reported tails. The resulting distribution of reports
in the 4-coin treatment is indistinguishable from the distribution under complete
truth-telling. Moreover, while previous studies (e.g., Dreber and Johannesson, 2008)
have found correlations between individual characteristics, like gender, and truth-
telling, we do not find any robust correlations between individual characteristics and
reporting behavior. This is not surprising if almost all participants report truthfully.
Reports are solely determined by chance, namely the coin toss, which cannot be
related to any individual characteristic. Our results thus show that lying costs are
pervasive and are influencing behavior regardless of gender, religious beliefs, educa-
tion, or age.
We complement our telephone study with two additional control treatments in the
laboratory to better understand what shapes lying costs, in particular the effect of
the mode of communication. In both lab treatments subjects reported the outcomes
of four consecutive coin tosses. Incentives were the same as in the 4-coin treatment
in the telephone study: 5 euros times the numbers of tails reported. In the first
lab treatment, subjects had to report the outcome directly to an interviewer via the
phone, mirroring our telephone study. We observe the same patterns of behavior as
in previous lab experiment: subjects lie much more than in the telephone study. In
the second control treatment, subjects reported the outcomes by clicking a number
between 0 and 4 on the computer screen as in most previous lab experiments. We find
that subjects who enter their report by clicking report slightly higher numbers but
this difference is not statistically significant. The difference to the telephone study
persists: the average report in both lab treatments is higher than in the telephone
study. This shows that the mode of communication does not systematically influence
reporting behavior strongly and is not driving the widespread truth-telling in our
telephone study. We also elicit beliefs about the behavior of other participants and
find in all four treatments that participants believe others to lie more than they
actually do. Older participants (correctly) believe that lying is less prevalent. In
the lab, higher beliefs are correlated with higher own reports. We find no evidence
that being a student has a significant impact on behavior, or that the perceived time
pressure on the telephone or the limited experience of the survey participants with
7
the abstract design of economics experiments played a role.
Our paper adds to the nascent literature studying lying outside the lab. Previous
studies focused on particular groups: Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) study a sample of
children and find that many of them lie, unless they are reminded to be honest; Cohn,
Mare´chal, and Noll (2015) study prisoners and find that they become less honest
when reminded of their criminal identity; and Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) ask a
small sample of nuns to report the roll of a dice and find significant downward lying.
Studies looking at unethical behavior in less abstract environments include Azar,
Yosef, and Bar-Eli (2013) who find that the majority of customers in a restaurant do
not return excessive change. Similarly, Bucciol, Landini, and Piovesan (2013) study
free-riding in public transportation in Italy and find that 43 percent of passengers
evade the fare. We add two features: we study a representative sample and we can
investigate the underlying motives by conducting additional lab experiments using
the same well-defined decision.
Taken together, our results strengthen the doubts that previous lab experiments
have cast on the assumption of zero lying costs: we find evidence for even higher
lying costs in the telephone study. This suggests that studying the theoretical impli-
cations of such costs (e.g., Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani, 2007; Kartik, Tercieux,
and Holden, 2014; Doerrenberg, Duncan, Fuest, and Peichl, 2014) is a promising re-
search avenue. At the same time, it is very likely that altruism, efficiency concerns,
etc. are also important factors in the decision to pay taxes or how to treat patients,
for example. Future research would need to investigate the relative importance of dif-
ferent motives that hold people back from misreporting and the interactions between
motives. Our results also do not mean that lab experiments are uninformative about
non-laboratory settings. However, the difference in behavior between our telephone
study and our and previous lab experiments rather shows how malleable report-
ing behavior can be. This opens many new questions about how exactly reporting
private information depends on the decision-making context. Intuitively, different
norms might apply when making such a decision at home, representing a private and
familiar environment. Similarly, people could be more attentive to their own moral
rules, e.g., abstaining from lying when at home.3 Irrespective of these differences be-
3Previous research comparing behavior of student samples vs. non-students samples and be-
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tween lab and field, our study establishes that lying costs are more important than
previously assumed and are strongly influencing behavior across different decision
environments.
In the next two sections, we present the design of the study and our hypotheses.
Section 3.3 contains the results. We discuss policy implications in Section 1.5.
1.2 Design
The computer-assisted telephone interviews were operated by the Institute for Ap-
plied Social Sciences (infas), a private and well-known German research institute.
They were conducted between November 2010 and February 2011.4 The average
interview lasted 20 minutes (standard deviation: 5.5 minutes). Telephone numbers
were selected using a random digit dialing technique: numbers were generated ran-
domly based on a data set of all potential telephone numbers in Germany. Only
landline numbers were used in this study, as 92.7 percent of German households
have a landline number (Destatis, 2012). The selection of the participant within
each household was also random: only the member of the household whose birthday
was the most recent among all household members was eligible to participate. We
restricted participation to those aged between 18 and 70 years at the time of the
interview.5
The survey was split into two parts. The first part of the questionnaire consisted
of questions relating to the participants’ socio-demographic background and their risk
and trust preferences. Risk and trust preferences were measured by using subjective
havior in the lab vs. outside the lab has in most cases shown little differences (with a few notable
exceptions, e.g., Stoop, Noussair, and Van Soest, 2012). The strong difference in behavior between
our field and lab studies suggests that truth-telling is more context dependent than other behaviors,
like cooperation, altruistic behavior, or consumption choices (Abeler and Marklein, forthcoming).
For an overview and critical discussion, see Falk and Heckman (2009), Camerer (in press), or
Coppock and Green (2015).
4The interviews were conducted in the infas telephone studio. Infas ensures a high quality of
interviews by supervising interviews randomly. Supervisors are present in the telephone studio at
all times and interviews can be monitored without the interviewer noticing this.
5The majority of non-participation was due to no-one answering the phone or people hanging
up immediately after hearing that a market research firm called. Of the 738 people who started the
questionnaire of the 1-coin treatment at all and could condition their participation on the content of
questionnaire or experiment, 658 participants (89.1 percent) completed the entire questionnaire and
the experiment. Like in all telephone-based surveys, the resulting sample is therefore representative
for the part of the population who was at home at the time of call and was willing to participate.
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self-assessments, using the general risk question of the GSOEP (“How do you consider
yourself? Are you in general a rather risk-loving person, or do you try to avoid risks?
Use a scale from 1, meaning that you are not at all willing to take risks, to 7, meaning
that you are absolutely willing to take risks.” Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde,
Schupp, and Wagner, 2011) and the World Value Survey trust question (“Generally
speaking: Do you think one can trust other people, or that one should rather be
careful when dealing with other people? Please indicate your answer on a scale from
1 to 7, with 1 meaning that one should be careful when dealing with other people,
and 7 meaning that one can trust other people.”). After this part, the experiment
described below took place. After the experiment, participants were asked about
their political preferences, their current living and financial situation, their religious
beliefs, and their attitudes towards opportunistic behavior and everyday crime. At
the very end of the interview, participants were asked to state their belief about
other participants’ behavior in the experiment.
Before the experiment started the participant was reminded that the resulting
data would be anonymized, and that infas and the University of Bonn guaranteed
the correct payment. The interviewer then asked the participant to take a coin and
explained the rules of the experiment: the task was to toss the coin and report
whether heads or tails came up.6 If the participant reported heads, they received
no payment. If the participant reported tails, they would receive 15 euros. Then,
the participant was asked to toss the coin and report the outcome. We will call
this treatment “1-Coin-Telephone.” 658 people participated in this version of our
experiment. A translation of the exact experimental instructions can be found in
online appendix 1.6.1.
In a second treatment, 94 people were interviewed and participated in the follow-
ing variation of the experiment. Participants were asked to take a coin, toss it four
times, and report the number of times that tails came up. For each time participants
reported tails they received 5 euros. Thus, they could earn 0, 5, 10, 15, or 20 euros.
We will call this treatment “4-Coin-Telephone.” Payment in both treatments could
6A referee mentioned that some euro coins were reported to not be fair, in particular when
spinning the coin. We don’t think this is a concern in our study since we asked participants to flip
or toss the coin. See Gelman and Nolan (2002) for an explanation on why it is extremely difficult
to bias a coin when flipping it.
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be received either in cash via regular mail or as an Amazon gift certificate code. The
alphanumeric 14-digit gift certificate code was transmitted via email or directly on
the phone at the end of the interview.
In order to further investigate what influences behavior in the telephone study,
in particular the mode of reporting, we additionally conducted two versions of the
4-coin treatment in the laboratory. Subjects were students of the University of Bonn
studying different majors except Economics. They were seated at a desk with a com-
puter in separate room-high cubicles closed off by curtains. As the experiment took
only a few minutes, it was run at the end of the sessions of a different experiment
(similar to Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013). In the preceding experiment sub-
jects made abstract consumption or labour supply choices which involved no private
information and no interaction with other subjects. When the experiment started,
subjects were asked to take a coin that was placed in their cubicle, toss it four times,
and report how often tails came up. For each time they reported that tails came
up they received 5 euros, i.e., up to 20 euros, just like in 4-Coin-Telephone. Their
earnings were paid in cash directly after the experiment.7
The only difference between the two lab treatments was how the reporting was
done. In the first treatment, subjects had to state their report directly to an in-
terviewer via the phone, mirroring our telephone study. After tossing the coin in
their cubicle, they were asked to go one-by-one to an adjacent room and pick up
the telephone that we had placed there. An interviewer on the other side of the line
(whom subjects never met directly) would then ask for their experimental ID and the
number of times the coin showed tails. We made sure that other subjects could not
hear the conversation. The starting times for the coin tossing was staggered, such
that subjects did not have to wait between coin-tossing and reporting. 170 subjects
participated in this treatment which we will call “4-Coin-Lab-Tel.” This treatment
serves to replicate our telephone study as closely as possible in the laboratory. In the
second treatment, subjects reported their outcome by clicking a number 0 to 4 on the
computer screen, similar to previous lab experiments. 180 subjects participated in
the second treatment which we will call “4-Coin-Lab-Click”. This treatment serves to
7The instructions for the lab experiment can be found in online appendices 1.6.2 and 1.6.3. The
experiment was conducted using ztree and ORSEE (Fischbacher, 2007; Greiner, 2004).
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investigate whether the mode of communication, i.e., clicking on a computer screen
versus reporting to a person via the telephone, influences reporting behavior.
1.3 Hypotheses
The standard economic prediction in our setup is straightforward: depending on
the treatment, people will report tails one or four times, respectively. This is the
payoff maximizing outcome as there are no exogenous costs linked to misreporting, no
possibility of detection and no fines. The setup is extremely simple and participants
should have no trouble identifying the payoff maximizing choice. Moreover, the setup
is highly anonymous, discouraging any reputational concerns because of repeated
interaction.
If, however, some participants incur a psychological cost or derive direct disutility
from falsely reporting their private information per se we should expect both heads
and tails to be reported in the experiment. There are a few recent theoretical papers
that assume such a cost. For example, Kartik (2009) and Kartik, Ottaviani, and
Squintani (2007) build on Crawford and Sobel’s 1982 cheap-talk model and derive
predictions for the case that some agents incur costs when misreporting their private
information (see also, e.g., Saran, 2011; Kartik, Tercieux, and Holden, 2014). As-
suming some degree of heterogeneity in the incurred costs when misreporting, it is
then a question of the trade-off between psychological costs and monetary benefits
of misreporting how many participants will report heads and how many report tails.
Participants in 1-Coin-Telephone have to make a clear, binary choice whether
to lie or not; if lying costs are related to self-reputation or identity (e.g., Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2006; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), lying in such a setting could impact
self-reputation or identity more and thus make lying more costly. Participants in
4-Coin-Telephone can make a finer choice between being honest, exaggerating a
little bit, or lying maximally; this could render small lies compatible with a positive
self-reputation and thus enhance lying (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008). Such non-
maximal lying has already been shown to be important by Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-
Heusi (2013).
In the telephone study, participants tossed the coin at their home. It was thus
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obvious that the interviewer could not secretly observe the true outcome of the coin
toss.8 If some participants in our lab experiments (erroneously) believed that the
experimenter could observe the true outcome and believed (again erroneously) that
misreporting would lead to some negative or unpleasant outcome, we would expect
more truth-telling in the laboratory.9
Regarding potential differences in reporting behavior according to individual
characteristics, we would expect that women are more honest than men (as already
shown by Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Houser, Vetter, and Winter, 2012). More
religious participants would be expected to be more honest, since religious priming
leads to less lying and more pro-social behavior (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008;
Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007). Income could be positively correlated with honesty
because of the lower marginal utility of the monetary rewards or negatively correlated
because of reverse causality. A similarly ambiguous hypothesis can be derived for
education or the social environment, e.g., the size of the community or family status.
Along theories of endogenous social norms (e.g., Traxler, 2010; Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2010,
2012), we would expect that higher beliefs about the reporting of other participants
are correlated with own high reporting.
8We cannot rule out the possibility that, e.g., family members were in the same room with the
participant. Behavior, however, does not differ between participants who live alone and those who
do not.
9Actual anonymity is very high in the telephone study and clearly higher on the telephone than
in the lab. Perceived anonymity can and will vary from actual anonymity, for example, participants
might believe that someone calling their landline will also know their name or address (which was
not the case). However, we don’t see a clear reason why perceived anonymity should be higher in
the lab than on the phone. The arguments above even suggest that perceived anonymity in the
lab is lower than actual anonymity, increasing the telephone-lab difference in perceived anonymity.
Either way, there is evidence that the degree of anonymity does not affect behavior much anyway.
Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013) conduct a double-blind version of their experiment in which
both randomization and receiving payment are unobservable by the experimenter. Subjects roll
a die in private, take the payment out of an envelope, and then put the envelope back into a
box with other envelopes such that it is clear that payments and reports cannot be assigned to
any individual. Behavior does not change compared to the baseline treatment, suggesting that
(perception of) anonymity plays only a small role.
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1.4 Results
1.4.1 Telephone Study
Result 1: In 1-Coin-Telephone, the distribution of actual reports is very
close to the truthful distribution; participants report the payoff-maximizing
outcome slightly less often than expected if everyone reported truthfully. In
4-Coin-Telephone, the distribution of reports is indistinguishable from the
truthful distribution.
Figure 1.1 illustrates aggregate behavior (the dashed line corresponds to the expected
distribution if every participant reported the true outcome of the coin toss). 55.6 per-
cent of participants report heads as the outcome of the coin toss, yielding a payoff
of zero, the remaining participants report tails yielding a payoff of 15 euros. The
payoff-maximizing outcome is reported slightly less often than in 50 percent of the
cases and although the difference is small in terms of effect size, it is significant (Bi-
nomial test, p = 0.004). Figure 1.2 shows aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-Telephone.
Again, reporting behavior follows the expected distribution under complete honesty
very closely (the dashed line corresponds to the truthful distribution). In fact, the
distribution of reported outcomes is statistically indistinguishable from the truth-
ful distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.61; binomial tests of the expected
against the observed frequency, all five p > 0.13). In particular, and unlike in 1-Coin-
Telephone where “too many” people report the payoff-minimizing outcome, there is
no significant over-reporting of zero in this treatment.10 Looking at behavior in both
treatments we can therefore summarize that the payoff-maximizing outcome is re-
ported by much fewer participants than expected if no one incurred lying costs. It is
also reported less often than suggested by previous lab experimental studies, which
find some truth-telling but also many instances of the payoff-maximizing report. In-
stead, it is close to the distribution that would arise if every participant reported his
or her type truthfully.11
10While the sample size in 4-Coin-Telephone is substantially smaller than in 1-Coin-Telephone
(94 vs. 658), the non-significance is not due to lack of power but rather due to the small effect size.
If we (counterfactually) increase the sample size to 658 and assume the same shares of reports as in
4-Coin-Telephone, the distribution continues to be indistinguishable from the truthful distribution
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.20).
11We can only speculate about why some people obviously falsely claim to be of the payoff-
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Figure 1.1: Aggregate Behavior in 1-Coin-Telephone
Reporting heads yielded no payoff; reporting tails yielded a payoff of 15 euros. The dashed line
corresponds to the expected distribution if every participant reported the true outcome of their
coin toss.
Figure 1.2: Aggregate Behavior in 4-Coin-Telephone
The payoff was 5 euros times the number of tails reported. The dashed line corresponds to the
expected distribution if every participant reported the true outcomes of their coin tosses.
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Previous studies have shown that truth-telling correlates with observable charac-
teristics, e.g. gender or religiosity Dreber and Johannesson (2008); Houser, Vetter,
and Winter (2012); Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008); Shariff and Norenzayan (2007).
In contrast, if our conjecture that almost all participants report truthfully is correct,
an individual’s reported outcome will only be driven by their random coin toss; if
this is the case, reporting cannot be correlated with any individual characteristic,
as these are orthogonal to the chance move. Therefore, if we do not find such a
correlation, our finding of (almost) complete honesty is supported. More specifically,
we conduct regression analyses for the two experiments in order to examine whether
there are systematic effects of individual characteristics on reporting behavior. First,
we regress the report only on clearly exogenous variables such as age and gender,
in a second step adding religious denomination. We then include income, the size
of the city the individual lives in, and education dummies. Finally, we look at the
effect of an individual’s religiousness (interacted with denomination), their risk and
trust preferences, and their belief about the reporting behavior of other participants.
Result 2: There is no significant correlation between reporting behavior
and any individual characteristic.
First, we look for potential group differences in terms of reporting behavior in 1-
Coin-Telephone by conducting Probit regressions of the reported outcome on the
respective characteristics (see Table 1.2 in online appendix 1.6.4). No characteristic
except for one’s belief about others’ behavior is significantly associated with report-
ing in the experiment: participants who think many other participants report tails
dishonestly, are less likely to report tails themselves. This belief is, however, not
significant if we include it as the only explanatory variable (p = 0.15). Note in par-
minimizing type and why this only happens in 1-Coin-Telephone. The design of the experiment
allows to rule out reputational concerns towards the interviewer as an important factor. Privacy
concerns could drive this effect: reporting the type that gives zero payoff makes it unnecessary to
hand over one’s address. The reason why we do not observe such an effect in 4-Coin-Telephone might
be that reporting zero to avoid handing over the address was less salient in this treatment. However,
we ensured that privacy concerns were minimized in both treatments by giving participants the
opportunity to receive the payment as a gift certificate code by email or directly via the phone.
17.2 percent of eligible participants chose this last payment option which made it unnecessary
to hand over any additional contact details. Another possible explanation would be self-image
concerns: refraining from easily and safely earning 15 euros could be a strong signal to oneself
that one is not greedy and thereby flattering for one’s self-image. This interpretation would be in
line with how Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) interpret their finding that nuns lie to their monetary
disadvantage. We will show more data below which strongly suggests that downward lying is not
widespread in our study.
16
ticular that neither gender nor any religion-related variable is significantly correlated
with reporting. Conducting the same regressions as in Table 1.2 using OLS leaves
the results unchanged. Next, we check whether these results also hold in 4-Coin-
Telephone. We run Ordered Logit regressions of the reported number of tails on the
same explanatory variables as before. Table 1.3 in the online appendix illustrates the
results from this estimation. Only the coefficient for trust is significant. This effect
is, however, not robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables. The effect
is also not present in 1-Coin-Telephone. In contrast to 1-Coin-Telephone, the belief
coefficient shows no significant association with reporting behavior in this treatment
and the point estimate has the opposite sign. We will discuss the data on beliefs in
more detail in Section 1.4.3.
Two further aspects of our analysis are worth noting. First, when running OLS
regressions using the same predictor variables as above, we find that only one of the
10 specifications has an adjusted R2 above 0 (at 0.0146), all other adjusted R2 values
are negative. Moreover, the resulting adjusted R2 tend to decrease in the number
of included variables. This again underlines our conclusion: the tested predictor
variables do not increase explained variance in the dependent variable compared to
pure chance. Second, we also test the correlations between reported number and
answers to the survey questions that we did not include in the main specifications
of Tables 1.2 and 1.3. These include a person’s citizenship and country of birth,
various personal characteristics, a person’s current job or educational situation and
their current or recent position in the professional hierarchy, a person’s willingness
to tell white lies in different situations, a person’s family status and living situation
(whether one lives with a partner and the number of people belonging to the house-
hold), the frequency of church attendance, a person’s political preference, and the
individual’s tendency to behave in an opportunistic way as well as the belief about
others’ willingness to behave like that. Testing these variables as predictors in Probit
and Ordered Logit regressions in the two different data sets, akin to Tables 1.2 and
1.3, we find no robust association between any of them and reporting behavior. In
particular, this means that students and non-students do not behave differently in
our sample. This holds when we consider current students or include former stu-
dents as well (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, all p > 0.409). It is thus not a students
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vs. non-students difference, e.g., a difference in education, age, cognitive skills, or
socio-demographic background, which drives the difference between our results and
previous lab experiments. Summing up, the overall picture is confirmed: no indi-
vidual characteristic, whether exogenous or endogenous, is systematically associated
with reporting behavior suggesting that almost all participants in our study tell the
truth. It could still be that a subgroup of people, which we cannot identify with our
background information, reports tails more often than actually true while another
subgroup reports tails less often. This could result in the two effects offsetting each
other, which would result in a similar picture of aggregate behavior. However, we
consider this to not be likely as our analysis shows that this is not the case for any
of the numerous subgroups that we can identify with our data. More importantly,
such an effect would further need to recreate the distinct distributions of Figures 1.1
and 1.2 which is implausible.
1.4.2 Laboratory Experiment
To further investigate the motivations underlying behavior in the telephone study,
we conducted two 4-coin treatments as laboratory experiments. We will first discuss
the 4-Coin-Lab-Tel treatment which keeps the mode of communication as in the
telephone study: subjects had to report their result over the phone directly to an
experimenter.12 Subsequently, we compare this treatment to 4-Coin-Lab-Click, in
which subjects reported their number by clicking a button on a computer screen as
in previous lab experiments. This second comparison will allow us to disentangle the
influence of the mode of communication.13
Result 3: Subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel report substantially higher numbers
than subjects in 4-Coin-Telephone.
The upper panel of Figure 1.3 shows aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel: most
subjects refrain from reporting the maximal outcome, forgoing on average 6.83 eu-
12It was obvious to the subjects that the experimenter on the phone was not the same person as
the experimenter in the lab, since the experimenter in the lab coordinated the procedure of calling
subjects one-by-one into the separate room with the phone.
13We asked subjects to toss the coin four times instead of only once, to be able to replicate
non-maximal overreporting, one of the main results of Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013). See
Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2012) and Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) for studies with a single coin
toss; both also find significant overreporting.
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ros, quite a considerable amount compared to the average hourly student wage in
Germany of about 10 euros. At the same time, behavior is significantly different
from the distribution expected under truthful reporting, the dashed line in the figure
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p < 0.001; binomial tests, all five p < 0.009). This repli-
cates previous findings in the lab: many subjects lie but often not maximally. Re-
porting behavior also deviates strongly from what we have observed in the telephone
study: reports are significantly higher in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel than in 4-Coin-Telephone.
In Table 1.1, columns 1 and 2, we regress the reported number of tails on a dummy
for being in the lab, a dummy for 4-Coin-Lab-Click and controls for age and gen-
der. The lab dummy is highly significant.14 We find the same result if we compare
4-Coin-Telephone and 4-Coin-Lab-Tel using a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
(p < 0.001). These results demonstrates that our 4-coin randomization mechanism
does not drive the truthful behavior in 4-Coin-Telephone and that, by moving our
telephone setup to the laboratory, we are able to strongly change behavior (as we
showed within the telephone study, this is not driven by subjects being students per-
se). How big is the additional effect if we also change the mode of communication?
Result 4: Subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Click report slightly higher numbers than
subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel but this difference is not statistically significant.
Only the report of 4 occurs significantly more often in 4-Coin-Lab-Click;
the reports of 0, 1, 2, and 3 are not different across treatments. Reports in
4-Coin-Lab-Click are significantly higher than in 4-Coin-Telephone.
The lower panel of Figure 1.3 shows aggregate behavior in 4-Coin-Lab-Click. The
distribution of reports is very similar to the one in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel, the average report
being only slightly higher (2.78 in Click vs. 2.64 in Tel). The overall distribution
and the average report are not significantly different across the two treatments (two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.136; Ordered Logit in Table 1.1, columns
1 and 2, both p > 0.096). The share of subjects reporting 0, 1, 2 or 3 are also
not significantly different (tests of proportion, all p > 0.101). However, subjects
in 4-Coin-Lab-Click report 4 significantly more often (p = 0.007).15 At the same
14We use Ordered Logit regressions in Table 1.1. All results, including the ones discussed below,
also obtain when we use OLS instead.
15Two subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Click told us that they “accidentally clicked the wrong button”
and thus wanted to change their report; both subjects wanted to reduce their report, one subject
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Figure 1.3: Aggregate Behavior in the 4-Coin-Lab-Tel (upper panel) and
4-Coin-Lab-Click treatments (lower panel)
The payoff was 5 euros times the number of tails reported. The dashed line corresponds to the
expected distribution if every participant reported the true outcomes of their coin tosses.
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Table 1.1: Comparison of 4-Coin Treatments
Dependent Variable:
Number of Reported Tails (0–4) Belief about other participants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if Either Lab treatment 1.370*** 1.079*** 1.242*** 1.260*** 0.074** -0.072
(0.225) (0.289) (0.246) (0.334) (0.035) (0.060)
1 if 4-Coin-Lab-Click 0.334* 0.307 0.230 0.204 0.098*** 0.100***
(0.201) (0.203) (0.204) (0.206) (0.031) (0.030)
1 if Female -0.345* -0.371* -0.017
(0.183) (0.190) (0.028)
Age -0.013 0.001 -0.006***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.002)
Belief about other participants 2.114*** 2.115***
(0.356) (0.358)
N.Obs. 444 443 425 424 425 424
Notes: Ordered Logit Estimates (columns 1–4) and Tobit estimates (columns 5–6). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes all 4-coin
treatments, i.e., 4-Coin-Telephone, 4-Coin-Lab-Tel, and 4-Coin-Lab-Click. “Belief about other participants” is the belief of this participant about the share of
participants who report to have tossed more tails than they actually did and who report 4 tails (see text for details about the question). Significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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time, behavior in 4-Coin-Lab-Click is markedly different from 4-Coin-Telephone (two-
sample Kolmogorov Smirnov test, p < 0.001, Ordered Logit in Table 1.1, columns
1 and 2, F-test, both p < 0.001). Overall, our data thus show that the mode of
communication does not have a strong effect on behavior and cannot explain the
difference between our telephone study and previous lab experiments. This result
is further confirmed by Waubert De Puiseau and Glo¨ckner (2012) who also find
considerable truth-telling at home, though not as extreme as in our data, using
an online panel in which participants answered questions at home by clicking on a
computer screen. Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2012) conduct a 1-coin lab experiment
and find similar levels of lying as in our lab experiments, replicating the other side
of our results.
One could think that one reason why behavior in the telephone study differs is
a perceived time pressure on the telephone which might make lying more difficult.
However, we measure response times in the laboratory and do not find a correlation
with the report (Ordered Logit, p = 0.108).16 If anything, the report in the lab is
higher for short decision times. This mirrors results of Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-
Meyer (2012) who impose exogenous time pressure in a similar lab experiment and
who find that subjects become less honest under time pressure. Taken together,
these results suggest that behavior in the telephone study is not driven by perceived
time pressure. We also find no correlation of the number of previous participations
in other lab experiments with reporting behavior in the lab (p = 0.829), suggesting
that the limited experience participants of the telephone study have with the abstract
design of economics experiments does not play a role. It rather seems that different
norms apply when making a reporting decision at home, representing a private and
familiar environment, compared to the in lab where other, more selfish norms might
be triggered.17
from 4 to 2 and the other from 4 to 0. The data shown here includes their final report as they
received this report as payoff. Results stay very similar when we consider their initial click.
16We restrict the sample to 4-Coin-Lab-Click as the response time is measured very noisily in
4-Coin-Lab-Tel where we cannot distinguish the actual decision time from the walking to the next
room, reporting, and coming back to the cubicle.
17Our lab and field experiments differ in a couple of other respects which we cannot disentangle:
subjects in the lab, for example, know that other subjects are in the same room, even though they
are separated by walls and curtains, while at least some telephone participants will be alone; this
might lead to different norms being triggered as suggested above. Furthermore, the telephone survey
came as a surprise to participants while subjects in the lab experiment signed up in advance and
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We showed above that women do not report differently from men in the telephone
study. As one can see from Table 1.1, women do report lower numbers in the lab.
This effect is only weakly significant in the sample of all three 4-coin treatments, i.e.,
also including 4-Coin-Telephone which dilutes the effect, and becomes significant
if we restrict the sample to the two lab treatments (p = 0.027 and p = 0.046 in
regressions akin to columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.1).
1.4.3 Beliefs about other Participants
Previous studies (e.g., Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2010; Diekmann, Przepiorka, and Rauhut, 2015)
have investigated the relationship of reporting behavior and the beliefs about what
other people report. Since our telephone and lab settings generate strong differences
in reporting behavior, we next examine whether there is a similar difference in beliefs
and whether this could help explain the differences in behavior.
In all four treatments, we elicited beliefs about the reporting behavior of the other
participants. We will mainly focus on analyzing beliefs in the 4-coin treatments as
the outcome variable is richer and we have additional treatments. In the 4-coin treat-
ments, subjects were asked two questions regarding their beliefs about the behavior
of other subjects in their treatment (the question referred to 1000 participants in
4-Coin-Telephone): “We are conducting this experiment also with 100 other partici-
pants. How many of these 100 participants do you think report tails more often than
they actually tossed?” and “How many of these X overreporting participants do you
think report that they tossed tails in each of the four coin tosses?”18 We will use the
answers as direct measure of the belief about the share of liars and about the share
of maximal liars.
Result 5: In all treatments, participants believe others to overreport more
than they actually do.
Figure 1.4 compares average beliefs with average actual behavior for each treat-
ment. We take as variable of interest the share of participants who report the
expected to participate and to earn money. Abeler (2013) explores the interaction of expectations
and honesty and suggests that higher expectations could lead to less honesty, in line with our
results.
18In 1-Coin-Telephone, we only asked one question: “How many of the participants report tails
although they tossed heads?”
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Figure 1.4: Share of maximal reports across treatments
The maximal report is 4 in the 4-coin treatments and 1 in 1-Coin-Telephone. The dark bars depict
actual behavior. The light-colored bars depict the average belief of participants in each treatment
about the behavior of the other participants in their treatment.
payoff-maximizing outcome, i.e., 4 tails in the 4-coin treatments and tails in 1-Coin-
Telephone. Since we expected participants to be unfamiliar with the true distribution
of the sum of four coin tosses, we didn’t ask directly for their belief about this share.
We are able to calculate it, given the assumption of convex lying costs, from the two
questions for the 4-coin treatments: it is the share of liars who report 4 (question 2)
plus the share of honest 4’s (the probability of a true 4 times (1 - answer1)). Since we
do not observe whether any individual overreports we cannot directly compare the
two answers to actual behavior.19 We find in all four treatments that participants
believe that others overreport more than they actually do. The differences are highly
significant (t-tests, all p < 0.001). The same results obtain when we consider the
average reported number as variable of interest.20
19In Figure 1.4 we assume that subjects in 1-Coin-Telephone expect all tossed tails to be reported
as tails.
20If some participants care about the distribution of behavior among all participants, i.e., a kind
of group reputation, the wrong belief could be a potential reason for why we find that some people lie
to their monetary disadvantage in 1-Coin-Telephone: their behavior could be motivated by a desire
to compensate for others’ behavior whom they (falsely) believe to be lying. In 4-Coin-Telephone,
such a strategy is not fruitful as too many 0s would not help the group reputation.
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What shapes these beliefs?
Result 6: Older participants believe others to overreport less. Participants
expect more overreporting when participants can enter their report by click-
ing on the screen.
In Table 1.1, columns 5 and 6, we regress the answer to the second question on
treatment dummies, a gender dummy and age (the table only considers the 4-coin
treatments). We find that subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Click believe others to overreport
more than subjects in 4-Coin-Lab-Tel. Being in the laboratory seems to increase
beliefs (column 5) but this effect goes away once we control for age (column 6).
Participants in the telephone study are on average much older than the student
sample in the lab and older participants expect others to overreport less. This
means that the beliefs of older participants in the telephone study are closer to
actual behavior than the beliefs of younger participants. The same effect of age is
present in 1-Coin-Telephone (p < 0.001). Using the answer to the first question,
or the belief about the average report or the belief about the share of participants
reporting 4 does not change any of the results.
Result 7: In the lab, participants who believe that others report high num-
bers also report higher numbers themselves.
We discussed above that there is no robust correlation between reports and beliefs
in the telephone study. In Table 1.1, columns 3 and 4, we study the correlation of
reports and beliefs for the 4-coin treatments in lab and field. We regress the reported
number of coin tosses on treatment dummies, controls for gender and age and on
the answer to the second belief question. We find that participants who believe
others to report high numbers also report higher numbers themselves. If we exclude
4-Coin-Telephone from the analysis, the coefficient on the belief variable becomes
even bigger and stays significant. One could interpret this finding as yet another
indication that almost all participants are honest in the telephone study because, if
some were not, we should also find a correlation with beliefs in the telephone study
(similar to the gender effect we do not find). Furthermore, since beliefs are on average
higher in 4-Coin-Tel-Click, the difference between the two lab treatments—which is
barely significant in column 1—becomes even smaller once we control for beliefs.
These results are again robust to the exact belief measure we use.
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The direction of causality between beliefs and behavior is obviously unclear in
our setting. On the one hand, it could be that a high belief induces participants to
also report higher numbers. This would be in line with a notion that moral norms
are endogenous to the beliefs people hold about the behavior of their peers (see,
e.g., Traxler, 2010; Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2010, 2012). Diekmann, Przepiorka, and Rauhut
(2015) provide causal evidence that higher beliefs lead to higher reports. If this
is the mechanism for the correlation between beliefs and behavior, it is even more
surprising that participants, in particular in the telephone study, decided to refrain
from exploiting the opportunity to receive a considerable amount of money when
they believed that many others would do so. On the other hand, the causality might
run in the opposite direction if participants ex-post justify their own high report
with a stated belief that others also overreport.
1.5 Conclusion
Using a representative sample of the German population we conducted telephone
interviews during which respondents participated in an incentivized experiment. De-
pending on the treatment, they could earn money by reporting tails as the outcome of
one or four coin tosses. We find that almost all participants report their coin toss(es)
honestly: the distributions of reports are extremely close to the true distribution of
a fair coin toss or four coin tosses, respectively. Moreover, reports are not correlated
with any individual characteristic, including gender which has been shown tp predict
honesty in previous lab studies. We conduct additional laboratory experiments to
study the motives underlying the behavior on the phone. While reports are generally
higher in the lab than in the telephone study we find little evidence that the mode of
communication (reporting directly to someone via the phone vs. clicking a number
on a computer) influences behavior. Being a student has also no effect.
Our results underline doubts about the generalizability of economic models which
assume that people always lie maximally when it is financially beneficial. Apparently,
people do not only care for the trade-off between financial gains from misreporting
and the monetary fines when misreporting is detected (cf. Becker, 1968). Our results
instead support models like Erard and Feinstein (1994), Kartik, Tercieux, and Holden
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(2014) or Doerrenberg, Duncan, Fuest, and Peichl (2014) which assume that many
people do not lie or do not lie maximally; intrinsic lying costs could be a potential
microfoundation for these and similar models. The effect of patriotism and religiosity
on tax morale (Konrad and Qari, 2012; Torgler, 2006), for example, could also work
through an increased lying cost.
The strong differences we find between telephone and lab environment suggest
that lying costs are stronger in our setting outside the lab. It seems that different
norms apply when reporting private information at home. Similarly, it might be that
the familiar and intimate environment of one’s own home reinforces one’s personal
identity and renders personal moral standards more salient. This is in line with recent
evidence by Cohn, Mare´chal, and Noll (2015) who conduct a similar experiment
with prisoners. They find that priming prisoners with their criminal identity reduces
honesty. Lab experiments, in turn, could be more representative of decisions for
which people take on a particular role or identity in addition to their private identity.
At the same time, this study does not imply that everybody always reports their
private information truthfully. The level of lying costs seems rather to be influenced
by the context in which people are asked to report their type (see also Mazar and
Ariely, 2006; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008). The difference in behavior on the
phone and in the lab shows how malleable reporting behavior can be. Our results
therefore point to important policy implications: institutions, e.g., tax authorities,
could make use of the context dependence of reporting behavior when designing
decision-making environments. As we find strong evidence for widespread lying costs,
appropriate mechanisms might be much less complex than those resulting when
assuming that agents have no qualms about lying. It might be possible to change
reporting behavior in simple and low-cost ways in the spirit of libertarian paternalism
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Further research is necessary to uncover what the
crucial aspects of the decision-making environment are that induce truth-telling.
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1.6 Appendix to Chapter 1
1.6.1 Experimental Instructions (1-Coin- and 4-Coin-Telephone)
These are the instructions for 1-Coin-Telephone translated into English. The instruc-
tions for 4-Coin-Telephone were adapted according to the rules of 4-Coin-Telephone
but otherwise identical.
The experiment’s purpose is without any exception scientific, and all legal regula-
tions of data protection are strictly respected and the anonymity of the data analysis
is fully warranted. Your participation in the experiment is, of course, on a voluntary
basis. Infas and the University of Bonn guarantee the correct and proper payment
of the achieved amount of money.
In case the participant had doubts about any part of the experiment he or she was
given the phone number of the supervisor of the study at Infas, so that he or she
could make sure that everything was legitimate.
You can receive the payment in cash via regular mail (we will then need your
address), or we will give you a gift certificate code which equals the respective amount
via email or via phone. The gift certificate is valid for a purchase at Amazon. The
address will only be used for mailing the payment of the money you earned and will
be deleted from our database afterwards. You will need a coin to take part in the
experiment (any coin). Please get the coin first. I will then explain the details of the
experiment.
Now, I will explain the experiment. Your coin has one side showing a number,
and another one, often showing some image. After receiving the instructions, I will
ask you to toss the coin, and you will have to tell me afterwards which side of the
coin came up. You receive 15 euros if “tails” comes up.21 You receive 0 euros if
“heads” comes up.
The interviewers were instructed to react with the following sentence to any com-
ments or questions that could possibly influence the participants decision: “I can only
give you the instructions. What side of the coin you report to me, is completely up
to you.” They were also reminded, to react neutrally towards any comment by the
participant concerning the number they reported, and to refrain from making any
21The German word for “tails” is “Zahl”, literally “number”.
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comments or jokes.
Once again: You toss the coin and tell me which side came up. If “tails” came
up, you receive 15 euros. Please don’t start just yet. Do you understand the rules?
If participant said that he or she understood the rules, the interviewer continued
with the experiment.
Please put aside your telephone receiver (but please do not hang up), and toss
the coin. Afterwards please tell me which side of the coin came up. Please toss the
coin now.
In case the participant hung up by accident he or she was called again immediately.
If necessary, the interviewer read the following question: Which side came up?
1.6.2 Experimental Instructions (4-Coin-Lab-Tel)
First screen
Please take now the coin to hand that you should find in your cubicle. If you can’t
find the coin, please notify the experimenter.
Your coin has one side, showing a number, and another one, often showing some
image (tails and heads). After receiving the instructions, you will be asked to toss
the coin, and you will have to report afterwards how often the coin came up with
tails. For every time tails you will receive 5 euros.
You receive 0 euros if tails came never up; you receive 5 euros if tails came up
once; 10 euros if it came up twice; 15 euros if it came up three times; and 20 euros
if it came up four times. This payment will be in addition to the payments that you
will receive for the previous experiment.
Once again: You toss the coin four times, count how often tails came up and
then report how often tails came up. You’ll receive 5 euros per times tails.
You will report the number of tails in the adjacent room via telephone: after you
tossed the coin four times, notify the experimenter who will guide you to the adjacent
room. There will be a telephone connecting you to another experimenter who will
take your report. The payments due will be transmitted to us at the end of this
experiment such that you will receive the payment for both of today’s experiments
at the end of the experiment.
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Please don’t start just yet.
If you have understood the rules, click “Next”. Otherwise, please notify the
experimenter.
Second screen
Please toss the coin four times now and remember how often tails came up.
Then notify the experimenter to make your report via telephone.
As soon as you are back from the telephone, click “Next”.
1.6.3 Experimental Instructions (4-Coin-Lab-Click)
First screen
Please take now the coin to hand that you should find in your cubicle. If you can’t
find the coin, please notify the experimenter.
Your coin has one side, showing a number, and another one, often showing some
image (tails and heads). After receiving the instructions, you will be asked to toss
the coin, and you will have to report afterwards how often the coin came up with
tails. For every time tails you will receive 5 euros.
You receive 0 euros if tails came never up; you receive 5 euros if tails came up
once; 10 euros if it came up twice; 15 euros if it came up three times; and 20 euros
if it came up four times. This payment will be in addition to the payments that you
will receive for the previous experiment.
Once again: You toss the coin four times, count how often tails came up and
then report how often tails came up. You’ll receive 5 euros per times tails.
Please don’t start just yet.
If you have understood the rules, click “Next”. Otherwise, please notify the
experimenter.
Second screen
Please toss the coin four times now. Then report how often tails came up.
How often did tails came up?
[Five buttons 0 to 4]
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1.6.4 Additional Regression Tables
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Table 1.2: Covariates in 1-Coin-Telephone
Dependent Variable: 1 if Reported Tails
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 if Female 0.041 0.040 0.079* 0.065 0.066
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049)
1 if Protestant 0.010 0.021 -0.038 -0.084
(0.046) (0.056) (0.140) (0.141)
1 if Catholic 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.064
(0.048) (0.057) (0.150) (0.152)
Income 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1 if Professional Education 0.041 0.053 0.056
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
1 if Academic Education -0.016 -0.009 -0.015
(0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
City Size 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Religiousness 0.029 0.023
(0.020) (0.020)
Religiousness*Catholic -0.010 0.004
(0.035) (0.036)
Religiousness*Protestant 0.005 0.013
(0.034) (0.035)
Risk Tolerance -0.003
(0.018)
Trust -0.028
(0.018)
Belief about other -0.218**
Participants (0.092)
N.Obs. 658 658 465 464 454
Notes: Probit Estimates. Marginal effects are shown, robust standard errors are in parentheses. “Risk tolerance”
is the answer to the general risk question of the GSOEP (“How do you consider yourself? Are you in general a
rather risk-loving person, or do you try to avoid risks? Use a scale from 1, meaning that you are not at all willing
to take risks, to 7, meaning that you are absolutely willing to take risks.”) and “trust” is the answer to the WVS
trust question (“Generally speaking: Do you think one can trust other people, or that one should rather be careful
when dealing with other people? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning that one should
be careful when dealing with other people, and 7 meaning that one can trust other people.”). “Belief about other
participants” is the belief of this participant about the share of other participants who reported “tails” while actually
“heads” came up. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 1.3: Covariates in 4-Coin-Telephone
Dependent Variable: Number of Reported Tails (0–4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age -0.015 -0.017 0.006 0.008 -0.013
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
1 if Female 0.120 0.159 0.177 0.072 0.075
(0.389) (0.399) (0.496) (0.526) (0.573)
1 if Protestant -0.099 0.073 -1.052 -1.588
(0.473) (0.622) (1.258) (1.269)
1 if Catholic 0.292 0.703 -0.407 -1.425
(0.452) (0.565) (1.373) (1.520)
Income 0.039 0.042 0.025
(0.176) (0.184) (0.211)
1 if Professional Education -0.591 -0.721 -0.759
(0.587) (0.620) (0.693)
1 if Academic Education -0.640 -0.757 -0.764
(0.697) (0.693) (0.729)
City Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Religiousness -0.271 -0.289
(0.238) (0.250)
Religiousness*Catholic 0.328 0.475
(0.318) (0.345)
Religiousness*Protestant 0.336 0.395
(0.283) (0.276)
Risk Tolerance -0.324
(0.251)
Trust 0.491**
(0.215)
Belief about other 0.715
Participants (1.311)
N.Obs. 94 94 62 62 60
Notes: Ordered Logit Estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. “Risk tolerance” is
the answer to the general risk question of the GSOEP (“How do you consider yourself? Are you
in general a rather risk-loving person, or do you try to avoid risks? Use a scale from 1, meaning
that you are not at all willing to take risks, to 7, meaning that you are absolutely willing to take
risks.”) and “trust” is the answer to the WVS trust question (“Generally speaking: Do you think
one can trust other people, or that one should rather be careful when dealing with other people?
Please indicate your answer on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 meaning that one should be careful
when dealing with other people, and 7 meaning that one can trust other people.”). “Belief about
other participants” is the belief of this participant about the share of participants who report to
have tossed more tails than they actually did and who report 4 tails (see text for details about the
question). Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Chapter2
The Relationship Between Economic
Preferences and Psychological Personality
Measures
2.1 Introduction
Both economists and personality psychologists seek to identify determinants of het-
erogeneity in behavior. Economists typically depict decision problems in a framework
of utility maximization. An individual’s utility is shaped by preferences such as risk,
time, and social preferences.1 These preferences, in combination with expectations
of future events, perceptions, beliefs, strategic consideration, prices and constraints
shape behavior. Personality psychology, the branch of psychology studying person-
ality and individual differences, offers several frameworks describing universal traits
and individual differences. Personality traits – defined by Roberts (2009, p. 140) as
“the relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that reflect the
1In the standard expected utility framework, risk preference is captured by the curvature of the
utility function, whereas the degree of risk aversion is represented in the concavity of the utility
function (e.g. Gollier, 2001). Time preference describes how an individual trades off utility at
different points in time (Samuelson, 1937; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002). Social
preferences capture the idea that an individual’s utility does not depend only on his own material
payoff, but that it is also shaped by others’ behavior and material payoff. Social preferences include
altruism (e.g. Eckel and Grossmann, 1996) and negative and positive reciprocity (e.g. Falk and
Fischbacher, 2006). Finally, trust describes an individual’s belief about others’ trustworthiness
combined with a preference to take social risks (e.g. Fehr, 2009). Another important economic
preference is the preference for work versus leisure. This preference is difficult to measure in
experiments and is therefore not part of our analysis.
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tendency to respond in certain ways under certain circumstances” – are important
determinants of personality (Roberts, 2006) and affect outcomes. There has been
a long tradition in personality psychology to measure personality traits. The Big
Five or five-factor model is the most widely used taxonomy of personality traits. It
originates from the lexical hypothesis of Allport and Odbert (1936), which postulates
that individual differences are encoded in language (see Borghans et al. 2008). After
years of research in this tradition, psychologists have arrived at a hierarchical organi-
zation of personality traits with five traits at the highest level. These Big Five traits,
which are commonly labeled as openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraver-
sion, agreeableness, and neuroticism, capture personality traits at the broadest level
of abstraction. Each Big Five trait condenses several distinct and more narrowly de-
fined traits. It has been argued that the bulk of items that personality psychologists
have used to measure personality can be mapped into the Big Five taxonomy (see,
e.g., Costa and McCrae, 1992)).2 Another important concept in psychology focusing
on individual beliefs and perceptions is the locus of control framework by Rotter
(1966). It represents the framework of the social learning theory of personality and
refers to the extent people believe they have control over events.
An integration of the different measures and concepts used by economists and per-
sonality psychologists promises much potential for amalgamating evidence about the
drivers of human behavior which accumulated disjointedly in the fields of economics
and psychology (Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel, 2008). Recently,
scholars have begun to integrate personality into economic decision making (e.g.,
Borghans et al., 2008). Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011) enrich
theory by incorporating personality traits in a standard economic framework of pro-
duction, choice, and information. Their model interprets measured personality as a
“construct derived from an economic model of preferences, constraints, and infor-
mation” (Almlund et al., 2011, p. 3). However, empirical knowledge is too limited
to judge how personality traits relate to the concepts and parameters economists
typically model to predict behavior.
To shed more light on the relationship between economic preferences and psy-
2For a more detailed description of the research on the development of the Big Five, criticism
of the approach and alternative measurement systems see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter
Weel (2008).
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chological measures of personality we therefore study how key economic preferences,
such as risk, time and social preferences, are linked to conventional measures of per-
sonality, such as the Big Five and locus of control. We analyze this relationship
in a coherent framework using two main approaches. The first approach focuses
on assessing the magnitude of the correlations between psychological and economic
measurement systems in three unique data sets. The second approach departs from
the fact that both preference measures and measures of personality traits predict a
wide range of important life outcomes. If these two measurement systems are closely
linked, they are expected to be substitutes in explaining heterogeneity in behavior.
If, however, preferences and personality traits capture different aspects of behav-
ior, the two measurement systems may have complementary predictive power for
important life outcomes. We therefore evaluate the individual as well as the joint
explanatory power of economic preferences and psychological measures of personality
in explaining health, educational and labor market outcomes.
We use three complementary datasets. First, we look at data from laboratory
experiments. Using a student subject pool we conducted choice experiments on key
economic preferences, namely risk taking, time discounting, altruism, trust, and posi-
tive and negative reciprocity. We incentivized decision-making and obtained multiple
behavioral measures for each preference. We assessed the Big Five domains using
the 60-item NEO-FFI (NEO Five Factor Inventory) (Costa and McCrae, 1989) and
a 15-item subset, the so-called BFI-S (Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). We also measured
the locus of control using 10 items adapted from Rotter (1966). Our second data set
comprises very similar incentivized experimental measures with respect to risk tak-
ing and time discounting using a representative sample of almost 1000 participants
from the German population. We are therefore able to obtain incentivized preference
measures for a representative population. Personality was assessed using the BFI-S.
The third data set stems from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP),
comprising preference and personality measures for a representative sample of more
than 14.000 individuals. Preference measures were obtained using subjective self-
assessment survey items rather than incentivized experiments, and personality was
measured by using the BFI-S and the locus of control questionnaire. Using this data
set we analyze associations between important life outcomes, such as labor market
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success, subjective health status or life satisfaction, and individuals’ preferences and
personalities.
These three data sets allow for a comprehensive analysis. The first data set con-
tains very detailed personality measures in combination with multiple experimental
indicators for preferences. This student sample therefore provides a particularly
accurate assessment of potential relations between economic preferences and person-
ality. The second data set uses experimental measures for a limited set of preferences
and a shorter version of the Big Five but a representative sample. A comparison of
results of the two data sets therefore informs us about the generalizability of our
findings from the student sample. The third data set additionally allows us to study
an even larger sample and to explore the explanatory power of personality and pref-
erences for important life outcomes.
We start by analyzing data on 489 university students. We relate all five factors
that capture personality according to the Big Five taxonomy and the measure of
Locus of Control to our experimental preference measures. We generally find only
small correlations between personality traits and preferences. In particular, only 11
of the 36 correlations in our student sample exceed 0.1 in absolute value and only one
correlation exceeds 0.2 in absolute value. These eleven correlation coefficients are
all significant at conventional levels, and eight of them involve correlations between
social preferences and personality traits.
Next, we gauge whether the correlation patterns generalize to representative sam-
ples. We first turn to the data set that contains very similar experimental measures
of risk and time preferences and survey measures of the Big Five approximately 1000
individuals, who were sampled to be representative of the adult population living in
Germany (see Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2010). The correlation structure
between personality traits and risk and time preferences turns out to be similar to
the one we find for students, with few exceptions.
Finally, we assess whether the empirical associations between preference parame-
ters and personality traits are sensitive to the way in which preferences are measured.
We compare correlations between personality traits and measures of preferences de-
rived from the incentivized choice experiments in the student and the representative
sample to correlations that are constructed based on the non-incentivized subjective
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self-assessments in a representative sample of 14.000 individuals from the SOEP.
Our result on the pattern of correlations between preference measures and personal-
ity measures is again largely confirmed.
We then turn to a different type of analysis in which we assess the power of prefer-
ences and personality in explaining life outcomes, including health, life satisfaction,
earnings, unemployment and education. Our analysis reveals that both measure-
ment systems have similar explanatory power when used separately as explanatory
variables. The explained fraction of variance increases by approximately 60% when
life outcomes are regressed on both measurement systems. We therefore conclude
that each measurement system captures distinct sources of the heterogeneity in life
outcomes. A coherent picture emerges from our analysis. Both approaches strongly
suggest that standard measures of preferences and personality are complementary
constructs.
So far no clear picture concerning the relations between measures of personality
and economic preferences has emerged in the literature (see Almlund, Duckworth,
Heckman, and Kautz, 2011). For example, the study by Daly, Delaney, and Harmon
(2009) suggests a negative relationship between conscientiousness and the discount
rate, but such a negative correlation is not corroborated by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
and Sunde (2010), who relate experimental measures of willingness to take risk and
impatience to survey measures of the Big Five in a representative sample of adults
living in Germany, nor by Anderson, Burks, DeYoung, and Rustichini (2012), who
relate a measure of delay acceptance to four of the Big Five domains in a sample of
1065 US trainee truckers.3 In fact, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) find
no significant relationship between personality traits and preference measures in a
regression framework that includes controls for IQ, gender, age, height, education,
and household income. Raw correlations between preference and personality mea-
sures, which are also reported in Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011),
are weak; time preference is significantly correlated only to agreeableness (at the
10 percent level).4 This finding is confirmed by the significant correlation between
delay acceptance and agreeableness in the truck-driver sample of Anderson, Burks,
3The effect sizes of the correlations between preference and personality measures are all smaller
than 0.1 in absolute value.
4We report this data in Table 2.3.
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DeYoung, and Rustichini (2012).
Evidence on the link between risk preferences and the Big Five domains is equally
mixed. Raw correlations between a lottery-choice measure of risk preference and per-
sonality traits in the data from Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010) indicate
significant relationships between risk preferences and openness to experience (at the
1 percent level) and agreeableness (at the 5 percent level). Anderson, Burks, DeY-
oung, and Rustichini (2012) do not measure openness to experience. They do not
find a significant correlation for risk preference and agreeableness, but report a weak
correlation between risk preference and neuroticism (0.05 in absolute value), which is
significant at the 10 percent level. This finding is in line with the significant positive
association between risk aversion and neuroticism reported by Borghans, Golsteyn,
Heckman, and Meijers (2009). Other researchers (e.g. Zuckerman, 1994) have re-
lated risk preferences to sensation seeking, a facet of extraversion in the Big Five
taxonomy, and found mixed evidence. Whereas Bibby and Ferguson (2010) report
a significant correlation between a measure of loss aversion and sensation seeking
(r = 0.27), Eckel and Grossmann (2002) find no evidence of an association between
risk preferences and sensation seeking.
Evidence on the link between social preferences and personality is somewhat
stronger. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2008) relate survey measures of so-
cial preferences to measures of the Big Five using data from the SOEP and find
significant associations between trust, as well as positive and negative reciprocity
and personality traits. Trust is related positively to agreeableness and openness to
experience, and negatively to conscientiousness and neuroticism; while positive reci-
procity is positively associated with all five personality factors, negative reciprocity
is related negatively to conscientiousness and extraversion, and positively to neuroti-
cism. A link between extraversion and behavior in the dictator game, which can be
interpreted as a measure of altruism, has been established by Ben-Ner and Kramer
(2010).
This review is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes our three data sets.
In Section 2.3 we introduce our research strategy for investigating the link between
personality and preferences. Section 2.4 presents evidence on the correlation be-
tween measures of personality and measures of preferences. In addition it contains
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an assessment of the explanatory power of preferences and personality in explaining
important life outcomes. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and Measures
In this section, we provide a description of the three complementary data sets that
we employ for our analysis. Before we present our experimental and survey measures
in detail, a few comments on identification are warranted. Economists typically try
to infer preferences from choices, the so-called revealed preference approach. For
example, one might surmise that a person who does not wear a safety belt an who
invests in risky stocks has a preference for taking risks. It is, however, easy to show
that the same behavioral pattern is compatible with very different risk preferences if
other factors affect the person’s decisions. For example, differences in beliefs about
how risky driving without a safety-belt or investing in stocks actually is may affect
decisions equally strong than underlying risk preferences. The problem is that the
decision context is uncontrolled and person specific, rendering precise statements
about preference parameters very difficult.5 This is why economists run experiments
to infer preferences. In a typical choice experiment subjects make decisions in a
well-controlled decision environment. In risk experiments, for example, stakes and
probabilities are fixed and the action space is identical for every subject. Observ-
ing subjects’ decisions in a controlled experimental environment therefore rules out
many potentially confounding factors, allowing a more precise identification of pref-
erences. Even in an experiment, however, the identification of preferences is limited
(see Manski (2002) for a thorough discussion on the identification of experimental
outcomes). The same observed action can reflect different risk attitudes, for exam-
ple, if the experimental subjects dispose of different wealth levels and the curvature
of the utility function is not invariant to wealth levels. Despite these limitations
experiments deliver much more precise behavioral outcomes than non-experimental
observations. In strategic situations, which are relevant for measuring trust and reci-
5Conceptually identical problems apply to the identification of traits, such as ability, physical
strength and personality characteristics from observed performance on tasks, when performance
also depends on other unobserved factors such as time, energy and attention devoted to the task.
An illuminating discussion of the identification problem is provided in section 3 of Almlund et al.
(2011).
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procity, we are able to elicit not just an action but a complete strategy. With field
observations this is impossible. The relevance of eliciting a strategy is obvious: Sup-
pose one observes a second mover who defects in a cooperation context, in response
to a non-cooperative act of a first mover. This could reveal selfish preferences as well
as reciprocal preferences. Disentangling the two requires knowledge about what the
decision maker would have done, had the first mover cooperated. Eliciting a strat-
egy instead of observing only actions does exactly this. Experimental observations
have the additional advantage over survey responses that decisions have immediate
monetary consequences. This is of obvious importance, for example, for identifying
altruism. There is a big difference between simply stating altruistic preferences and
revealing them in a costly manner.
2.2.1 Experimental Data
The first data set consists of decisions from laboratory experiments among university
students. We ran a series of simple incentivized choice experiments to elicit prefer-
ences concerning risk taking, discounting, positive and negative reciprocity, and trust
as well as altruism.6 Table 3.2 presents an overview of the experiments and provides
a short description of the elicitation methods and the obtained behavioral measures.
Four important features about our experimental design are worth noting. First, sub-
jects took part in two very similar experiments each for risk taking, discounting, trust
and positive reciprocity. This allows us to average over both outcomes for each sub-
ject in order to minimize measurement error. Second, to reduce spillovers between
different choices, we ran the experiments not in one single session but in two sessions,
which were scheduled one week apart.7 Third, to reduce possible income effects with
respect to outcomes within a session, we gave feedback about experimental outcomes
only at the end of an experimental session. Fourth, the vast majority of subjects
in the experiments had never taken part in an experiment before. This eliminates
possible confounds in behavior due to previous experiences in similar experiments.
In total, 489 students from different majors from the University of Bonn partici-
6For a detailed description of the experimental procedures see Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman,
and Sunde (2016).
7We reversed the order of the sessions for half of the subjects. Statistical tests reveal no
significant order effects.
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pated.8 The experiments were run at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics
at the University of Bonn (BonnEconLab). We used zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) as
experimental software and recruited subjects using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each
session lasted about two hours, and average earnings were 64 Euros.
Table 2.1: Overview of the experimental measures in data set from laboratory
experiments among university students
Preference Experiment Measure
Time Two lists of choices between Average switching point
an amount of money “today” over both lists of choices
and an amount of money from the early to the
“in 12 months”. delayed amount.
Risk Two lists of choices between Average switching point
a lottery and varying safe over both lists of choices
options. from the lottery to the
safe option.
Positive Second-mover behavior in two Average amount sent back
Reciprocity versions of the trust game in both trust games.
(strategy method).
Negative Investment into punishment after Amount invested into
Reciprocity unilateral defection of the opponent punishment.
in a prisoner’s dilemma
(strategy method).
Trust First mover behavior in two Average amount sent as
versions of the trust game. a first mover in both
trust games.
Altruism First mover behavior in a Size of donation.
dictator game with a charitable
organization as recipient.
Preference Measures
Risk Preferences To elicit risk attitudes we adapted the design from Dohmen,
Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010). Subjects were shown a list of binary alternatives,
a lottery and a (varying) safe option. The lottery was the same for each decision:
If they chose the lottery participants could receive either 1000 points or zero points
8Out of these 489 students, 80 took part in a pretest of the study. Most of these 80 subjects
had taken part in an experiment before. The pretest did not include the experiments on altruism
and negative reciprocity.
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with 50 percent probability each. The safe option increased from row to row, starting
from a value of (close to) zero, and increasing up to a value of (close to) the maxi-
mum payoff of the lottery. To reduce measurement error subjects participated in two
risk experiments. The choice list of the second experiment was simply a perturbed
version of the first one. Perturbations were constructed such that a randomly drawn
integer value between -5 and +5 was added to the safe option in every choice, corre-
sponding to perturbations of maximally 5% of the step size of the increase in the safe
option. The complete list of choices was shown to subjects on the first screen. Each
choice situation was then presented on a separate screen, where subjects entered
their respective choice. Subjects were informed that one choice in each list would be
selected randomly and paid. Subjects with monotonic preferences should choose the
lottery for lower safe options and switch to the safe option when the latter reaches
or exceeds the level of their certainty equivalent. Thus switching points inform us
about individual risk attitudes. The earlier a subject switches to the save option the
less she is willing to take risks. For our analysis we constructed a risk preference
measure using the average of the two switching points from the two experiments.9
Time Preferences To measure individuals’ time preferences we implemented a
procedure very similar to the one for risk attitudes. In the discounting experiments,
subjects were given two lists of choices between an earlier amount of money (“to-
day”), which was the same in all choices, and an increasing delayed amount of money
(“in 12 months”). In the first row, the early amount was equal to the delayed amount.
Delayed amounts increased from row to row by 2.5%. As for risk preferences subjects
participated in a very similar second discounting experiment with small perturba-
tions of delayed amounts between +0.5 and -0.5 percentage points. One choice in
each of the two lists was randomly selected for payment. Payments resulting from
the two experiments were sent to subjects via regular mail. If a subject chose the
early amount, the payment was sent out on the day of the experimental session. If
a subject chose the delayed amount, the payment was sent out with a delay of 12
9If subjects switched between the lottery and the safe option more than once, we took the
average switching row as an estimate of their certainty equivalent. This happened in 16 % of the
cases in the first experiment on risk taking, and in 11 % of the cases in the second experiment.
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months.10 The switching point from early to delayed payment informs us about a
subject’s time preference. Subjects who switch later discount the future amount by
more (i.e., are less patient) than subjects who switch earlier.11 Our measure of indi-
vidual discounting is the average switching row in both lists. To ease interpretation
of the correlations reported below, we recode the measure, such that higher values
imply earlier switching rows, i.e., a higher level of patience.
Trust We elicited trust from first-mover behavior in the so-called trust game (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). We conducted two versions of the trust game. In one
version, the amount sent by the first mover was doubled by the experimenter, whereas
in the second version the amount was tripled. Every subject was in the role of the
first and of the second mover twice.12 Both trust games were incentivized, i.e., every
(relevant) decision was paid. In the role of a first mover, subjects could choose to
send any amount in {0, 50, 100, . . . , 500} points to the second mover. All interactions
in the trust game as well as in all other social preference experiments were one-shot
and anonymous (perfect stranger matching protocol). The average amount sent as
a first mover in both trust games constitutes our experimental measure for trust:
Subjects who send higher amounts of money are those who display higher levels of
trust.
Positive Reciprocity To elicit positive reciprocal inclinations we measure sub-
jects’ second-mover behavior in the trust game (see above). We implemented the
strategy method (Selten, 1967). This means that for every possible amount sent by
the first mover, subjects were asked to indicate how much they wanted to send back.
The actual decision of the first mover determined which of these decisions became
payoff relevant. The average amount sent back as a second mover in both trust
games was taken as individuals’ willingness to reciprocate, such that higher values
imply a higher willingness to reciprocate.
10Keeping the payoff mode identical over both time horizons rules out credibility concerns.
11For subjects, who switched more than once, we took the average switching row as an estimate
of their discount rate. This happened in 5 % of the cases in the first experiment on time discounting,
and in 7 % of the cases in the second experiment.
12Overall, we therefore ran four trust games.
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Negative Reciprocity To measure subjects’ willingness to engage in costly pun-
ishment of unfair behavior, we conducted a prisoner’s dilemma with a subsequent
punishment stage.13 In the punishment stage, subjects could choose to invest points
in order to deduct points from their opponent. Punishment was costly. Again, we
implemented the strategy method. Before taking their decisions in the first stage of
the experiment (i.e., in the prisoner’s dilemma) subjects were asked to indicate how
many points they wanted to deduct from the other player in case he cooperated or
defected, for both own cooperation and own defection. Then they played a simulta-
neous prisoner’s dilemma. The outcome of the first stage determined which choice
of the second stage became payoff relevant. The chosen investment into punishment
after unilateral defection of the other player served as a measure of an individual’s
willingness to reciprocate negatively.
Altruism To measure altruistic behavior we had subjects take part in a modified
dictator game in which the recipient was a charitable organization (adapted from
Eckel and Grossmann, 1996). Subjects were endowed with 300 points and had to
decide how much of this endowment to donate to a charitable organization.14 This
decision serves as our experimental measure of subjects’ altruistic inclination.
Personality Measures
Big Five As part of the study, subjects were given a paper-and-pencil survey, which
they were asked to fill out at home and return to us via mail.15 Of the 489 subjects,
319 completed the survey and sent it back to us. The survey included the NEO-FFI
version of the Big Five (Costa and McCrae, 1989). During the experimental sessions,
all 489 subjects also answered a shorter version of the NEO-FFI: the BFI-S, a subset
consisting of 15 items. The BFI-S has been developed by Gerlitz and Schupp (2005)
and was also part of the 2005 and 2009 waves of the SOEP. Correlations between the
long version and the short version of the Big Five differ between the five personality
dimensions. The lowest correlation is r = 0.48 for openness, and the highest is
13The design of the experiment was adapted from Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2005)
14Subjects could choose a charitable organization from a list, or name one themselves.
15We also handed out stamped envelopes with the address of our research institute, in order to
minimize additional costs for returning the survey to us.
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r = 0.71 for conscientiousness (all p-values < 0.001). We constructed our Big Five
measure in that we use data from the long version whenever available, while for the
remaining subjects we refer to the short version. That way, we have measures of the
Big Five domains for all 489 subjects.
Locus of Control The paper-and-pencil survey included 10 items that allows us
to construct a measure of the locus of control for the 319 individuals who filled in
the survey. These 10 items have been adapted from Rotter (1966) and they have
also been implemented in the 2005 wave of the SOEP. The personality construct
of locus of control assesses how much people believe they have control over their
life outcomes, or how much their lives are determined by forces that are outside of
their control, such as luck or faith. We constructed the measure such that higher
values represent a more internal locus of control, i.e., the belief that the person can
influence their life outcomes. Lower values represent a more external locus of control.
2.2.2 Representative Experimental Data
The second data set we employ consists of experimental data for a representative
sample of the German population.16 This data set is used to assess whether the find-
ings from the sample of university students can be corroborated in a representative
sample. Subjects’ risk and time preferences were elicited, and we again have informa-
tion on participants’ personality. The data used here stem from a study conducted
in 2005 and contains information on 1012 individuals. For a detailed description of
the study and its procedures see Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010).
Preference Measures The experiments on risk and time preferences were similar
to the ones we used in the laboratory experiments. In both experiments subjects had
to make multiple decisions in a list of choices. To elicit their risk preferences we had
subjects choose between a lottery, which remained the same in all choices, and safe
options, which increased in their value. As in the experiments discussed above, the
switching point informs us about the individual’s willingness to take risks. Similarly,
16The same data set is used in Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010).
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to elicit individuals’ time preferences we had all participants make a number of
intertemporal choices. They had to decide between an amount “today” and a larger
amount “12 months” later. The early amount remained the same in all choices. The
first delayed amount presented to subjects was devised to imply a 2.5% return on
the early amount assuming semi-annual compounding. In the subsequent choices the
delayed payment was gradually increased and was calculated such that the implied
rate of return rose in steps of 2.5 percentage points. Again, the switching points
from the early to the delayed option inform us about the subjects’ time preferences.
Personality Measures The five personality domains were assessed using the BFI-
S (see Section 2.1.2 for a more detailed description).
2.2.3 Representative Panel Data
The third data set we use stems from the SOEP, a large panel data set that is repre-
sentative of the adult population living in Germany (see Schupp and Wagner (2002)
and Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007) for a detailed description of the SOEP). We
use information from eight waves collected in the years between 2003 and 2009. In
each of these waves more than 20,000 individuals were interviewed. The SOEP com-
bines extensive sociodemographic information with various measures of attitudes,
preferences and psychological traits. In particular, the SOEP includes survey items
relating to all personality and preference measures that we discuss in the previous
sections.
Personality and economic preference measures were elicited several times between
2003 and 2009. To construct a measure for each individual, we use the maximum
available number of observations of a given measure. If several measures of personal-
ity and preferences are available, we take the average of the standardized measures of
all years in which this measure was elicited. The resulting average is then standard-
ized as well. In case a particular measure was elicited only in one wave (e.g., as it
is the case for patience) we just take the standardized measure from that respective
year. We restrict the sample to individuals for whom we have information about
each personality and preference measure. This results in a sample size of 14,243
individuals.
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Preference Measures As a measure for time preference we use answers to the
following survey question: “How would you describe yourself: Are you generally an
impatient person, or someone who always shows great patience?”.17 Participants
gave an answer on an 11-point scale where zero means “very impatient” and 10
means “very patient”. This survey question was implemented in the SOEP only in
2008. The risk preference question is worded in the same manner: “How do you see
yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try
to avoid taking risks?” Answers were given on an 11-point scale, where zero means
“unwilling to take risks” and 10 means “fully prepared to take risks”. This question
was included in the 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009 waves. The general risk question has
been studied in various papers and has been validated using incentivized experiments
in representative samples as well as through behavioral evidence in Dohmen, Falk,
Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011). In 2005 the SOEP contained six
items to measure reciprocal inclinations, three items each on positive and negative
reciprocity. Examples for positive and negative reciprocity are as follows: “If someone
does me a favor, I am prepared to return it” and “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take
revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the costs”. Participants expressed how
well these six statements apply to them on a seven-point Likert scale. For a detailed
description see Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009). Standard trust questions
were included in the 2003 and 2008 waves, using three sub-statements about whether
“one can trust people”, whether “in these times one can’t rely on anybody else” and
whether “when dealing with strangers it is better to be cautious”. Answers were given
on a five-point scale ranging from “totally agree” to “totally disagree”. Finally, our
survey measure for altruism is the answer to the question of how important it is for
the participant “to be there for others”. Answers were given on a four-point scale.
The altruism question was asked in the 2004 and 2008 waves.
Personality Measures The 2005 and 2009 waves of the SOEP contained the BFI-
S questionnaire, developed by Gerlitz and Schupp (2005). The locus of control was
elicited in 2005 using Rotter’s (1966) locus of control scale. Both inventories were
also used in our laboratory experimental data (see Section 2.1.2 for more details on
17The behavioral validity of this question with respect to incentivized experiments is documented
in Vischer, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2013).
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the BFI-S and the locus of control scale).
2.3 Research Strategy
To answer the question of whether measures of personality and economic prefer-
ences are closely linked we first study the raw correlations between these measures.
High correlations would indicate some degree of substitutability. Low correlations,
conversely, would suggest that the two measurement systems are complementary
concepts in explaining heterogeneity in behavior. Whether a correlation should be
interpreted as “high” or “low” is of course always debatable. We therefore first look
at statistical significance levels. Statistical significance, however, can also be found
for correlations that are low in terms of effect size (Cohen, 1992). Following con-
ventions in the social sciences we interpret effect sizes, i.e., correlations r, as rather
“low” if r is between 0.1 and 0.3, as “medium” if r is between 0.3 and 0.5 and as
“large” if r is larger than 0.5. Because the analysis of correlations is restricted to
linear relations, we also check for potential non-linear associations by conducting
non-parametric regressions. In particular, we look at kernel-weighted local linear
polynomial regressions.
We then check to see whether measures of personality and preferences are sub-
stitutes or complements in terms of their explanatory power for life outcomes. In
particular, we conduct linear regressions and assess the explanatory power of the
two concepts by reporting levels of adjusted R2. In these regressions, measures
of personality and preferences are included individually as well as jointly. If the
two measurement systems are substitutes, adjusted R2 in the combined regressions
should not be distinctly higher than in regressions that include only one of the two
concepts. The opposite should hold for complements. Additionally, we investigate
model selection criteria in these regressions. We check for robustness using binary
and ordered choice models as well as more comprehensive specifications including
square terms and cross-products of all regressors.
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2.4 Results
In this section we discuss our main findings. To ease comparison between data sets
and measures, we standardized all experimental as well as all personality measures
for the data analysis.
2.4.1 Correlation Structure
Experimental Data
Table 2.2 displays the 36 raw correlations of the personality and economic preference
measures obtained from the laboratory experiments. A first inspection of Table 2.2
reveals that only 11 of these 36 correlations are statistically significant at the 5% or
1% level.18 All correlation coefficients are smaller than 0.3 in absolute value. Hence
there is no correlation with a “medium” effect size or larger. Moreover, of the 36
correlations only 11 exceed 0.1 in absolute value and only 1 slightly exceeds 0.2.19
Table 2.2 also shows that among all personality factors agreeableness exhibits
the highest and statistically most significant correlations with measures of economic
preferences. It is significantly correlated with measures for positive and negative
reciprocity, trust and altruism (all p-values < 0.01) as well as with time preference
(p-value < 0.05). Correlations with social preferences range between 0.1 and 0.3 in
absolute value, indicating a small effect size according to the classification of Cohen
(1988). The high frequency of significant correlations of agreeableness with social
preferences is not surprising as the former is defined as “the tendency to act in a
cooperative, unselfish manner,...” (see Table 2.5).
The finding of only moderate correlations between preference and personality
measures does not necessarily indicate that these constructs are weakly connected;
it indicates only that there are weak linear relations. For example, a perfect U-shaped
relation between a personality factor and a preference would result in an insignificant
linear correlation. To explore the possibility of non-linear relationships we therefore
18Five additional correlations are weakly significant, i.e., significant at the 10% significance level.
19Results qualitatively stay the same when investigating Spearman correlations instead of Pear-
son correlations (see Table 2.6 in the appendix). Moreover, when looking at a potential linear
mapping, i.e., linear regressions of either the Big Five on preferences or vice versa, R2 is always
below 10%.
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Table 2.2: Pearson correlation structure experimental data set
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism LoC
Time 0.0370 0.0057 −0.0084 0.1026∗∗ −0.0518 0.0847
Risk −0.0379 −0.0611 0.0762∗ 0.0202 −0.1201∗∗∗ 0.0434
Pos. Reciprocity 0.1724∗∗∗ 0.0140 0.0211 0.2042∗∗∗ 0.0361 0.0152
Neg. Reciprocity −0.0885∗ −0.0393 0.0943∗ −0.1451∗∗∗ −0.0136 −0.1418∗∗
Trust 0.1232∗∗∗ −0.1300∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.1665∗∗∗ −0.0134 −0.0140
Altruism 0.1242∗∗ −0.0979∗ 0.0249 0.1911∗∗∗ 0.0847∗ 0.0480
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Correlations between economic preferences
and the Big Five were calculated using 394 - 477 observations. Correlations between economic preferences and locus of
control were calculated using between 254 - 315 observations. All measures are standardized.
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estimate kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions.20 In each regression,
we restrict the sample to a range of four standard deviations around the mean of
each variable to circumvent an analysis biased by outliers. Therefore, the results are
calculated using 70% to 97% of all observations. The predicted regressions are dis-
played in Figure 2.2. Although sometimes there are small deviations from linearity
at the boundaries, the overall picture strongly suggests a linear relation in the vast
majority of combinations.
Summarizing our analysis of the laboratory experimental data, we find that asso-
ciations between preference and personality measures are linear and that the degree
of association is rather low, suggesting a complementary relationship. We next turn
to the question of whether the correlation patterns observed in student samples can
be replicated in a sample that is representative of the adult population.
Representative Experimental Data
Table 2.3: Pearson correlation structure representative experimental data
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism
Time −0.0080 −0.0682 −0.0655 −0.0830∗ −0.0602
Risk 0.1356∗∗∗ −0.0720 0.0757 −0.0941∗∗ −0.0290
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All measures are
standardized.
Table 2.3 shows the correlations between the outcomes from the risk and time ex-
periments and the personality traits. As above, the measure for time is reversed so
that higher values indicate higher patience. In terms of significance the pattern is
similar to the one in the laboratory study. Only one correlation is significant at the
1%-level, one is significant at the 5%-level and one is significant at the 10%-level. In
terms of effect size, only the coefficient of the association between openness and risk
preferences exceeds the 0.1 benchmark to be classified as a small correlation (Cohen,
1988).21 Interestingly, the sign is positive, in contrast to our laboratory data. The
20We use the Epanechikov kernel and bandwidth is selected via the plugin estimator of the
asymptotically optimal constant bandwidth.
21Results qualitatively stay the same when investigating Spearman correlations instead of Pear-
son correlations (see Table 2.7 in the appendix).
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other two significant coefficients are even smaller. The analysis of representative
data therefore confirms that the level of association between preference personality
measures is rather small. However, we can draw this conclusion only with respect to
time and risk preferences, as we do not have experimental data on trust and social
preferences. We next analyze whether these findings also hold when looking at all
preference measures in a large representative sample.
Representative Panel Data
In this section, we study whether our findings from the experiments generalize to
a large representative sample using survey rather than experimental instruments
for measuring economic preferences. Table 2.4 shows the raw correlations between
personality measures and economic preferences using 14,243 observations from the
SOEP. Given the large number of observations it is not surprising to find a large
number of significant correlation coefficients (p-values < 0.05 for all correlation co-
efficients). In terms of effect size, however, only two correlations are of “medium”
size, i.e., larger than 0.3. Of the reported 36 correlations, 18 can be classified as
“small”, whereas 16 correlations are even below 0.1. This confirms the overall pic-
ture that emerged from the analysis of the two experimental data sets.22 A closer
comparison of the SOEP survey measures with our experimental measures further
reveals large similarities. As reported above, 11 correlations are significant at the
5% level in the experimental data. Ten of these correlations have the same sign and
are significant at the 1% level using survey data. Moreover, as it is the case in the
laboratory data set, the personality trait agreeableness exhibits the highest corre-
lations with economic preferences, in particular social preferences. Although there
are small differences in the results compared with the experimental data set (i.e.,
seven of the 36 correlation coefficients show a different sign), the general pattern
emerging from the SOEP measures is consistent with our previous findings. Of the
seven correlation coefficients only two are (weakly) significant in the experimental
data set. Nevertheless, the inconsistency of signs brings into question the conjecture
22Results qualitatively stay the same when investigating Spearman correlations instead of Pear-
son correlations (see Table 2.8 in the appendix). Moreover, when looking at a potential linear
mapping, i.e., linear regressions of either the Big Five on preferences or vice versa, R2 is always
around 15% with the exception of agreeableness, where R2 reaches 28%.
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Table 2.4: Pearson correlation structure between personality measures and economic preferences from
SOEP observations
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism LoC
Time 0.0183∗∗ 0.1122∗∗∗ −0.0415∗∗∗ 0.3122∗∗∗ −0.0584∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗
Risk 0.2793∗∗∗ −0.0400∗∗∗ 0.2601∗∗∗ −0.1454∗∗∗ −0.0996∗∗∗ 0.1521∗∗∗
Pos. Reciprocity 0.1814∗∗∗ 0.2520∗∗∗ 0.1473∗∗∗ 0.1842∗∗∗ 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗∗
Neg. Reciprocity −0.0522∗∗∗ −0.1558∗∗∗ −0.0264∗∗∗ −0.3756∗∗∗ 0.0612∗∗∗ −0.2154∗∗∗
Trust 0.1272∗∗∗ −0.0680∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗ 0.0945∗∗∗ −0.1919∗∗∗ 0.2094∗∗∗
Altruism 0.1756∗∗∗ 0.1495∗∗∗ 0.1670∗∗∗ 0.2557∗∗∗ 0.0908∗∗∗ 0.0874∗∗∗
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Correlations are calculated using 14,243
observations. All measures are standardized.
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that correlations are universally identical (i.e., identical irrespective of age or other
person characteristics). We return to this aspect in the final section.
We conclude this section with an analysis of potential non-linearities between our
SOEP preference and personality measures. As for the laboratory experimental data,
we perform kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions restricting the sam-
ple in each regression to four standard deviations above and below the mean. The
resulting subsamples represent 92% to 97% of the observations of the main sample.
The predicted functions presented in Figure 2.3 show no particular non-linearities,
except for some splines at the left ends of the considered range. Thus, analogous
to the experimental data set, it is not the case that systematic non-linearities bias
correlation coefficients.
Explanatory Power for Life Outcomes
Figure 2.1: Adjusted R2 for Life Outcomes
Adjusted R2’s for linear regressions for life outcomes. The number of observations available varies
for the different life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage
(7,199), unemployed (9,095), and years of education (13,768). Gross wage measures the gross
hourly wage.
All reported correlation structures indicate that personality and preference mea-
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sures are far from perfectly substitutable. To determine whether they actually com-
plement each other, we now analyze their explanatory power with respect to impor-
tant life outcomes. To that end we again use data from the SOEP. In particular,
we consider the following outcomes: subjective health, life satisfaction, gross wage,
being unemployed and years of education. For each outcome we estimate linear re-
gression models in which outcomes are regressed on the set of economic preferences,
the Big Five and the locus of control, separately as well as jointly.23 The idea is to
assess the explanatory power of each concept in isolation and in combination. This
enables us to check the extent to which explanatory power increases when combining
the concepts and thus allows us to reach conclusions regarding the degree of their
complementarity. The criterion used to compare differences in explanatory power is
adjusted R2.
All life outcomes we use come from the 2009 wave of the SOEP. Subjective health
was measured on a five-point-scale, from “very good” to “bad”. We reverse the an-
swer scale such that higher values indicate a better subjective health status. Life
satisfaction was elicited using the question “How satisfied are you with your life, all
things considered?”, which was answered on an 11-point-scale (with higher values
indicating higher life satisfaction). Our measure for gross hourly wage is the gross
monthly wage divided by monthly working hours.24 Unemployment status is a bi-
nary variable equal to one if the person was unemployed at the time of the survey
and zero otherwise. The variable years of education is created by adding up years of
schooling and additional occupational training (including university).25
Figure 2.1 shows adjusted R2’s for the different life outcomes. R2 values for the
three concepts – Big Five, Locus of Control and economic preferences – in isola-
tion range from 1% to 10% and vary both between concepts and outcomes. Thus,
they contribute to explaining heterogeneity in important life outcomes.26 More im-
portant in light of our research question, however, is that the explanatory power is
23The corresponding regressions are shown in Table 2.9 in the appendix.
24Monthly working hours are calculated as the average weekly working hours multiplied by four.
25For each school degree and occupational training (including university) official standard grad-
uation times in years are used for the calculation.
26In the explanation of life outcomes such as gross wages, unemployment and years of education
the preference for work versus leisure would probably play a key role. However, no question related
to this preference was included in the survey.
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considerably larger when combining the Big Five, the locus of control and economic
preferences compared to using each concept individually. Moreover, explanatory
power is always maximized when all three concepts are included in the regression,
hereafter referred to as the full model. In this case, resulting adjusted R2 values
reach levels of about 6% to 18%. This clearly indicates the existence of important
complementarities among the different concepts.27
Because the question here is one of model selection, we also employ model selec-
tion criteria (in particular the Akaike and Bayesian information criterion) to check
whether the full model is also chosen by model selection criteria. As can be seen in
Table 2.10 in the appendix this is the case for all life outcomes considered, corrobo-
rating our previous results. We perform the same analysis using binary and ordered
choice models when appropriate. Again, the full model is chosen by the model se-
lection criteria in all cases. As another robustness check we consider more flexible
models: Along with including each predictor linearly in our regressions we also in-
clude square terms and all possible cross-products (see Table 2.11 in the appendix).
Again the full model obtains the highest adjusted R2 measures when using ordinary-
least-squares estimation and is also chosen by the information criteria in nearly all
cases.28 Results are again robust for employing binary and ordered choice models
when appropriate. Moreover, in all models considered the joint hypothesis that all
coefficients are equal to zero is always rejected at the 1% level (Tables 2.10 and
2.11 in the appendix). In summary, sizeable complementarities among the different
concepts are corroborated in all robustness checks.
2.5 Discussion
In this review we examine the relation between economic preferences and personality
using three different data sets. We find no indication for a strong linear or a non-
linear association between the two. Thus we conclude that the two concepts cannot
27For an overview over the raw correlations between each preference and personality trait and
life outcomes see Figure 2.4 and 2.5 in Section 2.6.
28Only the Bayesian information criterion chooses a model just including the locus of control
when it comes to explaining gross wage and unemployment. However, this is not surprising given
the number of regressors included and the tendency of Bayesian information criterion to choose
parsimonious models.
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substitute for each other. In fact, with regard to explaining heterogeneity in life out-
comes, we find that the two concepts play complementary roles. Our findings imply
that researchers in economics and psychology can benefit greatly from the respective
disciplines when looking for potential sources of heterogeneity in life outcomes.
The finding of a rather low association between economic preferences and psy-
chological measures of personality is perhaps not surprising. First, both concepts
are constructed in very different ways. Whereas preferences are rooted in utility
theory, derived in terms of specific functional forms of utility functions, the Big Five
personality indicators originate in language analysis. Second, the Big Five measure
rather broad aspects of personality. In particular, each dimension of the Big Five is
by itself already an aggregation of different attitudes or subfacets. Thus, although
our results show low associations between personality and economic preferences, we
cannot exclude the possibility that there is a stronger degree of association between
economic preferences and subfacets of the five personality traits. The trait extraver-
sion, for example, comprises different attitudes, such as being “relatively outgoing,
gregarious, sociable, and openly expressive” (see Table 2.5), measured by 12 different
questions in the NEO-FFI or three different questions in the BFI-S. In other words,
each personality measure is not only comprises multiple items, but more importantly
captures distinct aspects of a character trait. Economic preferences, conversely, are
defined more narrowly. For example, the concept of time preferences refers to the
individual’s willingness to abstain from something in the present in order to benefit
from that decision in the future. Although this concept is applicable to different do-
mains (e.g., to health outcomes or financial decision making) the underlying concept
remains the same and is measured by standard incentivized experiments or survey
items as employed in this study. In this sense, our preference measures might resem-
ble the subordinate aspects of the five personality factors.
Third, the finding of strong complementarities between economic preferences and
personality measures may simply reflect conceptual differences in the way economic
and psychological models are constructed. The economic model explains hetero-
geneity in behavior in terms of three distinct components: preferences, beliefs and
constraints, such as abilities. In contrast, psychological measures such as the Big
Five include notions of preferences as well as beliefs and constraints. In other words,
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in our analysis we correlate economic preferences at least partly with beliefs and
constraints, which by construction should not necessarily be correlated. A good ex-
ample is conscientiousness. Being able and willing to work hard and being organized
comprises aspects of both, preferences and personal abilities. Likewise, emotional in-
stability, which is part of the neuroticism facet, is related to personal inability rather
than a preference. Even more extreme is the case of the locus of control, which is
clearly a belief rather than a preference. This does not rule out the possibility that
the two concepts are related, for example, because an external locus of control is
conducive to the development of impatient behavior: if it does not pay off to invest
because life circumstances are predominantly determined by circumstances beyond
my control, the willingness to forgo current consumption and wait in order to earn a
return in the future makes little sense. Yet, beliefs and preferences are two distinct
concepts.
The main focus of this review is the rather weak association and complementary
nature of economic and psychological measures of personality. We do not discuss the
specific signs of the correlations or ways to integrate personality into the economic
model. Important work in this direction has been done by Almlund, Duckworth,
Heckman, and Kautz, 2011. Many signs of the correlations reported above are con-
sistent across the three data sets, in particular those that are significant. For exam-
ple, in all three data sets risk attitudes and extraversion are positively correlated,
and risk and neuroticism are negatively correlated. There are important exceptions,
however. In the student sample, for example, risk attitudes and openness are nega-
tively correlated, whereas they are positively and significantly negatively correlated
in the two representative data sets. These and other inconsistencies raise important
questions. One possible reason for finding different signs is the use of different elicita-
tion methods for economic preferences (experiments and survey responses). Another
possibility is that the reported correlations vary over the life-cycle. If traits develop
with different speed and at different points in life correlations should vary with age.
This could explain differences between a relatively young student sample and the
representative samples. Not much is known about how economic preferences develop
over the life-cycle but at least for risk attitudes there seems to be a robust and large
negative age effect on willingness to take risks (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde,
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Schupp, and Wagner, 2011). Another possibility is that preferences and personal-
ity are generically differentially correlated between specific groups of the population
(e.g., varying by gender, age, height or education). From an evolutionary perspec-
tive the co-evolution of traits may serve different purposes depending on specific life
circumstances. It may be “optimal” for one subgroup of the population to develop
a positive correlation among particular traits, whereas for another subgroup it is
adaptive to form a negative correlation. More work needs to be done to uncover
potential group-specific correlations between personality and preferences.
The approach taken above is agnostic in the sense that we simply correlate ex-
isting and important measurement systems as they are. We think this is an impor-
tant exercise but it can only be a first step. What is needed is the development
of a comprehensive framework that combines insights from the approaches taken
by economists and psychologists to capture sources of heterogeneity in behavior.
It is surprising that the Big Five apparently misses important preferences such as
attitudes towards risk and time. Similarly, the economic model is incomplete not
only with respect to important preferences, but also with respect to heterogeneity in
abilities and beliefs. In the standard economic framework, beliefs are assumed to be
endogenous to the strategic situation and formed in a rational way. Perhaps, with the
exception of interpersonal trust, beliefs are typically assumed to follow common prior
assumptions and rational updating. The role of the locus of control in explaining
fundamental life outcomes on top of preferences, however, reveals the importance of
enduring and individual specific belief systems. Other examples include optimism,
pessimism, religious beliefs and ideological beliefs. The stability of belief hetero-
geneity is not well understood. It probably originates in different priors inherited
from parents, self-selection into peer groups and institutions with reinforcing belief
characteristics and boundedly rational belief formation, such as selected perception,
non-Bayesian updating and ego utility (Ko¨szegi, 2006). Regardless of the precise
channels that support enduring heterogeneous beliefs, economics would largely ben-
efit from measuring and including them in explanations of economic outcomes. In
addition, economists have started to model the fact that preferences and beliefs are
intimately related and not separable as traditionally assumed. In fact, people often
want to believe certain things, for example, in terms of being liked by others or be-
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ing better than others (overconfidence). Finally, another important extension of the
economic model would be the measurement of person-specific abilities. Whereas IQ
has become a standard individual-specific characteristic to be included in outcome
regressions, little work has acknowledged the importance of other competencies cap-
tured by Big Five traits, for example, the role of conscientiousness for educational
or labor market outcomes.
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2.6 Appendix to Chapter 2
Table 2.5: Definitions of the Big Five Domains
Big Five Domain APA Dictionary Definition
Openness Individual differences in the tendency to be open
to new aesthetic, cultural, and intellectual experiences.
Conscientiousness The tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking;
located at one end of a dimension of individual differences:
conscientiousness vs. lack of direction.
Extraversion An orientation of one’s interests and energies toward the
outer world of people and things rather than the inner
world of subjective experience; includes the quality of being
more outgoing, gregarious, sociable, and openly expressive.
Agreeableness The tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner;
located at one end of a dimension of individual
differences: agreeableness vs. disagreeableness.
Neuroticism A chronic level of emotional instability
and proneness to psychological distress.
This table is in parts reproduced from Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and ter Weel (2008).
Table 2.7: Spearman correlation structure representative experimental data
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism
Time −0.0199 −0.0737 −0.0764∗ −0.0829∗ −0.0598
Risk 0.1315∗ −0.0744 0.0661 −0.0854∗ −0.0261
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. All measures are standardized.
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Table 2.6: Spearman correlation structure experimental data set
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism LoC
Time 0.0388 0.0162 −0.0114 0.1077∗∗ −0.0684 0.1063∗
Risk 0.0027 −0.0486 0.0786∗ 0.0206 −0.0995∗∗ 0.0485
Pos. Reciprocity 0.1606∗∗∗ 0.0078 0.0177 0.2029∗∗∗ 0.0152 0.0441
Neg. Reciprocity −0.0967∗ −0.0221 0.0462 −0.083∗ −0.0165 −0.1376∗∗
Trust 0.1354∗∗∗ −0.1198∗∗∗ 0.002 0.1696∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.0648
Altruism 0.0969∗ −0.0804 0.0034 0.2000∗∗∗ 0.0879∗ 0.0418
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Correlations between economic preferences
and the Big Five were calculated using 394 - 477 observations. Correlations between economic preferences and Locus of
Control were calculated using 254 - 315 observations. All measures are standardized.
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Table 2.8: Spearman Correlation Structure SOEP
Openness Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism LoC
Time 0.0233 0.1192 −0.0342 0.3099 −0.0643 0.0709
Risk 0.2632 −0.0500 0.2452 −0.1496 −0.1049 0.1426
Pos. Reciprocity 0.1835 0.2622 0.1547 0.1947 0.0808 0.1041
Neg. Reciprocity −0.0616 −0.1767 −0.0426 −0.3853 0.0572 −0.2257
Trust 0.1224 −0.0693 0.0523 0.0788 −0.1889 0.2012
Altruism 0.1693 0.1501 0.1602 0.2416 0.0860 0.0843
All correlations are significant at the 1% level and are calculated using 14,243 observations. All measures are standardized.
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Table 2.9: Outcome Regressions: Representative Experimental Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Life Outcomes Subj. Health Life Satisf. Gross Wage Unemployed Years of Educ.
Openness 0.043*** 0.123*** 0.989*** -0.018*** 0.667***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.162) (0.004) (0.027)
Conscientiousn. 0.038*** 0.106*** 0.565*** -0.014*** -0.182***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.161) (0.004) (0.026)
Extraversion 0.026*** 0.134*** -1.201*** 0.006* -0.309***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.154) (0.004) (0.026)
Agreeableness 0.033*** 0.139*** -1.288*** 0.023*** -0.146***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.165) (0.004) (0.028)
Neuroticism -0.140*** -0.186*** -1.009*** 0.018*** -0.272***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.158) (0.004) (0.026)
LoC 0.105*** 0.307*** 1.899*** -0.043*** 0.421***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.145) (0.003) (0.024)
Patience 0.024*** 0.129*** -0.343** 0.001 -0.151***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.136) (0.003) (0.023)
Risk 0.131*** 0.076*** 0.415** 0.003 0.210***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.166) (0.004) (0.027)
Pos. Recip. -0.035*** 0.006 0.388*** -0.002 0.005
(0.008) (0.015) (0.140) (0.003) (0.023)
Neg. Recip. 0.064*** 0.039** -0.329** 0.006* -0.137***
(0.008) (0.015) (0.147) (0.003) (0.024)
Trust 0.122*** 0.308*** 1.763*** -0.035*** 0.587***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.145) (0.003) (0.024)
Altruism 0.070*** 0.072*** -0.780*** 0.005 0.084***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.152) (0.003) (0.025)
Constant 3.300*** 6.852*** 16.100*** 0.099*** 12.346***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.131) (0.003) (0.021)
Observations 14,218 14,214 7,199 9,095 13,768
Adj. R-squared 0.108 0.159 0.0919 0.0547 0.174
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All measures
are standardized.
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Figure 2.2: Kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions using experimental
data
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Figure 2.3: Kernel-weighted local linear polynomial regressions using SOEP data
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Figure 2.4: Correlation Coefficients Between Preference Measures and Life
Outcomes Using SOEP Data
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Pearson correlation coefficients between preference measures and life outcomes using SOEP data.
Trust always shows the strongest association with life outcomes. More trust and a higher willingness
to take risk are always related to better life outcomes, e.g. better health and greater life satisfaction,
whereas negative reciprocity is associated with less life satisfaction and lower wages. The number
of observations available varies for the different life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satis-
faction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095), years of education (13,768). Gross wage
measures the gross hourly wage.
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Figure 2.5: Correlation Coefficients Between Personality Measures and Life
Outcomes Using SOEP Data
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Pearson correlation coefficients between personality measures and life outcomes using SOEP data.
The locus of control and neuroticism show the strongest associations with life outcomes. A more
internal locus of control is always related to better outcomes (e.g. better health or more life
satisfaction), whereas a higher degree of neuroticism is associated with lower wages or a higher
probability of being unemployed. The number of observations available varies for the different life
outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed
(9,095), years of education (13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
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Table 2.10: Linear representation of outcome regressions
Subjective Health (OLS) Subjective Health (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0561 0.0383 0.0688 0.0975 0.1075 0.0220 0.0145 0.0268 0.0388 0.0429
F-Test/LR-Test 170.04 567.35 176.01 140.59 143.72 834.99 550.62 1016.47 1471.22 1627.11
AIC 37833 38094 37641 37201 37043 37139 37415 36960 36515 36361
BIC 37878 38109 37694 37292 37142 37207 37453 37035 36628 36482
Life Satisfaction (OLS) Life Satisfaction (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0899 0.0782 0.0917 0.1342 0.1588 0.0261 0.0219 0.0256 0.0390 0.0467
F-Test/LR-Test 281.88 1206.91 240.08 201.27 224.67 1406.38 1178.16 1376.73 2098.73 2513.61
AIC 55038 55216 55012 54335 53926 52448 52668 52480 51768 51355
BIC 55083 55231 55065 54426 54024 52561 52751 52601 51926 51521
Gross Wage(OLS)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC - - - - -
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0361 0.0388 0.0456 0.0704 0.0919 - - - - -
F-Test/LR-Test 54.97 291.20 58.31 50.57 61.71 - - - - -
AIC 55088 55088 55042 54857 54690 - - - - -
BIC 55102 55102 55090 54940 54779 - - - - -
Unemployed (OLS) Unemployed (probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0191 0.0331 0.0245 0.0375 0.0547 0.0322 0.0527 0.0412 0.0648 0.0926
F-Test/LR-Test 36.34 312.13 39.05 33.22 44.82 180.12 294.52 230.37 361.89 517.42
AIC 3067 2932 3017 2900 2738 5420 5298 5372 5250 5097
BIC 3110 2946 3067 2986 2830 5463 5312 5422 5336 5189
Years of Education (OLS) Years of Education (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 0.0914 0.0525 0.1061 0.1545 0.1736 0.0209 0.0126 0.0241 0.0359 0.0415
F-Test/LR-Test 277.93 763.89 273.29 229.74 242.03 1355.80 817.10 1563.14 2329.14 2688.38
AIC 65506 66078 65282 64520 64206 63490 64021 63285 62529 62171
BIC 65551 66093 65335 64610 64304 63641 64141 63443 62724 62375
For the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) models we calculate R2, whereas for the ordinal models we calculate
pseudo R2. The joint significance of all coefficients is tested using the F-test (OLS) and the LR-test (ordinal
models). All F- and LR-tests are significant at the 1% level. With regard to the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the smallest value for each outcome regression is underlined.
Note that the full model (including the Big 5, locus of control and preferences) is always chosen by both
information criteria. The number of observations available varies for the different life outcomes: subjective
health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095 obs.), and years of education
(13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
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Table 2.11: Outcome Regressions: Flexible Specification
Subjective Health (OLS) Subjective Health (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0632 .0388 .0714 .1054 .1165 .0251 .0146 .0282 .0435 .0483
F-Test/LR-Test 48.99 288.17 41.48 22.75 21.83 952.98 555.19 1068.56 1651.38 1834.03
AIC 37740 38088 37623 37142 36977 37051 37413 36949 36467 36310
BIC 37899 38110 37834 37732 37665 37232 37458 37184 37079 37021
Life Satisfaction (OLS) Life Satisfaction (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0948 .0783 .0948 .1397 .1659 .0278 .0219 .0273 .0422 .0505
F-Test/LR-Test 75.47 605.45 56.12 30.967 32.41 1493.78 1178.45 1470.26 2273.51 2715.76
AIC 54976 55214 54984 54311 53884 52391 52670 52428 51725 51309
BIC 55135 55237 55196 54901 54572 52617 52761 52708 52383 52065
Gross Wage(OLS)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC - - - - -
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0382 .0387 .0527 .0797 .1039 - - - - -
F-Test/LR-Test 15.30 145.74 15.84 9.092 10.27 - - - - -
AIC 55111 55090 55009 54851 54672 - - - - -
BIC 55256 55111 55202 55388 55298 - - - - -
Unemployed (OLS) Unemployed (probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .0212 .0385 .0291 .0463 .0705 .0357 .0539 .0498 .0852 .1166
F-Test/LR-Test 10.87 183.13 11.11 6.73 8.66 199.54 301.02 278.38 475.96 651.83
AIC 3062 2882 2995 2882 2662 5431 5294 5366 5268 5118
BIC 3211 2903 3194 3437 3309 5580 5314 5565 5823 5766
Years of Education (OLS) Years of Education (o. probit)
Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC Big5 LoC Pref Big5-Pref Big5-Pref-LoC
adj. R2/pseudo R2 .1043 .0525 .1200 .1771 .1982 .0243 .0126 .0281 .0433 .0497
F-Test/LR-Test 81.13 382.50 70.55 39.48 38.81 1575.60 817.25 1819.82 2808.59 3223.85
AIC 65324 66079 65087 64213 63869 63300 64023 63070 62181 61792
BIC 65482 66102 65297 64800 64554 63564 64151 63386 62874 62583
The outcome variables are regressed on the indicated personality and preference measures. The difference
with regard to the linear specification is that the model includes squares of all variables as well as all cross-
products. Cross-products are also calculated between concepts in case more than one concept is included,
e.g., in the Big 5-preferences case, we also include the cross-term neuroticism*risk. For the ordinary-least-
squares (OLS) models we calculate R2, whereas for the ordinal models we calculate pseudo-R2. The joint
significance of all coefficients is tested using the F-test (OLS models) and the LR-test (ordinal models). All
F- and LR-tests are significant at the 1% level. With regard to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the smallest value for each outcome regression is underlined. Note
that the full model (including the Big 5, locus of control and preferences) is chosen by both information
criteria in nearly all cases; only for gross wage and unemployment does the BIC indicate that the model with
only LoC and LoC2 included should be used. The number of observations available varies for the different
life outcomes: subjective health (14,218), life satisfaction (14,214), gross wage (7,199), unemployed (9,095),
and years of education (13,768). Gross wage measures the gross hourly wage.
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Chapter3
The Preference Survey Module: A
Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk,
Time, and Social Preferences
3.1 Introduction
Individuals’ preferences - next to individuals’ beliefs and their constraints - largely
determine their choices and are thus fundaments of virtually all types of outcomes,
e.g. educational attainment, labor market success, health status or life satisfaction.1
Experimental economics offers a clean and reliable way to measure of these prefer-
ences: by conducting incentivized experiments. However, in non-laboratory settings,
e.g. in representative samples or multinational studies, it is practically impossible
due to budget, time or administrative constraints to obtain incentivized experimen-
tal measures. Nevertheless, it is highly desirable to have reliable preference measures
for these settings. Empirical economics - like many other empirical sciences - often
relies on survey measures to assess individual preferences. Since survey measures
1Empirically, risk aversion, time preferences, altruism, trust, positive reciprocity and negative
reciprocity have all been shown to predict wide range of choices at the individual level – ranging, e.g.,
from financial decision-making, to educational choices, labor market behavior, charitable giving, and
social norm enforcement and health outcomes (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2009 ; Dohmen et al., 2011;
Fehr et al., 2002; Kirby et al., 1999; Komlos et al., 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Smith et al., 2005;
Tanaka et al., 2010) – and are associated with important life outcomes at the individual level (e.g.,
Becker et al., 2012) as well as with economic outcomes at the organization level (e.g., LaPorta et
al., 1997) and the aggregate level (e.g., Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and
Knack, 2001).
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lack incentives, it is unclear whether and how precisely they actually measure the
underlying trait or whether they are confounded otherwise, e.g. by respondents’ as-
sociations or inattention. Moreover, the variety of survey measures is wide-ranging,
from short subjective self-assessments to lengthy hypothetical scenarios, and it is an
open question which of these survey measures are superior to others.
This paper develops the first comprehensive, experimentally-validated survey
module for measuring risk aversion, time discounting, trust, altruism, positive and
negative reciprocity. In contrast to previous studies, which have typically focused on
developing a survey measure of a single preference, our module covers preferences in
six dimensions and provides validated measures using a consistent framework.2 Our
main criterion in the item selection process was explanatory power with respect to
behavior in the incentivized experiments. In our item selection process, we system-
atically test a large battery of candidate questions, including many questions that
have been used in previous studies of preferences, as well as new questions. This is
an important feature because the resulting preference module not only consists of
survey questions that predict behavior, it is composed of the best predictors out of
a large set of candidate measures.
We propose a module that involves two survey items for the elicitation of each
preference, trading off parsimony and explanatory power. This module provides a
way to measure preferences without the cost of financial incentives, while preserving
a good level of explanatory power. The preference module is symmetric, in that most
preferences are measured with one quantitative and one qualitative item. Typically,
the quantitative item is a hypothetical version of the experiment itself.3 The second
survey item that is selected for our module is a qualitative question, asking about
a general orientation in the relevant preference dimension. The module thus offers
an attractive balance between measures that allow inferring (cardinal) preference
2Fehr et al. (2003), for example, examine six different attitudinal trust questions in terms of
their ability to predict behavior in a trust game as introduced by Berg et al. (1995), and find that
self-rated trusting behavior and willingness to trust strangers are most strongly associated with
behavior in the incentivized experiment. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that self-rated willingness
to take risk “in general” is significantly correlated with decisions in an incentivized lottery choice
experiment. Vischer et al. (2013) relate answers to a survey question asking respondents to rate
their general level of impatience to behavior in an experiment involving inter-temporal trade-offs.
3Naturally, this items usually also turns out to be the single best predictor of behavior in the
experiment as well
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parameters, and subjective measures that capture other contexts besides choices
involving monetary tradeoffs.
It turns out some of the survey items that are selected by our methodology have
been shown in previous studies to be behaviorally valid in various populations. For
example, the same qualitative measure of risk preference that is selected for our
module has been shown to predict behavior in an incentivized risk experiment with
a representative sample of German adults (Dohmen et al., 2011). Notably, the corre-
lation between the survey measure and experiment observed in their representative
sample is virtually the same as that found in our validation exercise. Other research
shows that the same survey question about risk preference predicts behavior in in-
centivized experiments in 30 different countries (Vieider et al., 2013). Thus, there
are strong indications that the types of measures selected for our module have good
predictive power in representative and cross-cultural samples.
In our construction of the survey module we took into account several consid-
erations. We strove to reduce measurement error in the experimental preference
measures by having subjects participate in more than one experiment for a given
preference and averaging over both choice-based preference measures. We designed
the validation to limit spurious interdependencies in decision-making in the experi-
ments and response behavior in the survey items by never asking survey questions
relating to a particular preference in the same session in which the experiments to
elicit the respective preference were conducted. Instead, experiments and surveys for
a given preference were conducted one week apart. We restricted the subject pool
to university students who had never participated in an experiment before, in order
to rule out possible biases in behavior due to experiences in previous experiments.
Out item selection procedure was extensive: we considered all possible combinations
of a given number of survey items and chose the combination that best explained
behavior in the experimental preference elicitation task.
We also offer a second, streamlined version of the preference module for applica-
tions in which time efficiency, and simplicity, are of paramount importance. A prime
example is the case of an international telephone survey measuring preferences; with
the telephone format and such a large-scale data collection effort, time constraints
are likely to be severe. In the streamlined module some of the hypothetical experi-
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ments were exchanged with more time efficient quantitative measures, which perform
almost as well as the more extended versions in terms of association with the incen-
tivized experimental measures. Other quantitative items that are relatively complex
or difficult to explain were dropped altogether from the set of possible items. After
selecting the items with best explanatory power from the modified battery of ques-
tions, we tested the performance of the resulting module in an international pilot
study.4 The streamlined module was implementable within tight time constraints,
and detailed feedback elicited from respondents was encouraging in terms of con-
firming a common understanding of the preference module across a very diverse set
of cultures. The feedback lead to a few minor wording changes that are incorporated
in this version of the module.
Both versions of our preference module are of great use for scientists interested
in measuring economic preferences. Our methodology leverages the strengths of
both experimental and survey approaches to measuring preferences. It encompasses
measures for six key economic preferences as provided conceptually by economic
theory. It also offers an opportunity to standardize preference measures in non-
experimental settings in order to increase comparability across studies and thereby
accelerate scientific progress.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the de-
sign of the validation study and the procedures to elicit preferences in experiments
and surveys. Section 3.3 explains the process and the criteria for the selection of
items. It also presents the preference module with two items for measuring each
of the six preferences, which performs best in out-of-sample prediction. Section 3.4
discusses additional important properties of the preference module, such as explana-
tory power and its suitability for non-student subject pools. Section 3.5 proposes
the streamlined version of the preference module and discusses its applicability in
representative and cross-cultural samples. Section 3.6 concludes.
4The pilot study was run in 22 countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, East Africa, Eastern
Europe and the Middle East.
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3.2 Design of the Validation Study
3.2.1 Procedural Details
409 subjects participated in our study. Subjects were students from the University
of Bonn, who were recruited using ORSEE Greiner (2004). They were required to
have never taken part in an experiment before in order to minimize potential con-
founds due to earlier experiences in similar experiments. Subjects signed up for two
laboratory sessions.5 These were scheduled one week apart and run at the Labo-
ratory for Experimental Economics at the University of Bonn in winter 2010/2011.
Both sessions consisted of incentivized experiments and non-incentivized surveys,
programmed in zTree Fischbacher (2007). Each session lasted about two hours.
Payoffs earned in the incentivized experiments were paid out to the subjects at the
end of each session.6 Average earnings over both sessions amounted to 64 Euros (cor-
responding to approximately 83 US-dollars at the time of the experiment), including
a fixed fee of 10 Euros for showing up to the second session.
In order to minimize spillovers between the experimental and the survey measures,
e.g., because individuals might try to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and
strive for giving consistent responses (Falk and Zimmermann, 2015, forthcoming),
we never ran survey and experiment for the same preference in the same session.
More specifically, we conducted all experiments relating to social preferences and
all surveys relating to time discounting and risk taking in one session. The other
session then contained the experiments relating to time discounting and risk taking
as well as the surveys on social preferences. In addition, we reversed the order of
experimental and survey elicitation of preferences for about half of our subjects.
This design feature takes care of potential order effects, i.e., differences in behavior
or responses due to differences in the way preferences were measured first. Table 3.1
gives an overview of the general study design.
5We also conducted a pre-test with 80 students. This pre-test was intended to provide in-
formation on the duration and feasibility of the experiment. Experimental measures for negative
reciprocity and altruism were not elicited in this pre-test and the constraints on the participants
regarding previous participation were not applied.
6The payments resulting from the choice experiments on time discounting were delivered to
the subjects in cash via regular mail, either at the same day of the session or 12 months later,
depending on the payoff relevant choice.
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Table 3.1: Overview: Study Design
Week 1 Week 2
Group 1 Experiments on risk taking and Experiments on social preferences
(n=198) time discounting; Surveys on risk taking and time
Surveys on social preferences discounting
Group 2 Experiments on social preferences; Experiments on risk taking and
(n=211) Surveys on risk taking and time time discounting
discounting Surveys on social preferences
3.2.2 Preference Elicitation in Choice Experiments
We conducted standard economic experiments on risk taking, time discounting, al-
truism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity in order to obtain behaviorally valid
preference measures. The experiments that were used in each of the preference di-
mensions are summarized in Table 3.2. A detailed description of the experiments is
relegated to Appendix 3.7.1. Monetary stakes were presented to subjects in points,
where 100 points equaled 80 Cents. Subjects received feedback about the outcome
of the experiments only at the end of the sessions in order to limit the impact of
possible income effects on subsequent choices within a session. All experiments in-
volving social or strategic interaction were one-shot to isolate social preferences from
repeated game motives. We also implemented a perfect stranger random matching
protocol implying that subjects never interacted more than once with the same per-
son. Subjects were informed about this at the beginning of each session as well as
before each experiment involving social interaction.
For risk taking, time discounting, trust, and positive reciprocity we conducted
two experiments each. These experiments had the same structure, but payoffs in the
second experiment differed in small nuances, such that subjects were never asked
to make tradeoffs between alternatives that involved the exact same amounts. For
instance, the first lottery choice experiment involved 21 choices between a safe pay-
ment option, which increased in steps of 50 points from 0 points in the first choice
to 1000 points in the last choice, and a lottery that yields 1000 points with prob-
ability 0.5 and 0 points otherwise. We perturbed the safe payments in the second
experiment by adding or subtracting up to five points to each safe payment alter-
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native. The number of points added or subtracted was determined by a randomly
drawn integer value between -5 and +5. In the discounting experiments, in which
subjects made choices between an immediate payment and a larger payment with a
12-months delay, we perturbed the delayed payment in the second experiment in the
same manner.
The experimental measure of risk aversion was constructed by averaging over the
switching rows in the two lottery choices experiments.7 This averaging reduces mea-
surement error compared to using a single experimental measure. Analogously, we
constructed our experimental measure of time preference by averaging the switching
rows in the discounting experiments.8 Trust and positive reciprocity were elicited
as first and second mover behavior, respectively, in two versions of the Investment
Game (Berg et al., 1995). Each subject was in the role of the first and the second
mover twice, such that overall each subject participated in four Investment Games.
In one version, the amount sent by the first mover was tripled, in the other one it
was doubled. For the second mover behavior, we implemented the strategy method
(Selten, 1967). As our measure of trust, we took again the averages from the two de-
cisions made as a first mover. For positive reciprocity, we first averaged all decisions
from the strategy method in the two versions of the Investment Game. The aver-
age of these two amounts constitutes our preference measure of positive reciprocity.
For altruism, we conducted a dictator game with a charitable organization as recip-
ient. The chosen donation then constitutes our preference measure of altruism. For
negative reciprocity, we conducted two different experiments. A subjects’ minimum
acceptable offer in an ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al., 1982) serves as one assessment
of negative reciprocity. We obtain a second assessment from a subject’s investment
into punishment after unilateral defection of their opponent in a prisoner’s dilemma
(Falk et al., 2005). In order to obtain our preference measure of negative reciprocity,
7As is common for this type of elicitation methods, some subjects exhibit multiple switching
points. We observe that about 86 individuals switch more than once from preferring the lottery
to the safe payment in either of the two lottery choices experiments, 36 of them have multiple
switch points in both experiments. For subjects who make that kind of inconsistent choices, we
calculate the average switching row in each choice table and construct the experimental measure of
risk aversion as the mean of the two averages.
8In the discounting experiments, we observe that around 7 percent of subjects switch more
than once from preferring the early payment to the late payment. For these subjects we construct
the experimental measure by taking the mean of the average switching row in the two experiments
involving intertemporal choices.
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we standardized both variables to account for the different response scales and then
took the average.
Table 3.2: Overview: Experimental Measures
Preference Experiment Measure
Risk Two multiple price lists in which Average of rows in both price lists in
Taking subjects choose between a lottery and which a subject switches from preferring
varying safe options. the lottery to the safe option.
Time Two multiple price lists in which Average of rows in both price lists in
Discounting subjects choose between a payment “today” which a subject switches form preferring
and a larger payment “in 12 months”. the early to the delayed payment.
Trust First mover behavior in two trust Average amount sent as a first
games. mover in both trust games.
Altruism First mover behavior in a dictator Size of donation.
game with a charitable organization
as recipient.
Positive Second mover behavior in two trust Average amount sent back in both
Reciprocity games (strategy method). trust games.
Negative Investment into punishment after Average score: amount invested into
Reciprocity unilateral defection of the opponent punishment and minimum acceptable
in a prisoner’s dilemma (strategy offer in an ultimatum game.
method) and minimum acceptable
offer in an ultimatum game.
3.2.3 Preference Elicitation in Surveys
In the survey, we asked both quantitative and qualitative questions to measure a
given preference. On average, we asked about 32 survey questions in each of the
six preference dimensions. Qualitative questions included subjective assessments of
the respective preference. Many survey items were taken or adapted from exist-
ing surveys, like the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) or the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY), or from previous research (e.g., Weber et al.,
2002; Perugini et al., 2003). Additionally, we designed and included a number of
new items. Each battery of survey questions on a particular preference began with
a qualitative measure, asking respondents to self-assess their preference “in general”
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on an 11-point scale.9 Next, respondents were asked to state how they believe others
judge them with respect to that preference and to compare their preference to the at-
titude of others. Then, respondents had to assess their attitude in qualitative terms
with respect to different domains, e.g., financial decision-making. This sequence of
items was then followed by other qualitative survey items and quantitative items.
Quantitative items typically included a hypothetical version of the incentivized
choice experiment. Since the multiple price lists used in the lottery choice experiment
and in the inter-temporal choice experiment involve 30 choices and are rather time-
consuming, we also included an alternative elicitation procedure in which subjects
only had to make five sequential choices. In the five-question measure of risk prefer-
ence all subjects first decided between the lottery versus a safe payment that slightly
exceeds the expected value of the lottery. In the second decision (and all subsequent
decisions) the lottery remained the same. If the participant chose the safe option
in the first question, the safe option in the subsequent decision was smaller. If the
participant chose the lottery, the safe payment increased. In the same manner, the
safe option was increased or decreased in the third decision when the lottery or the
safe payment were preferred in the second decision, respectively. This procedure was
repeated five times. Figure 3.2 in the Appendix illustrates the method underlying
this condensed quantitative measure, which is commonly referred to as an “unfold-
ing brackets” method.10 For the case of time discounting, an analogous unfolding
brackets elicitation was used in which the early option was identical in every choice
while the delayed option varied. The detailed procedures are described in Appendix
3.7.6 and 3.7.7. Finally, we asked all subjects to rate the reliability of their answers
in the survey part.
9An example of this type of question is the general risk question that was validated in Dohmen
et al. (2011).
10In psychology this approach is often referred to as the “staircase method” Cornsweet (1962).
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3.3 The Preference Module
3.3.1 Item Selection Procedure
Our aim was to develop a survey preference module that contains the set of items
for each preference that best capture revealed preferences in incentivized laboratory
experiments, in the sense of an optimal tradeoff between explanatory power and
parsimony. While previous studies have typically focused on identifying survey mea-
sures that are significantly correlated with experimental preference measures, our
approach is to identify the combination of survey items from an extensive battery
of alternative survey items that best predicts choices in incentivized experimental
preference elicitation tasks.
In order to identify the best linear combination of items for measuring a par-
ticular preference, we regressed each experimental preference measure on different
combinations of the respective survey items. In the spirit of best subset selection,
we considered all possible combinations of survey items as regressors.11 We then
took into account statistical model selection criteria, based on explanatory power
and prediction error, in order to identify the preferred combination of survey items
for each preference.12
11Alternative selection procedures commonly applied in, e.g., personality psychology are step-
wise selection procedures, including forward selection and backward elimination procedures. In
forward selection approaches the analysis starts with the null model and chooses the predictor vari-
able which explains the highest share of variance in the dependent variable. Given this predictor,
the next variable is selected applying the same criterion. This process is repeated until no addi-
tional predictor variables can be found that meet a certain criterion, e.g., an F -statistic above a
certain threshold (compare, e.g., Kadane and Lazar, 2004). In backward selection approaches the
analysis starts with the model that includes all potential predictor variables and then, one by one,
eliminates variables from the model that perform worst according to a predetermined criterion.
Again, this procedure is repeated until only predictor variables are left in the model that fulfill a
certain criterion. Clearly, the resulting model in both forward selection and backward elimination
procedures strongly depends on the order of selecting (eliminating) items. Consequently, they do
not necessarily result in the same model (see also Graybill, 1976). Stepwise regression approaches
combine backward elimination and forward selection procedures and mitigate the problem of or-
der dependence. However, all three approaches share the feature that not all possible models are
evaluated. A further potential alternative would be to use the so-called Lasso-technique as intro-
duced by Tibshirani (1996). Lasso is particular useful when best subset selection is not feasible,
e.g. when there are more potential explanatory variables than observations, which is not the case
in our setting in which we consider linear models only that are additively separable in explanatory
variables. In fact, in this case Lasso selects largely the same modules. We deliberately did not
consider non-linear and fully interacted prediction models for reasons of simplicity, to facilitate
applicability and interpretation of the preference module, and to enhance comparability of results
across studies.
12Another important ex ante criterion was cost efficiency, i.e., considering the tradeoff between
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We implemented the selection procedure using a stepwise approach. In the first
step, we ran OLS regressions and identified for every number of regressors the best
model in terms of explanatory power, using an R¯2 criterion.13 In the second step,
we considered all models selected in the first step, i.e., one model for any number of
regressors, and used information criteria to narrow down the number of candidate
models.14 Since these information criteria differ with respect to the extent to which
the inclusion of additional regressors is penalized, the different information criteria
will not necessarily all favor the same model. In our case, the two-item and three-item
models were among the set of candidate modules for each preference, in the sense
that they were reasonably close according to the different information criteria.15
Since we value brevity of the preference module, we favor the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC), which contains a larger penalty for additional regressors than the
Akaike information criterion (AIC). According to the BIC, the two-item model is
superior for altruism, negative reciprocity and trust, while the three-item model is
selected for risk taking, time discounting and positive reciprocity.16
In the final step, we considered the predictive power of our candidate modules,
in order to identify the preferred preference module. Whenever possible, we consid-
ered out-of-sample predictive power, making use of a truly independent sample of
80 subjects for whom we had collected data on the same experimental and survey
measures on risk taking, time discounting, positive reciprocity and trust. For each of
predictive power and conciseness of the module. It turned out, however, that the statistical criteria
were not in conflict with the cost criterion as favored combinations are parsimonious in terms of
the number of items.
13In the following we will only report results from OLS regressions. However, all results reported
here are robust to estimating Ordered Probit models and selecting items using the criteria of
maximum log-likelihood or Pseudo-R¯2.
14Naturally, R2 will increase with the number of regressors, but adding regressors may result in
overfitting. Different criteria such as adjusted R¯2, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), or the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) contain a penalty term for the number of items.
15In particular, in our case, the one-item module is never selected, irrespective of whether we
consider AIC or BIC. Many previous studies have relied on only one item, which suggests that
many of the results in previous literature understate the strengths of correlations between different
preference dimensions or the strength of estimated relationships between preferences and outcome
variables, due to attenuation bias that results from measurement error. Moreover, studies using
survey measures of preferences are often not based on survey preference measures that exhibit
the highest correlation with the experimental preference measure (cf. Online Appendix C). The
pairwise correlations of single items with the experimental preference measure are also informative
with respect to comparability of results across existing studies that are based on single but different
measures.
16The AIC, on the other hand, favors the two-item module only in the case of positive reciprocity.
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these preferences we determined the predicted values of the respective experimental
preference measure according to the candidate models that differ with respect of the
number of items.17 For each preference, we then assessed the predictive power of
the different candidate models by comparing their mean squared prediction error
(MSPE). For all four preference dimensions, the MSPE is minimized for the model
with two items.
Since data on altruism and negative reciprocity is lacking in our independent
sample, we evaluated the predictive power of the models with different numbers of
items for these preference dimensions based on cross-validation using the original
sample.18 In line with our out-of-sample prediction results for the other four pref-
erences, the cross validation errors are smallest when using the two-item models for
negative reciprocity and altruism.19 As a result, we prefer two-item models for each
preference dimension.
3.3.2 Survey Items Contained in the Preference Module
Table 3.3 displays the items that were selected for the preference module with two
survey questions for each preference dimension. Appendix 3.7.3 presents the wording
of the survey items in the preference module, translated from German to English;
the original wording of the items in German is provided in section D in the online
appendix.
A notable feature of the preference module is its symmetry: For most preference
dimensions, it contains a measure based on a hypothetical choice experiment and
a qualitative item.20 These two types of measures are complementary in the sense
that the quantitative measure is akin to the standard revealed preference approach
whereas the qualitative item is a subjective self-assessment. Previous research has
shown that subjective assessments with abstract framings can lead to strong all-
17Predicted values were calculated as the product of the vector of observed answers to the specific
preference module and the vector of estimated coefficients from the regression of the experimental
preference measure on the respective preference module in the main sample on which the selection
procedure was based.
18Our cross-validation procedure entails that the sample is randomly split into k partitions.
One partition is used as a validation sample, whereas the remaining k − 1 samples are used as the
“training” sample.
19Our results obtain using k = 5 or using k = 10 partitions.
20The only exception is positive reciprocity.
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around predictors of life choices across many different life contexts. For example,
a general assessment of willingness to take risks can predict a range of behaviors
ranging from holding risky assets, to being self-employed, to smoking (Dohmen et
al., 2011). Quantitative survey measures that involve explicit monetary stakes are
no exception, as they are somewhat tied to the context of financial decision making
by construction; they may be better predictors of financial decisions in life than
qualitative measures of a general disposition, but less predictive of choice in other
domains. The preference module has an attractive balance between both approaches.
Table 3.3 also documents the correlations between the module items and the re-
spective behavioral measures. The last column of Table 3.3 provides estimated OLS
coefficients obtained from a multivariate regression of the standardized experimental
preference measure on standardized measures of the two survey items for the respec-
tive preference dimension. In applications, these coefficients can be used to calculate
weights, and then construct measures for each preference as the weighted sum of the
two items that capture the respective preference.
3.4 Properties of the Preference Module
3.4.1 Correlation between Survey Preference Measures and
Experimental Preference Measures
As a first indication of the quality of the preference module, we present the corre-
lations between the experimental preference measure and its predicted value based
on the two survey items. The correlations are 0.4079 for risk taking, 0.5861 for time
discounting, 0.6748 for trust, 0.4235 for altruism, 0.5771 for positive reciprocity, and
0.3729 for negative reciprocity. One might be inclined to evaluate these correlations
against a benchmark of 1. This benchmark would only be appropriate, however,
if the experimental preference measures and the survey based preference measures
were measured without error and perfectly aligned with the respective underlying
preference. The assumption that there is no measurement error is unlikely to be
correct in the case of preference measures. For example, measuring preference pa-
rameters that are inherently continuous on a discrete grid, the typical approach in
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Table 3.3: The Preference Module
Preference Item Description Correlation OLS Coeff.
Risk risk quant Multiple price list (31 hypothetical choices between a lottery and a safe option) 0.4095*** 0.2758***
Taking risk qual How do you see yourself: Are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks? 0.3524*** 0.2034***
Time time quant List of 25 hypothetical choices between an early payment “today” and a delayed payment “in 12 months” 0.5826*** 0.4849***
Discounting time qual In comparison to others, are you a person who is generally willing to give up something today in order to benefit -0.4039*** -0.1712***
from that in the future?
Trust trust quant Hypothetical investment game: first mover behavior 0.6201*** 0.6289***
trust qual Self-assessment: As long as I am not convinced otherwise, I assume that people have only the best intentions. 0.2829*** 0.1331***
Altruism altr quant You won 1,000 Euro in a lottery. Considering your current situation, how much would you donate to charity? 0.3913*** 0.1845***
altr qual How do you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return when it comes to charity? 0.3845*** 0.3210***
Positive posrecip quant1 Hypothetical investment game: second mover behavior 0.5560*** 0.4857***
Reciprocity posrecip quant2 Hypothetical scenario: Which bottle of wine do you give as a thank-you gift? 0.3530*** 0.1640***
Negative negrecip quant Minimum acceptable offer in hypothetical ultimatum game 0.3416*** 0.3284***
Reciprocity negrecip qual How do you see yourself: Are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior even if this is costly? 0.1609*** 0.1479***
See Appendix 3.7.3 for the exact wordings of the survey questions. The column “Correlation” displays Spearman correlations between the survey item and the respective experimental
measure. The final column displays OLS coefficients in a regression of the standardized experimental measure on the standardized module items. For details see the regression tables in
section B in the online appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively.
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choice experiments, gives rise to measurement error (see Einav et al., 2012).
With measurement error, the correlation between the experimental preference
measure and a candidate item from our battery of survey questions would be smaller
than one, even if the survey item measured the underlying preference equally well as
the experimental measure. It seems therefore more adequate to consider a benchmark
that recognizes the consequences of measurement error. An obvious benchmark is the
correlation θ between two measurements that arise from the repetition of the exact
same experiment because the best predictor of behavior in an experiment is arguably
a prior choice in the same experiment. In what follows, we use a test-retest sample to
measure θ. This test-retest correlation then becomes our benchmark for the highest
possible correlation one might achieve between survey measures and experiment,
should the two be perfectly aligned. We compare the actual explanatory power of
the survey measures to this revised benchmark.
In order to assess the size of measurement error in the experimental preference
measures, we conducted additional experiments with 44 subjects, who participated
in preference elicitation experiments twice. The experimental sessions were sched-
uled one week apart (there was no perturbation of experimental parameters across
sessions). The data on two identical experimental measures elicited one week apart
allow us to compute the test-retest correlations (i.e., θ) between two experimental
measures of the same underlying preference.
We estimate the test-retest correlation (more precisely, the square of the cor-
relation) by regressing the preference measure revealed in the experiments in the
first session on the respective preference measure obtained in the second session and
calculating the R2 for this regression. The share of variance that can be explained
by the second experimental measure is substantially lower than 1, indicating the
presence of measurement error in the experimental measures. The correlations are
0.3469 for risk taking, 0.6715 for discounting, 0.5986 for trust, and 0.4203, 0.4336,
0.4446 for altruism, positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity respectively.21 The
R2-values of these regressions serve as a sensible benchmark against which to evalu-
ate the explanatory power of our preference module, since these values measure the
explanatory power for behavior in the experiments of an identical repeated measure
21A more detailed regression table is relegated to section B in the online appendix.
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of the experiment itself. Compared to this benchmark, our survey module achieves
high explanatory power.
3.4.2 Out-of-Sample Prediction
After having established the superiority of the two item survey module in out-of-
sample prediction relative to longer modules in the previous section, we now discuss
the out-of-sample performance of the two item survey module in absolute terms.
For the subjects in our pretest panel we used their survey responses to predict their
choices in the four experimental preference elicitation tasks (measuring risk and
time preferences, trust and positive reciprocity), and regressed the actual choices on
the predicted choices. If our preference module reliably captures the preferences of
individuals in this sample, one would expect the intercept of the regression of actual
on predicted choices to be zero and the coefficient of the predicted value to be 1. In
fact, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the constant is zero and the slope coefficient
equals one for all preferences, except for trust, at the 10 percent significance level.
For trust, we find that the slope coefficient is not statistically different from one if
we suppress the constant in the regression. It is also reassuring that predicted and
actual choices are strongly and statistically significantly correlated. The correlations
are 0.2919 for risk preferences, 0.5868 for time discounting, 0.2629 for trust, and
0.4424 for positive reciprocity.
3.4.3 Validity in Non-Student Samples
Conceptually, the module will be behaviorally relevant for non-students as long as
the correlations between survey items and experiments are similar to those in our
student sample. While the distributions of preferences may differ for students and
non-students, there is no particular reason to think that the correlation structure
should differ. Even if it does, it seems likely that the same types of survey items
would still be selected as best predictors for non-students as for students; in the
student sample the top two predictors are typically superior to other measures by a
substantial margin. Moreover, the quantitative survey items in the module closely
resemble the experimental measures that are widely used to elicit preferences in non-
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student samples. Hence, there is no compelling reason why the correlations between
these hypothetical and incentivized measures should exist only among students.
Empirically, there is evidence that survey measures are significantly correlated
with experimental preference measures in representative, non-student samples. For
example, Fehr et al. (2003) used a representative sample of adults, and documented
a significant correlation between subjects’ behavior in an incentivized investment
game, and survey measures on trust of the type contained in our preference mod-
ule. Likewise it has been shown that answers to the qualitative survey question to
elicit risk attitudes, contained in our preference module, are significantly correlated
with incentivized lottery choices in a large representative subject pool (Dohmen et
al., 2011). In fact, they report a correlation coefficient between the survey measure
and behavior in the lottery choice experiment in their representative sample that
is almost identical to the one in our validation sample consisting of students.22 It
is also notable that the correlation is not significantly different for students versus
non-students in their representative sample. Similarly, Ziegelmeyer and Ziegelmeyer
(2012) predict risk-taking behavior in an alternative lottery choice experiment (Holt
and Laury, 2002) using the same survey item that is part of our module. In addition,
the qualitative survey risk measure contained in our preference module has previ-
ously been administered in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, and other large
representative surveys in the US, Asia and Australia as well as in other European
countries. Various studies have documented that answers to this question are related
to risky behaviors in many contexts of life, for example, occupational choice and self-
employment, geographical mobility, ownership of risky assets, as well as smoking (see,
e.g., Barasinska et al., 2012; Bauernschuster et al. 2014; Bonin et al., 2007; Caliendo
et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011; Fouarge et al., 2014; Jaeger et al., 2010). These
findings illustrate that the types of survey items selected in our preference module
provide behaviorally valid preference measures in non-student samples.
There is also evidence that items from our preference survey module are valid
across cultures. For example, recent empirical work by Vieider et al. (2015) uses
22The correlations are 0.25 in the representative sample of Dohmen et al. (2011), and 0.24 in
our validation sample if we focus on the same survey measure for predicting behavior in a single
risk experiment (as shown above, the correlation is even higher for the validation sample if we use
choices from both risk aversion experiments).
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the same qualitative measure of risk attitudes that is included in our module and
documents that it correlates with incentivized lottery choice experiments conducted
in 30 different countries. In addition, Hardeweg et al. (2013) replicate the validation
exercise of Dohmen et al. (2011) and confirm the significant relationship between
this risk question and incentivized lottery choices for a representative sample of
900 inhabitants of rural Northern Thailand. Ding et al. (2010) corroborate these
results for a sample of 121 Beijing University students. Taken together, this evidence
suggests that the survey module can provide a useful tool for preference elicitation
also in an international context.
3.5 A Streamlined Version of the Preference Mod-
ule
Our survey module offers a reliable, easily implementable and low cost alternative to
conducting incentivized experiments. Nevertheless, there are applications for which
our module will not be ideal, as some of the quantitative items either require in-
structions that are as complex as corresponding experiments (e.g., the hypothetical
investment game) or entail a considerable number of decisions (e.g., choice tables
for eliciting risk and time preferences). Particularly if time constraints are severe or
if respondents have limited cognitive capacity, an even simpler and shorter module
seems useful, even if it comes at some costs in terms of lower explanatory power. A
streamlined module is also particularly useful for measuring preferences in large scale,
representative, and cross cultural surveys, as these may use telephone, have severe
time constraints, and cover a subject pool that is heterogeneous in terms of education
ad cognitive capacity. With this in mind, when developing the streamlined version
we also paid particular attention to ensuring that the preference survey measures
can be implemented across different cultural backgrounds, and are understandable
and measure the same preference across different cultures.
Streamlining the module involved several steps. First, we discarded the most
lengthy or complicated items, i.e., the (hypothetical) investment game, ultimatum
game, and the time-consuming lists of (hypothetical) choices between safe payments
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and a lottery and between early and delayed payments. As we discuss in detail below,
in the majority of cases, our set of remaining survey items included simpler analogues
of the discarded items. As a result, this restriction ultimately only led to a minimal
reduction in explanatory power (R2). Second, we made some minor wording changes
where this seemed appropriate, for cultural neutrality. Third, using the modified sets
of candidate measures, we then implemented the same selection procedure we used
for the original module version. We only deviated from this procedure in a couple
of cases, when other relevant features - such as implementability or comparability of
preference measures between the two module versions - would otherwise have been
jeopardized. Importantly, this never resulted in a substantial decrease of adjusted
R2, our main selection criterion. In our final step we tested the resulting streamlined
version of our preference module in collaboration with Gallup Europe in the field in 22
countries representing different cultural backgrounds. Using respondent’s feedback
from this pilot study we made some additional minor changes to the wording. In
what follows, we describe the development of the adjusted module for each preference
and describe the composition and nature of the multinational pilot study in more
detail.
For the sub-modules for risk taking and time discounting, we discarded the choice
lists from the list of candidate items, and ran the selection procedure described in
section 3.3 on the restricted set of items. For risk preferences, the “staircase” pro-
cedure for a hypothetical lottery choice was selected. This quantitative measure is
very comparable to the choice list measure, as it contains the same lottery. Yet, it
is much more time-efficient to use “staircase” procedures, as they only require five
interdependent choices (lottery vs. safe payments and early vs. delayed payments,
respectively).23 Both preference measures are highly correlated with experimental
measure of risk preference (see section C in the online appendix). The other item
selected for risk was the same qualitative measure selected in the original module.
The resulting reduction in explanatory power of the streamlined version compared
to the original version in terms of R2 is only 0.02. In the case of time discounting,
the item selection procedure also selected the “staircase” measure for intertempo-
ral choice (see Appendix 3.7.7), which mirrors the hypothetical choice list for the
23The staircase procedures are presented in detail in Appendix 3.7.6
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same intertemporal trade-off as in the original version of the module, but it yielded
a slightly different subjective self-assessment than the one in the original module
version. Instead of the item asking for a self-assessment of one’s willingness to ab-
stain from something today in order to benefit from that in the future in comparison
to others, the item selected asks for the same self-assessment in general. Since this
change was only minor relative to the original module we modified the sub-module
accordingly. The resulting reductions in adjusted R2 compared to the original mod-
ule version are again rather modest (reduction in R2 by 0.04).
For positive reciprocity, we discarded the hypothetical choices as a second mover
in the investment games before running the selection procedure. Corresponding
to the original sub-module, the procedure selected the quantitative item measuring
one’s willingness to reciprocate by asking for which wine bottle (a cheaper or a more
expensive one) one would give to a stranger in order to reciprocate kindness in a
hypothetical scenario. Since giving a bottle of wine is a very common and popular
gesture in Western industrialized societies but very uncommon or even inappropriate
in other cultures, e.g. Muslim societies, we replaced “bottles of wine” with the more
neutral term “thank-you-gift”. As a second item, the selection procedure picked a
simple subjective self-assessment: “When someone does me a favor I am willing to
return it”. The resulting modified sub-module for positive reciprocity comes with a
reduction in adjusted R2 to 0.19 in our experimental subject pool.
In the case of negative reciprocity we discarded the hypothetical experiment.
The item selection procedure resulted in selecting two qualitative self-assessments,
the first of them being the “general willingness to punish”-item that was also included
in our original module version. In this case, there was a more substantial reduction
in adjusted R2 relative to our original module (0.0367 vs. 0.1342). Since the second
item strongly resembled the first item (“general willingness to punish”), we decided
to instead include an item asking for one’s willingness to take revenge, thereby adding
a more emotional and less neutral item to the sub-module. This change resulted in
a negligible reduction of adjusted R2 (0.0320 vs. 0.0367).
Due to severe time constraints in the pilot study we could only include one item
for trust. We therefore discarded the hypothetical experiment which would have
been discarded anyways due to its length and complexity and - since we did not have
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an adequate and implementable alternative for the hypothetical experiment - kept
the qualitative self-assessment of the original module version.24 While running the
selection procedure for a one-item sub-module without the hypothetical experiment
would have resulted in a different item, we decided to stick to the original module
version as closely as possible in order to ensure a maximum degree of comparability
of preference measures between studies using the original module version and those
using the adapted streamlined version. In the case of altruism, we did not make any
changes to the module items since the hypothetical experiment was neither lengthy
nor complicated and the qualitative self-assessment seemed unproblematic for the
purpose of a multinational study.
In the next step, we tested the streamlined module in an in-depth pilot study in
22 countries. In collaboration with Gallup Europe, we surveyed respondents from
10 countries in central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), 2 countries in South-
East Asia (Bangladesh and Cambodia), 5 countries in Southern and Eastern Europe
(Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Turkey), 4 countries in the Middle East and
North Africa (Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi-Arabia), and 1 country in Eastern
Africa (Kenya).25 In each country, the sample size was 10 to 15 people. Overall, more
than 220 interviews were conducted. In most countries, the sample was mixed in
terms of gender, age, educational background, and area of residence (urban vs. rural).
For all items involving hypothetical monetary amounts we adjusted the stake sizes for
each country in terms of their real value such that they represent the same share of a
country’s median income in local currency as the share of the amount in Euro of the
German median income, where our validation study had been conducted. Monetary
amounts used in the validation study with the German sample were rounded numbers
to facilitate easy calculations (e.g., the expected return of a lottery with equal chances
24This leads to a substantial reduction in adjusted R2 from 0.44 to 0.07 due to the omission of
the hypothetical experiment.
25Gallup Europe ensured that the items of the preference module were translated into the major
languages of each target country, using state-of-the-art techniques. The translation process involved
three steps. As a first step, a translator suggested an English, Spanish or French version of a German
item, depending on the region. A second translator, being proficient in both the target language
and in English, French, or Spanish, then translated the item into the target language. Finally,
a third translator would review the item in the target language and translate it back into the
original language. If differences between the original item and the back-translated item occurred,
the process was adjusted and repeated until all translators agreed on a final version.
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of winning and losing) and to allow for easy comparisons (e.g., 100 Euro today
versus 107.50 in 12 months). To proceed in a similar way in all countries, monetary
amounts were always adjusted to the next “round and easy” number after adjusting
the amounts in terms of their real values.26
In order to detect potential difficulties in the understanding of module items and
differences in the respondents’ interpretation, respondents were explicitly asked to
give extensive feedback with respect to the appropriateness and understandability
of the module. In particular, we asked respondents to rephrase the meaning of the
items in their own words and to state any difficulties in understanding the items.27
If they encountered difficulties in understanding or interpreting items, respondents
were asked to make suggestions on how to modify the wording of the item in order
to attain the desired meaning.
Overall, the understanding and implementability of our module was very good.
Nevertheless, respondents’ feedback induced some additional changes to some items.
In terms of wording changes, the use of the term “lottery” in hypothetical risky
choices was troubling to some Muslim participants and some refused to answer the
item completely since gambling is a taboo (haram) in Islam. As a consequence, we
dropped the term “lottery” and replaced it with the more neutral but equally accu-
rate term “random draw”. Second, the term “charity” caused confusion in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, so it was replaced it with “good cause”. Third, some
respondents had difficulties answering the question asking about one’s willingness
to punish unfair behavior without knowing who was treated unfairly. We there-
fore decided to split the question into two separate items, one item asking for one’s
willingness to punish unfair behavior towards others, and another asking for one’s
willingness to punish unfair behavior towards oneself. Fourth, some participants,
especially in countries with current or relatively recent phases of volatile and high
inflation rates, stated that their answer in questions involving intertemporal trade-
offs would depend on the rate of inflation, or said that they would always take the
immediate payment due to uncertainty with respect to future inflation. Therefore,
26While this necessarily resulted in some (minor) variations in the real stake size between coun-
tries, it minimized cross-country differences in the understanding the quantitative items due to
difficulties in assessing the involved monetary amounts.
27For example, respondent were explicitly asked to explain a “50-percent chance” in their own
words and give their own interpretation of “safe payment”.
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we added the following phrase to each question involving hypothetical choices be-
tween immediate and future monetary amounts: “Please assume there is no inflation,
i.e., future prices are the same as today’s prices.” The final version of the stream-
lined preference module is presented in Table 3.4. Finally, the survey questions were
brought into a format that is consistent with the Gallup World Poll questionnaire
style. For example, the first question of the module, which happened to be the qual-
itative survey question on risk taking, was commenced by the request “Please tell
me”. The complete module version including exact wordings is relegated to Section
3.7.8 in the appendix.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper presents an experimentally validated survey module to measure six key
economic preferences – risk aversion, discounting, trust, altruism, positive and nega-
tive reciprocity – in a reliable, parsimonious and cost-effective way. The paper offers
two versions of the module. One provides the maximum explanatory power, sub-
ject to having a parsimonious number of survey items (two items) per preference.
We strongly recommend this tool for eliciting preferences in small to medium-scale
studies among (fairly) educated respondents, such as lab experiments and field exper-
iments. This version of the module is also well-suited for surveys that use detailed
questionnaires or that are based on written or computer-assisted personalized in-
terviews (CAPI). The other version of the module is a more streamlined one that
prioritizes time efficiency, and simplicity, at the expense of a modest reduction in
explanatory power. This streamlined version of the module is particularly useful
in the context of large-scale international surveys among respondents sampled from
the entire age and education spectrum and covering individuals from diverse socio-
economic backgrounds.
The streamlined version of the module is also well-suited for all kinds of sur-
vey modes, including telephone surveys. Indeed, it has now been successfully im-
plemented within framework of the Gallup World Poll 2012, a major international
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Table 3.4: The Streamlined Module
Preference Module Items
Risk 1. Staircase measure (five interdependent choices between a lottery and a safe option)
Taking 2. Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks.
Time 1. Staircase measure (five interdependent choices between an early and a delayed amount of money)
Discounting 2. How willing are you to give up something that is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future?
Trust 1. I assume that people have only the best intentions.
Altruism 1. Hypothetical donation.
2. How willing are you to give to good causes without expecting anything in return?
Positive 1. Hypothetical choice: size of a ”thank-you”-gift.
Reciprocity 2. When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.
Negative 1. If I am treated very unjustly, I will take revenge at the first occasion, even if there is a cost to do so.
Reciprocity 2. How willing are you to punish someone who treats you unfairly, even if there may be costs for you?
3. How willing are you to punish someone who treats others unfairly, even if there may be costs for you?
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survey. This has yielded the Global Preference Survey (GPS) data, which has pref-
erence measures for more than 80,000 drawn as representative samples in each of
76 countries worldwide (see Falk et al., 2015, for a detailed description of this data
set). Importantly, these data reveal the behavioral validity of our preference module
(Falk et al., 2015). For example, more risk tolerant individuals are more likely to
become self-employed and are more likely to smoke. Likewise, patient individuals
are more likely to save and have higher educational attainment around the world.
Finally, social preferences are strongly correlated with a broad range of prosocial
behaviors and outcomes such as donating, volunteering time, assisting strangers,
helping friends and relatives, or family structure.
Both versions of the preference module share several desirable features. First,
the module items are experimentally validated. The ability of the items to explain
behavior in incentivized choice experiments helps ensure that they are meaningful for
predicting choices under real incentives, mitigating one of the major concerns about
hypothetical questions. The selected items are not just significant predictors of be-
havior, but are jointly the best predictors out of a large set of alternative measures.
The validation is based on a consistent research design across preferences, and ap-
plies state-of-the-art experimental techniques and transparent, quantitative criteria
for module selection. Second, the modules consist of a balanced mix of qualitative
self-assessments and questions involving quantitative hypothetical trade-offs. This
gives the module an attractive balance between different approaches to assessing
preferences. Third, the module has a wide range of possible applications. The two
versions can be implemented in various survey modes, including modes with tight
time constraints. Some module items have already been validated in representative
samples, and in different countries. We additionally conducted an international pilot
in order to verify comprehension and implementability of the module across very
different cultures. Thus, the two versions of the module can be applied to a range of
different subject pools, from lab experiments, to large representative samples, or to
samples that are culturally very heterogeneous. Fourth, by providing an attractive
and low cost approach to measuring preferences the module has the potential for
widespread adoption, with potentially significant positive externalities in terms of
easier comparison of results across studies.
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3.7 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.7.1 Design of Experimental Preference Elicitation Tasks
Risk Taking We used a multiple price list format to elicit how subjects trade off
risky payments and sure payments. Subjects made choices in two tables. In each of
the 21 rows of a given table they had to choose between a safe payment and a lottery
that yielded 1000 points with probability 0.5 and 0 points otherwise. The lottery was
always the same in all rows of both price lists, while the safe payment varied. We
call these tables “price lists” as is commonly done in the literature. In one price list,
we increased the safe payment in steps of 50 points from 0 points in the first choice
to 1000 points in the last choice. In the other price lists we perturbed these safe
payments by adding or subtracting up to five points to each safe payment alternative.
The number of points added or subtracted was determined by a randomly drawn
integer value between -5 and +5. These integer values were randomly drawn once
and for all before the experiment was programmed. As a result, all subjects faced
the same lists of choices. After subjects had made their choices, one of the choices
was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were informed about this procedure
in advance. The row in which a subject switched from preferring the lottery to
preferring the safe payment informs us about the subjects’ risk preferences. Earlier
switching points indicate a lower certainty equivalent than later switching points.
Time Discounting In order to obtain a measure of the subjects’ willingness to
trade off monetary payoffs at two different points in time we adapted a the design
from Dohmen et al. (2010), and asked subjects to make choices in two price lists.
In both price lists, subjects had to trade off a payment of 400 points “today” and
a higher payment that would be received 12 months in the future. In one price list,
we increased the delayed amount such that the implied annual return from waiting
would rise in steps of 2.5 percentage points from 0 percent in the first row to 60
percent in the 25th row, assuming semiannual compounding. In the second price list
we perturbed the actual delayed payments by adding or subtracting an amount of up
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to 0.6 points. Again, one choice made in the two price lists was randomly selected by
the computer for payment. Subjects were informed about this procedure in advance.
We also notified subjects ex ante about the payment mode. In particular, they
were told that any payment resulting from this experiment would be delivered to
them via regular mail. If they chose the payment “today” the respective amount
would be sent on the same day. If they chose the payment “in 12 months”, it would
be sent to them exactly 12 months after the experiment. By keeping the payoff mode
identical over all time horizons we can rule out concerns about differential credibility
of payments dependent on timing, or simply a taste for a certain payoff mode, as
drivers of decision making. These features were made very salient to subjects: To
enhance credibility an envelope was placed in each cubicle and subjects had to write
on the envelope the address to which they wanted the payment delivered. In order
to allow us to identify the relevant payment they also had to note their identification
number on the envelope. No participant expressed any concern with respect to this
procedure.
The row in which a subject switched from preferring the earlier payment to the
larger delayed payment (or, equivalently, the implied annual rate of return in the
switching row) provides a measure of impatience.
Trust We conducted two versions of the Investment Game as introduced by Berg
et al. (1995). We refer to this as the Trust Game. In one version of this game
the amount sent by the first to the second mover was doubled by the experimenter,
in the second version the amount was tripled. In every version of this experiment
both subjects were endowed with 500 points. The choice set of the first mover
was restricted to amounts in {0, 50, 100, ..., 500}, because we applied the contingent
response method for the second mover. Each subject acted in the role of the first
and second mover in each version, such that overall each subject took part in four
Investment Games. All outcomes of the four decisions of the Investment Games were
payoff relevant. The average amount sent as a first mover in the two versions serves
as our measure of the subjects’ willingness to trust strangers.
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Altruism Subjects were endowed with 300 points and had to decide how many
of these points to assign to a charitable organization. We gave them a list of
well-established and well-known charitable organizations with various purposes but
they could also name a different charitable organization to which they wanted the
money to be donated. The list of charitable organizations included: Brot fu¨r die
Welt, Kindernothilfe, German Red Cross, Welthungerhilfe, Bund fu¨r Umwelt und
Naturschutz Deutschland, Greenpeace, Terre des Hommes, and Aktion Mensch. At
the end of the laboratory session we gave the subjects an address of a website on
which they could look up all donations made to the charitable organizations. Sub-
jects were informed again about the possibility to check their donation after all
sessions had been conducted and the money had been transferred to the charitable
organizations. This was done in order to ensure credibility and transparency of the
procedure. The amount an individual transferred to charity serves as a measure of
their altruistic inclination.
Positive Reciprocity We elicited positive reciprocity from second mover behavior
in the Trust Games described above. The use of the contingent response method
for second mover behavior allowed us to measure how much a subject wanted to
send back for each possible amount sent to them by the first mover. The payoff
relevant choice was the one corresponding to the actual choice made by the first
mover. Average second mover behavior in the Investment Games then constitutes our
behavioral measure of the individual’s willingness to reciprocate positively. Subjects
were informed about their opponents’ decisions and the resulting payoffs at the end
of the laboratory session.
Negative Reciprocity We conducted two different types of experimental game in
order to elicit subjects’ willingness to reciprocate negatively. First, subjects took part
in two Ultimatum Games as introduced by Gu¨th et al., 1982. Subjects were randomly
assigned the role of the proposer in one game and the role of the responder in the
other game. Proposers had to decide how many of 500 points they wanted to offer to
the responder. Responders, in turn, had to indicate their minimum acceptable offer
and this was taken as a first measure of the individuals’ level of negatively reciprocal
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inclination. A higher minimum acceptable offer increases the rejection probability,
and is hence a measure of the higher willingness to forego a monetary payoff in order
to reduce the payoff of the proposer.
We also conducted a Prisoner’s Dilemma with a subsequent punishment stage
(see e.g., Falk et al., 2005 or Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). The Prisoner’s Dilemma was
framed as a project in which both players could decide to participate or not. If both
players decided to participate they both received 480 points. If both players decided
not to participate, both received 300 points. If one player decided not to participate
while the other decided to do so, the former received 540 points while the latter
received 240 points. Figure 3.1 illustrates the payoff structure of this part of the
experiment. First, subjects had to decide how many points to invest into punishing
their opponent contingent on every possible first stage outcome. Punishment was
costly.28 Then they were asked to decide whether they wanted to participate in the
project or not. All decisions were taken simultaneously.
As a measure of the individuals’ willingness to reciprocate negatively we consider
behavior in both experiments, i.e., minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum Game
and the amount invested into punishment given unilateral defection of the other
player. We standardized both measures to account for the different response scales
and took the average. This constitutes the score for the level of negative reciprocity.
Figure 3.1: Payoff Matrix: Prisoner’s Dilemma
28We implemented two different punishment technologies: in 7 sessions the technology was such
that each point invested into punishment resulted in one point being deducted from the opponent.
In the other sessions each point invested into punishment lead to three points being deducted from
the other player.
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3.7.2 All Survey Items
This section presents all survey items on preferences that subjects answered.29 Unless
stated otherwise, all items were answered on an eleven-point scale from 0 to 10.
For example, all items asking for one’s willingness to behave in a certain way were
answered on a scale from 0 meaning ”not willing to do so” to 10 meaning ”very
willing to do so”. Likewise, items asking for how well a statement describes the
participant as a person were answered on a scale from 0 ”does not describe me at
all” to 10 ”describes me very well”. Items which were not answered according to
this pattern are, for example, hypothetical experiments. In these cases, the potential
answers are presented at the end of the respective item.
Risk Taking
1. Staircase Measure (see Appendix 3.7.6)
2. List of 31 hypothetical choices between a lottery (300 Euro with a 50 percent
chance, 0 Euro with a 50-percent chance), which is the same in all choices,
and varying safe options (starting at 0 Euro and increasing to 300 Euro in
increments of 10 Euro). Answer options: lottery or safe payment.
3. Sind Sie im Allgemeinen ein risikobereiter Mensch, oder versuchen Sie, Risiken
zu vermeiden? [Generally speaking, are you a person who is willing to take
risks or do you try to avoid risks? ]
4. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen ein risikobereiter Mensch, oder versuchen Sie
im Vergleich zu anderen, Risiken zu vermeiden? [In comparison to others, are
you a person who is willing to take risks or do you try to avoid risks? ]
5. Scha¨tzen andere Sie im Allgemeinen als einen risikobereiten Menschen ein, oder
scha¨tzen andere Sie als jemanden ein, der versucht, Risiken zu vermeiden? [Do
other people assess you as a person who is willing to take risks or as a person
who tries to avoid risks? ]
6. Wie scha¨tzen Sie Ihre Risikobereitschaft in Bezug auf folgende Bereiche ein?
[How do you assess your willingness to take risks in the following contexts? ]
29Subjects were required to answer each question, i.e. they did not have an option to skip items.
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(a) Wenn es um Geldanlagen geht? [When it comes to financial investments? ]
(b) Wenn es um wichtige Entscheidungen im Leben geht? [When it comes to
important decisions in life? ]
(c) Wenn es um die berufliche Karriere geht? [When it comes to your profes-
sional career? ]
(d) Wenn es um Freizeit und Sport geht? [When it comes to leisure and
sports? ]
(e) Wenn es um Verhalten im Straßenverkehr geht? [When it comes to be-
havior in road traffic? ]
(f) Wenn es um den Umgang mit anderen Menschen geht? [When it comes
to dealing with other people? ]
7. Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass... [How likely is it, that...]30
(a) Sie zugeben, dass Ihr Geschmack sich von dem Ihrer Freunde unterschei-
det? [you admit that your tastes are different from those of your friends? ]
(b) Sie in der Wildnis zelten, fernab der Zivilisation oder eines Camping-
platzes? [you go camping in the wild, far away from civilization or camp-
grounds? ]
(c) Sie Ihr Tageseinkommen beim Pferderennen fu¨r Wetten einsetzen? [you
bet a day’s income at the horse races? ]
(d) Sie illegale Drogen fu¨r Ihren eigenen Konsum kaufen? [you buy an illegal
drug for your own use? ]
(e) Sie in einer Klausur versuchen zu ta¨uschen? [you try to cheat on an
exam? ]
(f) Sie einen Tornado oder Hurricane im Auto verfolgen, um spektakula¨re Fo-
tos zu schießen? [you chase a tornado by car to take spectacular photos? ]
(g) Sie 10% Ihres Jahreseinkommens in einen Anlagefonds mit moderaten
Wachstumsraten investieren? [you invest 10% of your annual income into
an investment funds with moderate growth rates? ]
30Most of these items are adapted from Weber et al. (2002).
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(h) Sie fu¨nf oder mehr als fu¨nf alkoholische Getra¨nke an einem einzigen Abend
verzehren? [you drink five or more alcoholic drinks on one evening? ]
(i) Sie einen wesentlichen Betrag bei der Steuererkla¨rung falsch angeben?
[you cheat subtantially on your income tax? ]
(j) Sie sich mit Ihrem Vater in Bezug auf ein wichtiges Thema nicht einig
sind? [you disagree with your father on a major issue? ]
(k) Sie Ihr Tageseinkommen bei einem Pokerspiel mit hohen Einsa¨tzen ver-
wenden? [you take a day’s income to play poker with high stakes? ]
(l) Sie eine Affa¨re mit einem verheirateten Mann oder Frau haben? [you have
an affair with a married man or woman? ]
(m) Sie die Unterschrift einer anderen Person fa¨lschen? [you forge somebody’s
signature? ]
(n) Sie die Arbeit einer anderen Person als Ihre eigene darstellen? [you present
somebody else’s work as your own? ]
(o) Sie in ein Land der Dritten Welt reisen, ohne vorher festgelegte und ar-
rangierte Reiseroute und U¨bernachtungsmo¨glichkeiten? [you go on va-
cation in a third-world country without a pre-arranged travel route and
without booking accomodations ahead? ]
(p) Sie sich mit einem Freund/einer Freundin u¨ber etwas streiten, bei dem
sich seine/ihre Meinung stark von Ihrer unterscheidet? [you argue with a
friend who has a very different opinion on an issue? ]
(q) Sie eine Skipiste nehmen, die Ihre Fa¨higkeiten u¨bersteigt, oder gesperrt
ist? [you go down a ski run that is too hard or closed? ]
(r) Sie 5% Ihres Jahreseinkommens in eine sehr spekulative Aktie anlegen?
[you invest 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock? ]
(s) Sie Ihren Chef um eine Gehaltserho¨hung bitten? [you ask your boss for a
raise? ]
(t) Sie illegal Software kopieren? [you illegally copy a piece of software? ]
(u) Sie Wildwasser-Rafting bei reißenden Wasserstro¨mungen im Fru¨hling be-
treiben? [you go whitewater rafting at high water in the spring? ]
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(v) Sie Ihr Tageseinkommen bei einer Sportwette einsetzen (zum Beispiel
Fußball, Basketball, Baseball)? [you invest your day’s income on sports
bets (e.g. Soccer, Basketball, Baseball)? ]
(w) Sie einem Freund oder einer Freundin erza¨hlen, dass sein oder ihr Partner
mit Ihnen geflirtet hat? [you tell a friend that his/her partner flirted with
you? ]
(x) Sie 5% Ihres Jahreseinkommens in einer konservativen Aktie anlegen?
[you invest 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock? ]
(y) Sie einen kleinen Gegenstand in einem Gescha¨ft klauen (z.B. einen Stift
oder einen Lippenstift)? [you shoplift a small item (e.g., a pen or a lip-
stick?]
(z) Sie provokative oder unkonventionelle Kleidung bei Gelegenheiten tragen?
[you wear unconventional or provocative clothes? ]
8. Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass... [How likely is it, that...]31
(a) Sie ungeschu¨tzten Sex haben? [you engage in unprotected sex? ]
(b) Sie von Ihrem Kabelanschluss, den Sie bezahlen, noch einen weiteren An-
schluss abzweigen? [you steal an additional TV cable connection? ]
(c) Sie sich nicht anschnallen, wenn Sie im Auto vorne sitzen? [you don’t wear
a seatbelt when in the front seat? ]
(d) Sie 10% Ihres Jahreseinkommens in Staatsanleihen investieren? [you in-
vest 10% of your annual income in government bonds (treasury bills)? ]
(e) Sie dann und wann eine gefa¨hrliche Sportart ausu¨ben (z.B. Bergsteigen
oder Sky Diving)? [you periodically engage in a dangerous sport (e.g.
mountain climbing or sky diving)? ]
(f) Sie keinen Helm tragen wenn Sie ein Motorrad fahren? [you ride a mo-
torcycle without wearing a helmet? ]
(g) Sie das Einkommen einer Woche im Casino verspielen? [you gamble away
a week’s income at a casino.]
31Most of these items are adapted from Weber et al. (2002).
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(h) Sie einen Job annehmen, der Ihnen Spaß macht, anstelle eines Jobs, der
angesehener ist, Ihnen aber weniger Spaß macht? [you take a job that you
like instead of a job that is very reputable but that you like less? ]
(i) Sie einen unbeliebten Standpunkt, von dem Sie u¨berzeugt sind, bei einer
Gelegenheit vertreten? [you openly express an opinion or viewpoint that
is unpopular but of which you are convinced? ]
(j) Sie sich der Sonne aussetzen, ohne Sonnenschutz benutzt zu haben? [you
don’t wear sunscreen when you expose yourself to the sun? ]
(k) Sie zumindest einmal im Leben Bungee Jumping ausprobieren? [you try
bungee jumping at least once in your life? ]
(l) Sie ein eigenes kleines Flugzeug fliegen, wenn Sie ko¨nnten? [you fly a
small plane if you could? ]
(m) Sie nachts alleine in einer eher unsicheren Gegend der Stadt herumlaufen?
[you walk alone through a rather unsafe part of the city at night? ]
(n) Sie regelma¨ßig Essen mit hohem Cholesterin-Gehalt essen? [you regularly
eat high-cholesterol food? ]
9. Wie sehr treffen folgenden Aussagen auf Sie zu? [How well do the following
statements describe you as a person? ]
(a) Ich handle oft nach dem Motto: Vorsicht ist besser als Nachsicht. [I often
behave according to the motto: It is better to be safe than sorry.]
(b) Ich vermeide riskante Dinge. [I avoid risky things.]
(c) Ich mag es, Risiken einzugehen. [I like taking risks.]
10. Stellen Sie sich vor, dass Sie in einem Preisausschreiben 100.000 Euro gewin-
nen. Unmittelbar nach Erhalt des Gewinns bekommen Sie ein Angebot fu¨r
folgende Lotterie: Es gibt eine Chance, das Geld zu verdoppeln. Es gibt aber
auch ein gleich hohes Risiko, die Ha¨lfte des eingesetzten Geldes zu verlieren.
Sie ko¨nnen mit Ihren 100.000 Euro ganz oder teilweise an der Lotterie teil-
nehmen. Wir wu¨rden von Ihnen gerne wissen: Welchen Teil des Gewinns
aus dem Preisausschreiben wu¨rden Sie fu¨r die einerseits riskante, andererseits
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gewinnversprechende Lotterie einsetzen? [Imagine you win 100.000 Euro in a
lottery. Immediately after receiving the money you get an offer to participate
in the following lottery: There is a chance to double the money. But there is
an equally high chance to lose half of the money invested in the lottery. You
can participate in the lottery using the whole amount you won or only a part
of it. We would like to know: How much of the money you won in the lottery
would you invest in the risky yet profitable lottery? ]
11. Stellen Sie sich vor Sie haben in einem Preisausschreiben gewonnen. Sie ko¨nnen
zwischen zwei Auszahlungsalternativen wa¨hlen. Entweder erhalten Sie ein Los
oder eine sichere Auszahlung. Wenn Sie sich fu¨r das Los entscheiden erhalten
Sie mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit 1.000 Euro und mit 50% Wahrscheinlichkeit
nichts. U¨berlegen Sie bitte: Wie hoch mu¨sste die sichere Auszahlung min-
destens sein, damit Sie die sichere Auszahlung gegenu¨ber dem Los bevorzugen?
[Imagine you won a prize in a lottery. You can choose between two payment
options. Either you get a raffle ticket or you get a safe payment. If you de-
cide to take the raffle ticket you receive 1,000 Euro with a probability of 50%
and you receive nothing with a probability of 50%. Please consider: How much
money would the safe payment need to be in order for you to prefer it over the
raffle ticket? ]
12. Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Sie sind die einzige Person im Haushalt
mit einem monatlichen Einkommen, und Sie haben einen guten Job, durch
den Ihr aktuelles Familieneinkommen fu¨r den Rest Ihres Lebens gesichert ist.
Nun wird Ihnen die Mo¨glichkeit angeboten einen neuen und ebenso guten Job
anzunehmen. Bei dem neuen Job ist die Bezahlung variabel, so dass sich
mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% Ihr Haushaltseinkommen verdoppeln
wird, und mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit Sie eine Einkommenseinbuße von
30% haben. Wa¨ren Sie bereit diesen neuen Job anzunehmen? [Imagine the
following situation: you are the only member of your household that has a
monthly income, and you have a good job which would guarantee your family
income for the rest of your life. Now you have the option to take a new and
equally good job. The payment at this new job is variable, so that your house-
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hold income will double with a probability of 50% and will decrease by 30% with
the same probability. Would you be willing to take the new job? ]
Time Discounting
1. Staircase
2. List of 25 hypothetical choices between 100 Euro today or an equal or larger
payment in 12 months. The larger payment starts at 100 Euro and increases
up to 185 Euro.32
3. Sind Sie jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, heute auf etwas zu verzichten,
um in der Zukunft davon zu profitieren, oder sind Sie dazu nicht bereit? [Are
you a person who is generally willing to give up something today in order to
benefit from that in the future, or are you not willing to do so? ]
4. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen im Allgemeinen bereit, heute auf etwas zu
verzichten, um in der Zukunft davon zu profitieren, oder sind Sie im Vergleich
zu anderen dazu nicht bereit? [In comparison to others, are you a person who
is generally willing to give up something today in order to benefit from that in
the future or are you not willing to do so? ]
5. Scha¨tzen andere Sie im Allgemeinen als jemanden ein, der bereit ist, heute auf
etwas zu verzichten, um in der Zukunft davon zu profitieren, oder als jemanden,
der dazu nicht bereit ist? [Do other people generally assess you as a person
who is willing to give up something today in order to benefit from that in the
future or as someone who is not willing to do so? ]
6. Wie scha¨tzen Sie Ihre Bereitschaft, auf etwas zu verzichten, um in Zukunft
davon zu profitieren, in Bezug auf die folgenden Bereiche ein? [How would you
assess your willingness to give up something today in order to benefit from that
in the future in the following contexts:]
32The larger payments are 100.0/103.0/106.1/109.2/112.4/115.6/118.8/122.1/125.4/128.8/
132.3/135.7/139.2/142.8/146.4/150.1/153.8/157.5/161.3/165.1/169.0/172.9/176.9/180.9/185
Euro.
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(a) Wenn es um finanzielle Entscheidungen geht. [When it comes to financial
decisions.]
(b) Wenn es um wichtige Entscheidungen im Leben geht. [When it comes to
important decisions in life.]
(c) Wenn es um die berufliche Karriere geht. [When it comes to your profes-
sional career.]
(d) Wenn es um gro¨ßere Anschaffungen geht. [When it comes to bigger pur-
chases.]
(e) Wenn es um eine gro¨ßere Reise geht. [When it comes to a longer jour-
ney/trip.]
7. In welchen Maße treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? [How well do the fol-
lowing statements describe you as a person? ]
(a) Ich stelle oft fest, dass ich Entscheidungen treffe, von denen ich weiß,
dass ich sie ku¨nftig bereuen werde. [I often realize that I make decisions
knowing that I will regret them in the future.]
(b) Ich denke oft u¨ber die Zukunft nach. [I often think about the future.]
(c) Mir fa¨llt es oft schwer, auf ungesundes, aber leckeres Essen zu verzichten.
[I find it hard to resist unhealthy but delicious food.]
(d) Ich bin jemand, dem es ziemlich egal ist, was morgen passiert, und der nur
im Hier und Jetzt lebt. [I am a person who does not care about tomorrow
and who only lives for the moment.]
(e) Ich bin eine Person, die ha¨ufig getroffene Entscheidungen bereut. [I am a
person who often regrets my own decisions.]
(f) Ich bin eine Person, die oft vorschnell handelt. [I am a person who often
acts hastily/prematurely.]
(g) Ich spare fu¨r meine Rente. [I save for my retirement.]
(h) Mir fa¨llt es nicht allzu schwer, Versuchungen zu widerstehen. [I do not
find it hard to resist temptations.]
(i) Ich gebe zu viel Geld aus. [I spend too much money.]
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(j) Ich esse zu viel. [I eat too much.]
(k) Ich mache zu wenig Sport. [I work out too little.]
(l) Ich wu¨nschte, ich ha¨tte mehr Selbstdisziplin. [I wish I was more self-
disciplined.]
(m) Ich bin meistens ausreichend auf Klausuren vorbereitet. [Usually I am
sufficiently prepared for exams.]
(n) Ich handle oft, ohne alle Alternativen in Betracht gezogen zu haben. [I
often act without considering all alternatives.]
(o) In Gespra¨chen neige ich dazu, Leute zu unterbrechen. [I tend to interrupt
people in conversations.]
(p) Wenn ich mir ein Ziel gesetzt habe, erreiche ich dieses in der Regel auch.
[Once I set a goal for myself I usually achieve it.]
(q) Mir fa¨llt es schwer, schlechte Angewohnheiten abzulegen. [I find it hard
to give up bad habits.]
(r) Ich bin immer pu¨nktlich. [I am always on time.]
(s) Ich mag es u¨berhaupt nicht, an der Ampel darauf zu warten, dass sie gru¨n
wird. [I completely dislike waiting for a red light to turn green.]
(t) Wenn ich auf etwas warten muss, empfinde ich das als unangenehm. [I
find waiting uncomfortable.]
(u) Dinge, die Spaß machen, halten mich oft davon ab, andere wichtigere
Dinge zu erledigen. [Things that are fun often keep me from taking care
of more important things.]
(v) Ich neige dazu, Dinge auf spa¨ter zu verschieben, auch wenn es besser wa¨re,
diese sofort zu erledigen. [I tend to postpone things even though it would
be better to take care of them right away.]
8. In welchem Maße treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? [How well do the
following statements apply to you:]
(a) Ich kann mir gut vorstellen, wie mein na¨chster Job aussieht. [I have a
good idea of what my next job will look like.]
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(b) Mein derzeitiges Leben ist vo¨llig anders, als ich es mir vor drei Jahren
vorgestellt habe. [My life at the moment is completely different from what
I imagined it would be like three years ago.]
(c) Ich habe ein klares Bild von dem, was ich im kommenden Jahr erwarten
kann. [I have a precise idea/clear picture of what I can expect in the
upcoming year.]
(d) Letztes Jahr ist ziemlich anders verlaufen, als ich vorher erwartet hatte.
[Last year went very differently from what I previously expected.]
(e) Wenn ich eine wichtige Entscheidung treffen muss, bilde ich mir eine sehr
genaue Vorstellung u¨ber die Konsequenzen dieser Entscheidung. [When I
have to make an important decision, I try to paint a clear picture/get a
precise idea of the consequences of that decision.]
(f) Wenn ich eine wichtige Entscheidung getroffen habe, stimmt das Ergebnis
gewo¨hnlich mit dem u¨berein, was ich mir vorgestellt hatte. [When I make
an important decision, the outcome usually corresponds with what I have
imagined it to be.]
9. Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie ha¨tten eine 10-ta¨gige Urlaubsreise im Wert von 2.000
Euro fu¨r 2 Personen zu einem spannenden Reiseziel gewonnen. Aufgrund von
großer Nachfrage bei der Buchung werden Sie gefragt, ob Sie bereit wa¨ren, drei
Jahre auf den Urlaub zu warten. [Imagine you had won a 10-day trip for two
people worth 2,000 Euro to an exciting destination. Due to high demand you
are asked whether you would be willing to wait three years before making the
trip.]
(a) Im Gegenzug wu¨rde man Ihnen zusa¨tzliche Reisetage schenken. Bitte
u¨berlegen Sie: Wie viele zusa¨tzliche Reisetage mu¨sste man Ihnen anbieten,
damit Sie bereit wa¨ren, die Reise erst in drei Jahren zu unternehmen? [In
return for waiting you would be given an extension of the trip. Please
consider: how many extra days would one have to offer you for you to be
willing to postpone the trip for three years? ]
(b) Wenn es ebenfalls mo¨glich wa¨re, die Urlaubsreise gegen einen Geldbetrag
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zu tauschen: wie viel Geld mu¨sste man Ihnen anbieten, so dass Sie bereit
wa¨ren, auf die Urlaubsreise zu verzichten? [If it was possible to exchange
the trip for money: how much money would one need to offer you for you
to be willing to forgo the trip? ]
10. Die folgenden Aussagen kennzeichnen verschiedene Einstellungen zum Leben
und zur Zukunft. [The following statements characterize different attitudes
towards life and the future.]
(a) Ich bemu¨he mich, immer eine Geldreserve fu¨r unerwartete Ausgaben zu
haben. [I try hard to always have some extra money for unexpected ex-
penditures.]
(b) Ich verzichte heute auf etwas, damit ich mir morgen mehr leisten kann. [I
give up something today so that I can afford more tomorrow.]
(c) Ich will lieber heute meinen Spaß haben, und denke dabei nicht an morgen.
[I would rather have some fun today and not think about tomorrow.]
(d) Meine monatlichen Ausgaben sind oft ho¨her, als ich es mir leisten kann.
[My monthly expenses often exceed what I can afford.]
(e) Ich bin jemand, der sich an die eigenen guten Vorsa¨tze oft nicht ha¨lt. [I
am a person who often does not keep my own good resolutions.]
11. Wie viel Geld sparen Sie pro Monat? Versuchen Sie bitte, Ihren monatlichen
Sparbetrag so genau wie mo¨glich anzugeben. [How much money do you save
per month? Please try to specify the amount you save per month as exactly as
possible.]
12. Wenn Sie plo¨tzlich in eine unvorhergesehene Situation geraten wu¨rden, und
Sie innerhalb von zwei Wochen etwa 1.000 Euro bezahlen mu¨ssten, ko¨nnten
Sie das schaffen? [I you suddenly got into an unforeseen situation, and you had
to pay about 1,000 Euro within two weeks: could you manage that? ]
Altruism
1. Sind Sie jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, mit anderen zu teilen, ohne
dafu¨r eine Gegenleistung zu erwarten, oder sind Sie dazu nicht bereit? [Are
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you a person who is generally willing to share with others without expecting
something in return, or are you not willing to do so? ]
2. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, mit
anderen zu teilen, ohne dafu¨r eine Gegenleistung zu erwarten, oder sind Sie im
Vergleich zu anderen dazu nicht bereit? [In comparison to others, are you a
person who is generally willing to share with others without expecting something
in return, or are you not willing to do so (in comparison to others)? ]
3. Scha¨tzen andere Sie als jemanden ein, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, mit an-
deren zu teilen, ohne dafu¨r einen Gegenleistung zu erwarten, oder als jemanden,
der dazu nicht bereit ist? [Do other people assess you as a person who is gen-
erally willing to share with others without expecting something in return or as
a person who is not willing to do so? ]
4. Wie scha¨tzen Sie Ihre Bereitschaft mit anderen zu teilen, ohne dafu¨r einen
Gegenleistung zu erwarten, in Bezug auf die folgenden Bereiche ein? [How do
you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in
return in the following contexts:]
(a) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Stadt. [With people in your hometown.]
(b) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrem Freundeskreis. [With people in your circle
of friends.]
(c) Im beruflichen Umfeld. [With people from your professional environment.]
(d) Gegenu¨ber Fremden. [With strangers.]
(e) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Nachbarschaft. [With people in your neigh-
borhood.]
(f) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Notlagen. [With people in distress or emergency
situations.]
(g) Wenn es um gemeinnu¨tzige Zwecke geht. [When it comes to charity.]
5. Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Sie haben in einem Preisausschreiben
1.000 Euro gewonnen. Wie viel wu¨rden Sie in Ihrer momentanen Situation fu¨r
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einen gemeinnu¨tzigen Zweck spenden? [Imagine the following situation: you
won 1,000 Euro in a lottery. Considering your current situation, how much
would you donate to charity? ]
6. Wie sehr treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? [How well do the following
statements describe you as a person? ]
(a) Im Beruf bin ich nur dann bereit etwas fu¨r einen Kollegen zu tun, wenn
ich davon ausgehe, dass dieser dasselbe fu¨r mich tun wu¨rde. [At work I
am only willing to do something for a colleague if I expect that he would
do the same for me.]
(b) Ich bin bereit, Zeit und Geld fu¨r einen mir sinnvoll erscheinenden gemeinnu¨tzi-
gen Zweck aufzuwenden, auch wenn mir das nicht direkt selber nu¨tzt. [I
am willing to donate time and money to charity, even if I don’t profit from
that directly.]
(c) Ich bin bereit anderen zu helfen, auch wenn ich davon ausgehe, dass ich
diesen Menschen nie wieder begegnen werde. [I am willing to help others
even if I expect that I will never meet them again.]
(d) Wenn ich Zeit und Geld fu¨r etwas aufwende, erwarte ich, in Zukunft
selbst davon zu profitieren. [When I spend time and money on something
I expect to profit from that in the future.]
(e) Wenn ich Geld spende, erwarte ich, dass dies zur Kenntnis genommen
wird, und ich Besta¨tigung erhalte. [When I donate money I expect that
this is recognized and acknowledged.]
(f) Ich kann nicht nachvollziehen, warum manche Menschen ihre Lebenszeit
dafu¨r verwenden, fu¨r einen Zweck zu ka¨mpfen, der ihnen nicht unmittelbar
nu¨tzt. [I do not understand why some people spend their lifetime fighting
for a cause which they do not benefit from directly.]
(g) Ich bin jemand, der sein letztes Hemd gibt, um anderen zu helfen. [I am
a person who would give their shirt off their back to help others.]
(h) Im Vergleich zu anderen bin ich eher selbstlos. [In comparison to others
I am a rather selfless person.]
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(i) Ich bin nur bereit Menschen zu helfen, wenn ich davon ausgehe, dass diese
dasselbe fu¨r mich tun wu¨rden. [I am only willing to help others if I expect
that they would do the same for me.]
(j) Andere Menschen betrachten mich als eine uneigennu¨tzige Person. [Other
people regard me as an unselfish person.]
7. Geben Sie bitte mo¨glichst genau an, wie viele Stunden Sie pro Monat aufwen-
den, um sich fu¨r gemeinnu¨tzige Zwecke einzusetzen, wie etwa Umweltschutz,
Jugendarbeit, usw. [Please specify as precisely as possible how many hours per
month you volunteer for good causes, e.g. protecting the environment.]
8. Wie viele Menschen wissen von Ihrem gemeinnu¨tzigen Engagement? [How
many people know that you commit time to charitable purposes? ]
Trust
1. Sind Sie im Allgemeinen jemand, der bereit ist, anderen Menschen zu ver-
trauen, oder sind Sie nicht bereit, anderen zu vertrauen? [Generally speaking,
are you a person who is willing to trust other people, or are you not willing to
trust other people? ]
2. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen im Allgemeinen bereit, anderen Menschen
zu vertrauen, oder sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen nicht bereit, anderen zu
vertrauen? [In comparison to others are you a person who is generally willing
to trust other people, or a you not willing to trust others (in comparison to
others)? ]
3. Scha¨tzen andere Sie im Allgemeinen als jemanden ein, der bereit ist, anderen
zu vertrauen, oder als jemanden, der nicht bereit ist, anderen zu vertrauen?
[Do other people assess you as a person who is generally willing to trust others
or as a person who is not willing to trust others? ]
4. Wie scha¨tzen Sie Ihre Bereitschaft, anderen zu vertrauen, in Bezug auf die
folgenden Bereiche ein? [How do you assess your willingness to trust others in
the following contexts? ]
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(a) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Stadt. [When it comes to people in your
hometown.]
(b) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrem Freundeskreis. [When it comes to people
in your circle of friends.]
(c) Im beruflichen Umfeld. [When it comes to your professional environment.]
(d) Gegenu¨ber Fremden. [When it comes to strangers.]
(e) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Nachbarschaft. [When it comes to people
in your neighborhood.]
5. Sie sind im Urlaub in einem fremden Land, und eine Person, die Sie im Hotel
treffen, die Sie aber nicht kennen, bittet Sie um einen Gefallen: Sie beno¨tigt
schnell Bargeld, um den Arztbesuch ihres Partners zu bezahlen, und versichert
Ihnen, das Geld am kommenden Tag zuru¨ck zu geben. Wie viel wa¨ren Sie
bereit, dieser Person zu leihen? [You are on vacation in a foreign country. A
person, whom you meet in your hotel but whom you do not know, asks you for
a favor. He or she urgently needs cash in order to pay for their partner’s doctor
visit, and promises to pay you back the following day. How much money would
you be willing to lend to that person? ]
6. Wie oft kommt es vor, dass... [How often does it happen that...]
(a) Sie einen Anhalter mitnehmen? [you take a hitchhiker with you? ]
(b) Sie Ihre perso¨nlichen Wertgegensta¨nde an einem o¨ffentlichen Ort unbeobachtet
lassen? [you leave your personal belongings unattended in a public place? ]
(c) Sie Ihre Wohnungstu¨r nicht abschließen? [do not lock your apartment
door? ]
7. Wie sehr treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? [How well do the following
statements describe you as a person? ]
(a) Im Vergleich zu anderen Menschen fasse ich schnell Vertrauen in fremde
Personen. [In comparison to others I quickly (build up) trust with strangers.]
(b) Andere Menschen halten mich fu¨r zu vertrauensselig. [Other people regard
me as too credulous and trusting.]
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(c) Mir fa¨llt es nicht schwer, perso¨nliche Dinge mit Menschen zu besprechen,
die ich noch nicht lange kenne. [I find it difficult to talk about personal
issues with people I haven’t known for a long time yet.]
(d) Solange man mich nicht vom Gegenteil u¨berzeugt, gehe ich stets davon
aus, dass andere Menschen nur das Beste im Sinn haben. [As long as
I am not convinced otherwise, I assume that people have only the best
intentions.]
8. Was glauben Sie, wie sehr treffen die folgenden Aussagen im Allgemeinen zu?
[What do you think: how well do the following statements apply? ]
(a) Im Allgemeinen kann man den Menschen vertrauen. [In general, one can
trust other people.]
(b) Heutzutage kann man sich auf niemanden mehr verlassen. [Nowadays one
cannot rely on anyone anymore.]
(c) Im Umgang mit Fremden ist es besser, vorsichtig zu sein, bevor man sich
auf sie verla¨sst. [When dealing with strangers it is better to be careful
before one relies on them.]
9. Glauben Sie... [Do you think...]
(a) dass die meisten Menschen Sie ausnutzen wu¨rden, wenn sie die Gelegen-
heit ha¨tten, oder... [that most people would take advantage of you when
they have the chance, or... ]
(b) dass sich die meisten Menschen fair Ihnen gegenu¨ber verhalten wu¨rden?
[that most people would be fair to you? ]
10. Wu¨rden Sie eher sagen... [Would you rather say...]
(a) dass Menschen meistens versuchen hilfsbereit zu sein, oder... [that most
people try to be helpful/cooperative, or...]
(b) dass die Menschen meistens nur in ihrem eigenen Interesse handeln? [that
most people only act in their own best interest? ]
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Positive Reciprocity and Negative Reciprocity
1. Sind Sie jemand, der sich im Allgemeinen besonders anstrengt einen Gefallen
oder eine Hilfe zu erwidern, auch wenn das fu¨r Sie mit Kosten verbunden ist,
oder sind Sie dazu nicht bereit? [Are you a person who is generally willing to
go out of their way to return a favor or a help even if it is costly, or are you
not willing to do so? ]
2. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen jemand, der sich besonders anstrengt einen
Gefallen oder eine Hilfe zu erwidern, auch wenn das fu¨r ihn mit Kosten verbun-
den ist, oder sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen dazu nicht bereit? [In comparion
to others, are you a person who goes out of their way to return a favor or a help
even if it is costly, or are you not wiling to do so (in comparison to others)? ]
3. Scha¨tzen andere Sie im Allgemeinen als jemanden ein, der sich besonders
anstrengt einen Gefallen oder eine Hilfe zu erwidern, auch wenn das fu¨r ihn
mit Kosten verbunden ist, oder als jemanden, der dazu nicht bereit ist? [Do
other people assess you as a person who goes out of their way to return a favor
or a help even if it is costly or as a person who is not willing to do so? ]
4. Wie scha¨tzen Sie Ihre Bereitschaft, einen Gefallen oder eine Hilfe zu erwidern,
in Bezug auf die folgenden Bereiche ein? [How do you assess your willingness
to return a favor or a help in the following contexts? ]
(a) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Stadt. [When it comes to people in your
hometown.]
(b) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrem Freundeskreis. [When it comes to your
circle of friends.]
(c) In Ihrem beruflichen Umfeld. [When it comes to your professional envi-
ronment.]
(d) Gegenu¨ber Fremden. [When it comes to strangers.]
(e) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Nachbarschaft. [When it comes to people
in your neighborhood.]
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5. Sind Sie jemand, der in Allgemeinen bereit ist, unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen,
auch wenn das fu¨r Sie mit Kosten verbunden ist, oder sind Sie dazu nicht bereit?
[Are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior even if it
is costly? ]
6. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, un-
faires Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch wenn das fu¨r Sie mit Kosten verbunden ist,
oder sind Sie im Vergleich mit anderen dazu nicht bereit? [In comparison to
others, are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior even
if it is costly, or are you not willing to do so (in comparison to others)? ]
7. Scha¨tzen andere Sie als jemanden ein, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, unfaires
Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch wenn das fu¨r ihn mit Kosten verbunden ist, oder
als jemanden, der im Allgemeinen nicht dazu bereit ist? [Do other people assess
you as a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior even if it is
costly, or as a person, who is generally not willing to do so? ]
8. Wie wu¨rden Sie Ihre Bereitschaft, unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch wenn
das fu¨r Sie mit Kosten verbunden ist, in Bezug auf die folgenden Bereiche
einscha¨tzen? [How would you assess your willingness to punish unfair behavior
even if it is costly in the following contexts? ]
(a) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Stadt. [When it comes to people in your
hometown.]
(b) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrem Freundeskreis. [When it comes to your
circle of friends.]
(c) Im beruflichen Umfeld. [When it comes to your professional environment.]
(d) Gegenu¨ber Fremden. [When it comes to strangers.]
(e) Gegenu¨ber Menschen in Ihrer Nachbarschaft. [When it comes to people
in your neighborhood.]
9. Sind Sie jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, faires Verhalten zu belohnen
und unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch wenn das fu¨r Sie mit Kosten ver-
bunden ist, oder sind Sie dazu nicht bereit? [Are you a person who is generally
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willing to reward fair behavior and punish unfair behavior even if it is costly,
or are you not willing to do so? ]
10. Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, faires
Verhalten zu belohnen und unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch wenn das fu¨r
Sie mit Kosten verbunden ist, oder sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen dazu nicht
bereit? [In comparison to others, are you a person who is generally willing to
reward fair behavior and punish unfair behavior, even if it is costly, or are you
not willing to do so (in comparison to others)? ]
11. Scha¨tzen andere Sie als jemanden ein, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, faires
Verhalten zu belohnen und unfaires Verhalten zu bestrafen, auch wenn das fu¨r
ihn mit Kosten verbunden ist, oder als jemanden, der dazu nicht bereit ist?
[Do other people assess you as a person who is generally willing to reward fair
behavior and punish unfair behavior even if it is costly, or as a person who is
not willing to do so? ]
12. Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Zusammen mit einer anderen Person,
die Sie nicht kennen, haben Sie 100 Euro bei einem Preisausschreiben gewon-
nen. Die Regeln besagen nun folgendes: Einer von Ihnen soll einen Vorschlag
daru¨ber machen, wie die 100 Euro aufgeteilt werden. Der andere erfa¨hrt den
Vorschlag, und hat dann zwei Mo¨glichkeiten. Er kann die Aufteilung annehmen
oder ablehnen. Wenn er den Vorschlag annimmt, wird das Geld so aufgeteilt,
wie die andere Person es vorgeschlagen hat. Wird die Aufteilung abgelehnt,
gehen beide leer aus.
Angenommen, die andere Person schla¨gt folgende Aufteilung vor: 50 Euro fu¨r
Sie und 50 Euro fu¨r sich. Nehmen Sie diese Aufteilung an? Dann erhalten Sie
50 Euro und die andere Person 50 Euro. Wenn Sie ablehnen erhalten beide
null Euro.
Insgesamt wurden 5 Fragen mit gleichem Wortlaut aber unterschiedlichen Aufteilun-
gen beantwortet. die Aufteilungen sahen Betra¨ge von 50, 40, 30, 20 und 10
Euro fu¨r den Entscheider vor.
[Imagine the following situation: together with a person whom you do not know
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you won 100 Euro in a lottery. The rules stipulate the following: One of you
has to make a proposal about how to divide the 100 Euro between you two. The
other one gets to know the proposal and has to decide between two options. He
or she can accept the proposal or reject it. If he or she accepts the proposal, the
money is divided according to the proposal. If he or she rejects the proposal,
both receive nothing.
Suppose that the other person offered the following split: 50 Euro for you and
50 Euro for himself/herself. Do you accept this split? If you do, you will receive
50 Euro and the other person will receive 50 Euro. If you reject, both of you
receive 0 Euro.
Note that individuals answered a total of 5 questions that use the same wording
but vary the amount that was offered by the other person. These amounts were
50, 40, 30, 20, and 10. ]
(a) Angenommen, die andere Person macht einen Vorschlag u¨ber die Aufteilung.
Sie wiederum sollen entscheiden, ob Sie den Vorschlag annehmen oder
ablehnen. Welchen Betrag muss die andere Person Ihnen mindestens anbi-
eten, damit Sie bereit sind, den Vorschlag u¨ber die Aufteilung anzunehmen?
[Assume that the other person makes the proposal about how to divide the
money. You on the other hand have to decide whether to accept or reject
the proposal. What is the minimum amount the other person has to offer
you for you to be willing to accept the proposal? ]
(b) Angenommen, Sie sollen den Vorschlag u¨ber die Aufteilung machen. Welchen
Betrag wu¨rden Sie der anderen Person anbieten? [Assume that you have
to make the proposal about how to divide the money. Which amount would
you offer to the other person? ]
13. Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Sie sind beim Einkaufen unterwegs in
einer fremden Stadt, und merken, dass Sie sich verlaufen haben. Sie fragen
eine fremde Person nach dem Weg. Die Person bietet Ihnen an, Sie mit dem
Auto zu Ihrem Ziel zu fahren. Die Fahrt dauert etwa 20 Minuten, und kostet
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die fremde Person alles in allem etwa 20 Euro. Die fremde Person will aber
kein Geld dafu¨r. Sie haben 6 Flaschen Wein dabei. Die billigste Flasche kostet
5 Euro, die teuerste kostet 30 Euro. Sie entscheiden, der fremden Person eine
Flasche Wein als Dankescho¨n zu geben. Welche Flasche schenken Sie? [Imagine
the following situation: you are shopping in an unfamiliar city and realize you
lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take
you with their car to your destination. The ride takes about 20 minutes and
costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total. The stranger does not want money
for it. You carry six bottles of wine with you. The cheapest bottle costs 5 Euro,
the most expensive one 30 Euro. You decide to give one of the bottles to the
stranger as a thank-you gift. Which bottle do you give? (Options: The bottle
for 5/10/15/20/25/30 Euro)]
14. Angenommen, Sie sind im Ausland und mu¨ssen a¨rztlich behandelt werden. Es
ist in diesem Land u¨blich, dass der Arzt nur gegen Barzahlung behandelt. Die
Behandlung kostet umgerechnet 100 Euro. Sie haben aber kein Bargeld bei
sich. Eine fremde Person im Wartezimmer beobachtet dies, und schenkt Ihnen
umgerechnet 100 Euro. Sie nehmen das Geschenk gerne an. Sie fragen nach
der Adresse der Person. Als Sie zwei Wochen spa¨ter wieder zu Hause sind,
u¨berlegen Sie, dass Sie sich bei der Person bedanken und ein Geschenk nach
Hause schicken mo¨chten. Wie viel investieren Sie in ein Geschenk, das Sie
dann verschicken? [Assume that you are abroad and need medical treatment.
In the country you are in it is common that the doctor treats patients only for
cash. The treatment costs about 100 Euro. You don’t have any cash with you.
A stranger in the waiting room observes the situation and gives 100 Euro as
a gift to you. You are happy to take the gift. You ask the stranger for their
address. When returning home two weeks later you decide that you want to
thank the stranger and send them a present. How much do you spend on a
present that you then send to the stranger? ]
15. U¨berlegen Sie bitte, was Sie in folgender Situation tun wu¨rden: Sie sind mit
einer fremden Person in einen Verkehrsunfall verwickelt. Sie trifft keinerlei
Schuld, aber die andere Person behauptet, Sie seien u¨ber Rot gefahren, obwohl
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die Person selbst u¨ber Rot gefahren ist. Obwohl die Behauptung der Person
falsch ist, glaubt man ihr und Sie mu¨ssen eine Strafe in Ho¨he von 300 Euro
bezahlen. Es hab einen Augenzeugen, der gesehen hat, was passiert ist. Wenn
der Augenzeuge aussagt, mu¨ssen Sie die Strafe von 300 Euro nicht zahlen,
sondern der fremde Fahrer. Zusa¨tzlich muss der fremde Fahrer eine Strafe
wegen Falschaussage in Ho¨he von 1.000 Euro bezahlen. Nehmen Sie an, dass
ein Detektiv den Augenzeugen auf jeden Fall findet, und dass der Augenzeuge
aussagt, wenn er gefunden wird. Wie viel Geld sind Sie ho¨chstens bereit, fu¨r
den Detektiv auszugeben? [Please consider what you would do in the following
situation: you and a stranger are involved in a car accident. You are not to
blame for the accident, but the stranger claims that you ran a red light even
though it was the stranger himself who ran the red light. Even though the
stranger’s claim is false, the claim is believed to be correct and you have to pay
a fine of 300 Euro. There was an eyewitness who saw what really happened.
If the eyewitness testifies, you don’t have to pay the fine but the stranger has
to instead. In addition the stranger will then have to pay a fine for making
a false testimony. Assume that there is detective who will definitely find the
eyewitness, and that the eyewitness will testify if the detective finds him. What
is the maximum amount of money that you are willing to spend on hiring the
detective? ]
16. U¨berlegen Sie bitte, was Sie in folgender Situation tun wu¨rden: Sie und eine
andere Person, die Sie nicht kennen, treffen beide eine Entscheidung u¨ber die
Verwendung von Geld und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. Die Regeln gehen
so: Jeder Teilnehmer erha¨lt ein Konto mit 20 Euro. Am Anfang haben Sie und
die andere Person also jeweils 20 Euro auf dem Konto. Zuerst entscheidet die
andere Person. Sie kann Ihnen Geld auf Ihr Konto u¨berweisen. Sie kann Ihnen
einen beliebigen Eurobetrag u¨berweisen, also 0 Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro, usw.
bis 20 Euro. Jeder Euro, den die andere Person an Sie u¨berweist, wird von
den Leitern der Studie verdreifacht und Ihrem Konto gutgeschrieben. Nach
dem ersten Schritt sind also auf dem Konto der anderen Person 20 Euro minus
der U¨berweisung an Sie. Auf Ihrem Konto sind 20 Euro plus dem Dreifachen
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der U¨berweisung an Sie. Jetzt entscheiden Sie: Sie haben die Mo¨glichkeit,
der anderen Person Geld zuru¨ck zu u¨berweisen. Sie ko¨nnen jeden beliebigen
Eurobetrag zuru¨ck u¨berweisen, also 0 Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro, usw. bis 80 Euro,
je nachdem, wie viel Geld Sie insgesamt auf Ihrem Konto gutgeschrieben haben,
nachdem Sie die U¨berweisung der anderen Person erhalten haben. Damit ist
die Studie beendet. Die endgu¨ltigen Kontosta¨nde sind erreicht. Auf dem Konto
der anderen Person sind jetzt 20 Euro minus der U¨berweisung an Sie plus Ihrer
Ru¨cku¨berweisung. Auf Ihrem Konto sind jetzt 20 Euro plus das Dreifache der
U¨berweisung der anderen Person an Sie minus Ihrer Ru¨cku¨berweisung. Wir
mo¨chten nun von Ihnen wissen, welche Ru¨cku¨berweisung Sie wa¨hlen wu¨rden,
wenn die andere Person Ihnen einen bestimmten Betrag u¨berweist. [Please
consider what you would do in the following situation: you and a person whom
you do not know both have to make a decision about the employment of money
and together you achieve an outcome. The rules are the following: both of you
get an account with 20 Euro. Thus, at first, both you and the other person have
20 Euro each on their account. The other person has to decide first. She can
transfer money to your account. She can transfer any round amount, i.e. 0
Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro, etc. up to 20 Euro. Each Euro that the other person
decides to transfer to you is tripled by the people conducting the study and then
credited to your account. Thus, after the first step the other person has 20 Euro
minus the amount she transferred to you on her account. You on the other hand
have 20 Euro plus three times the amount that was transferred to you on your
account. Now you have to make a decision. You can transfer money back to the
other person. You can transfer any amount to the other person, i.e. 0 Euro, 1
Euro, 2 Euro, etc. up to 80 Euro depending on how much money is on your
account after receiving the transfer from the other person. After this decision
the study is over, and the amount on the two accounts are final. The other
person has 20 Euro minus the amount she transferred to you plus the amount
you transferred back on her account. You have 20 Euro plus three times the
amount the other person transferred to you minus the amount you transferred
to the other person on your account. For a given transfer of the other person
we would now like to know how much money you would decide to transfer back.]
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(a) Angenommen, die andere Person u¨berweist Ihnen 5 Euro. Sie haben dann
nach dem ersten Schritt 20+3*5 Euro = 35 Euro, die andere Person hat
20-5 Euro = 15 Euro. Wie hoch ist Ihre Ru¨cku¨berweisung? [Assume that
the other person transfers 5 Euro to your account. After the first step you
have 20+3*5 Euro = 35 Euro, the other person has 20-5 Euro = 15 Euro.
Which amount do you transfer back? ]
(b) Angenommen, die andere Person u¨berweist Ihnen 10 Euro. Sie haben
dann nach dem ersten Schritt 20+3*10 Euro = 50 Euro, die andere Person
hat 20-10 Euro = 10 Euro. Wie hoch ist Ihre Ru¨cku¨berweisung? [Assume
that the other person transfers 10 Euro to your account. After the first
step you have 20+3*10 Euro = 50 Euro, the other person has 20-10 Euro
= 10 Euro. Which amount do you transfer back? ]
(c) Angenommen, die andere Person u¨berweist Ihnen 15 Euro. Sie haben
dann nach dem ersten Schritt 20+3*15 Euro = 65 Euro, die andere Person
hat 20-15 Euro = 5 Euro. Wie hoch ist Ihre Ru¨cku¨berweisung? [Assume
that the other person transfers 15 Euro to your account. After the first
step you have 20+3*15 Euro = 65 Euro, the other person has 20-15 Euro
= 5 Euro. Which amount do you transfer back? ]
(d) Angenommen, die andere Person u¨berweist Ihnen 20 Euro. Sie haben
dann nach dem ersten Schritt 20+3*20 Euro = 80 Euro, die andere Person
hat 20-20 Euro = 0 Euro. Wie hoch ist Ihre Ru¨cku¨berweisung? [Assume
that the other person transfers 20 Euro to your account. After the first
step you have 20+3*20 Euro = 80 Euro, the other person has 20-20 Euro
= 0 Euro. Which amount do you transfer back? ]
(e) Zum Schluss noch eine andere Frage. Angenommen Sie wa¨ren in der
Rolle der anderen Person, d.h. Sie mu¨ssten entscheiden, welchen Betrag
Sie u¨berweisen wu¨rden. Welchen Betrag wu¨rden Sie u¨berweisen? [Finally,
a different question: assume you were in the position of the other person
and had to decide which amount to transfer. Which amount would you
transfer? ]
17. In welchem Maße treffen folgende Aussagen auf Sie zu? [How well do the
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following statements describe you as a person? ]
(a) Wenn mir jemand einen Gefallen tut, bin ich bereit, diesen zu erwidern.
[When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it.]
(b) Wenn mir schweres Unrecht zuteil wird, werde ich mich bei na¨chster Gele-
genheit um jeden Preis dafu¨r ra¨chen. [If I suffer a serious wrong I will
take revenge at the first opportunity.]
(c) Wenn mich jemand in eine schwierige Lage bringt, werde ich das Gleiche
mit ihm machen. [When someone puts me into a difficult situation I will
do the same to them.]
(d) Ich strenge mich besonders an, um jemandem zu helfen, der mir fru¨her
schon einmal geholfen hat. [I go out of my way to help someone who has
helped me before.]
(e) Wenn mich jemand beleidigt, werde ich mich auch ihm gegenu¨ber beleidi-
gend verhalten. [If someone insults me I will also behave in an insulting
way towards him.]
(f) Ich bin bereit Kosten auf mich zu nehmen, um jemandem zu helfen, der
mir fru¨her schon mal geholfen hat. [I am willing to incur costs to help
someone who has helped me before.]
(g) Wenn mir jemand mit Absicht Schaden zufu¨gt, werde ich versuchen, es
dieser Person mit gleicher Mu¨nze heimzuzahlen. [If someone harms me
on purpose I will try to give that person a taste of his own medicine.]
(h) Ich bin jemand, der sich nicht fu¨r dumm verkaufen la¨sst. [I am not a
person who is taken for a fool.]
(i) Ich mag das Gefu¨hl nicht, jemandem etwas zu schulden. [I do not like the
feeling of owing something to someone.]
(j) Wenn sich jemand im Sport unfair mir gegenu¨ber verha¨lt, werde ich mich
bei na¨chster Gelegenheit auch unfair verhalten. [If someone behaves un-
fairly towards me in sports, I will also behave unfairly towards them.]
(k) Ich bin jemand, der sich nicht auf der Nase herumtanzen la¨sst. [I am not
a person who lets others push me around.]
125
(l) Wenn mir ein Kollege am Arbeitsplatz einen Gefallen tut, achte ich beson-
ders darauf, diesen bei na¨chster Gelegenheit zu erwidern, auch wenn ich
dafu¨r kostbare Zeit aufwenden muss. [If a colleague does me a favor at
work, I make sure to return the favor at the next occasion, even if I have
to invest precious time to do so.]
(m) Wenn mich jemand schlecht behandelt, lasse ich das nicht einfach so ste-
hen. [When someone treats me in a bad way, I don’t just let it go.]
(n) Ich kann es u¨berhaupt nicht leiden, der Dumme zu sein. [I absolutely
dislike being the fool.]
(o) Mir ist es wichtig, von anderen respektiert zu werden. [It is important to
me to be respected by others.]
(p) Man muss manchmal eine gewisse Ha¨rte an den Tag legen, sonst wird
man immer u¨ber den Tisch gezogen. [You sometimes have to play tough
in order not to be taken advantage of.]
18. Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Sie sind beim Einkaufen unterwegs in
einer fremden Stadt, und merken, dass Sie sich verlaufen haben. Sie fragen
eine fremde Person nach dem Weg. Die Person bietet Ihnen an, Sie mit dem
Auto zu Ihrem Ziel zu fahren. Die Fahrt dauert etwa 20 Minuten, und kostet
die fremde Person alles in allem etwa 20 Euro. Die fremde Person will aber
kein Geld dafu¨r. Sie haben 6 Flaschen Wein dabei. Eine Flasche Wein kostet 5
Euro. Sie entscheiden, der fremden Person eine Flasche Wein als Dankescho¨n
zu geben. Wie viele Flaschen Wein schenken Sie der fremden Person? [Imagine
the following situation: you are shopping in an unfamiliar city and realize you
lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take
you with their car to your destination. The ride takes about 20 minutes and
costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total. The stranger does not want money
for it. You have six bottles of wine with you. One bottle costs 5 Euro. You
decide to give a bottle to the stranger as a thank-you gift. How many bottles do
you give? (Options: One/two/three/four/five/six bottles.)]
19. Stellen Sie sich folgendes Szenario vor: In einer Gemeinde mit hoher Arbeit-
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slosigkeit gibt es ein Unternehmen, das trotz Rezession noch Gewinne macht.
Der Vorstand des Unternehmens ku¨ndigt an, ab dem kommenden Quartal alle
Lo¨hne und Geha¨lter um 5% zu ku¨rzen. Wie fair finden Sie diese Entschei-
dung? [Imagine the following scenario: A business in a city with a high level
of unemployment makes profits despite a recession. The enterprise’s chairman
announces a decision to cut all wages and salaries by 5%. How fair do you
think is this decision? ]
20. Stellen Sie sich folgendes Szenario vor: Es ist das Wochenende eines allja¨hrlichen
Volksfestes, das wie immer gut besucht ist. Die Temperaturen sind dieses Jahr
unerwartet hoch, so dass die Besucher des Festes viel mehr an Getra¨nken kon-
sumieren wollen, als in den Vorjahren. Daraufhin erho¨hen die Besitzer der
Festzelte die Preise der Getra¨nke. Wie fair finden Sie diese Entscheidung?
[Imagine the following scenario: It is the weekend of the annual fair, which is
well-attended as usual. It is warmer than expected, so that the people at the
fair drink much more than in the preceding years. As a result, the hosts decide
to raise the prices of the drinks. How fair do you think is this decision? ]
21. Stellen Sie sich folgendes Szenario vor: Fu¨r ein Seminar an der Universita¨t
sind Sie und zwei andere Studenten aufgefordert, in einer Dreiergruppe eine
Pra¨sentation vorzubereiten. In Ihrer Gruppe haben Sie und ein anderer Stu-
dent ihren Teil der Pra¨sentation bereits fertig gestellt. Am Abend vor der
Pra¨sentation hat der dritte Student seinen Teil der Pra¨sentation noch immer
nicht bearbeitet, so dass Sie und der andere Student, der seinen Teil schon
fertiggestellt hat, beschließen, die Nacht durchzuarbeiten, um die Pra¨sentation
zu vervollsta¨ndigen. Am na¨chsten Tag stellt der dritte Student den Teil der
Pra¨sentation im Seminar als seine eigene Arbeit dar. Dru¨cken Sie die Intensita¨t
Ihrer Empfindung gegenu¨ber diesem Studenten aus. [Imagine the following sce-
nario: you and two other students have to prepare a presentation as a team for
a seminar at the university. You and one of the other two students have already
prepared your respective parts of the presentation. On the evening before the
presentation you realize that the third student still has not started to work on
their part of the presentation. Consequently, you and the other student decide
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to work all night in order to prepare the third part of the presentation. On
the day of the presentation, the third student presents your work as his work.
Please express the intensity of your feelings towards that student. ]
(a) Wie vera¨rgert sind Sie auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10? [How upset are you
on a scale from 0 to 10? ]
(b) Wie wu¨tend sind Sie auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10? [How angry are you on
a scale from 0 to 10? ]
22. Stellen Sie sich folgendes Szenario vor: In einem Unternehmen, in dem Sie
arbeiten, steht der Jahresabschluss an, so dass alle Mitarbeiter la¨nger im Bu¨ro
sein mu¨ssen, um die Arbeit, die ihr Vorgesetzter von ihnen erwartet, schaffen zu
ko¨nnen. Einer der Mitarbeiter verla¨sst das Bu¨ro dennoch ta¨glich pu¨nktlich zur
gewohnten Zeit, so dass Sie und Ihre Kollegen seinen Teil der Arbeit zusa¨tzlich
u¨bernehmen mu¨ssen. Dru¨cken Sie die Intensita¨t Ihrer Empfindung gegenu¨ber
diesem Mitarbeiter aus. [Imagine the following scenario: The preparation of
the annual accounts is coming up for the business you are employed by. Hence,
all employees have to work overtime in order to manage and finish the workload
that the boss expects from them. Nevertheless, one of your co-workers leaves
the office every day at the usual time, so that you and the other colleagues
additionally have to take on his workload as well. Please express the intensity
of your feelings towards that co-worker.]
(a) Wie vera¨rgert sind Sie auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10? [How upset are you
on a scale from 0 to 10? ]
(b) Wie wu¨tend sind Sie auf einer Skala von 0 bis 10? [How angry are you on
a scale from 0 to 10? ]
3.7.3 The Preference Module
1. Risk Taking
(a) List of 31 hypothetical choices between a lottery (300 Euro with a 50-
percent chance and 0 Euro with a 50-percent chance) and varying safe
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options (starting at 0 Euro and increasing to 300 Euro in increments of
10 Euro)
(b) How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to take
risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please use a scale from 0 to 10,
where a 0 means you are “completely unwilling to take risks” and a 10
means you are “very willing to take risks”. You can also use the values
in-between to indicate where you fall on the scale.
2. Time Discounting
(a) List of 25 hypothetical choices between an early payment “today” (100
Euro) and a varying delayed payment “in 12 months” (100.0/103.0/106.1/
109.2/112.4/115.6/118.8/122.1/125.4/128.8/132.3/135.7/139.2/ 142.8/
146.4/150.1/153.8/157.5 161.3/165.1/169.0/172.9/176.9/180.9/185 Euro).
(b) In comparison to others, are you a person who is generally willing to give
up something today in order to benefit from that in the future or are you
not willing to do so? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means
you are “completely unwilling to give up something today” and a 10 means
you are “very willing to give up something today”. You can also use the
values in-between to indicate where you fall on the scale.
3. Trust
(a) Please consider the following situation: You and another person, whom
you do not know, both participate in a study where you can decide on how
to assign a certain amount of money and thereby determine the outcome.
The rules are as follows. Both participants get an account with 20 Euros.
At the beginning, both participants thus own 20 Euros. The other person
decides first. She can transfer money to your account. She can transfer
any amount: 0, 1, 2 Euro, etc. up to 20 Euro. Each Euro that she
transfers to you is tripled by the conductors of the study and booked
to your account. After this first stage the other person therefore has 20
Euro minus the amount she transferred to you in her account. You have 20
Euro plus the tripled amount of the transfer of the other person on your
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account. Now you get to decide: you have the opportunity to transfer
money back to the other person. You can transfer any amount up to 80
Euro, depending on how much you have in your account. This will be the
end of the study and the account balances will be final. The other person
has in her account 20 Euros minus the amount she transferred to you
plus the amount you transferred back. You have 20 Euro plus the tripled
amount of what the other person transferred to you minus the amount
you transferred back to her. We would like to know how much you would
choose to transfer back to the other person, for a given transfer of her to
you.
Suppose you were assigned the role of the other person. Which amount
would you choose to transfer?
(b) How well does the following statement describe you as a person? As long
as I am not convinced otherwise, I assume that people have only the best
intentions. Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “does not
describe me at all” and a 10 means “describes me perfectly”. You can
also use the values in-between to indicate where you fall on the scale.
4. Altruism
(a) Imagine the following situation: you won 1,000 Euro in a lottery. Con-
sidering your current situation, how much would you donate to charity?
(Values between 0 and 1000 are allowed)
(b) How do you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting
anything in return when it comes to charity? Please use a scale from 0 to
10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling to share” and a 10 means
you are “very willing to share”. You can also use the values in-between to
indicate where you fall on the scale.
5. Positive Reciprocity
(a) Please consider the following situation: You and another person, whom
you do not know, both participate in a study where you can decide on how
to assign a certain amount of money and thereby determine the outcome.
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The rules are as follows. Both participants get an account with 20 Euros.
At the beginning, both participants thus own 20 Euros. The other person
decides first. She can transfer money to your account. She can transfer
any amount: 0, 1, 2 Euro, etc. up to 20 Euro. Each Euro that she
transfers to you is tripled by the conductors of the study and booked
to your account. After this first stage the other person therefore has 20
Euro minus the amount she transferred to you in her account. You have 20
Euro plus the tripled amount of the transfer of the other person on your
account. Now you get to decide: you have the opportunity to transfer
money back to the other person. You can transfer any amount up to 80
Euro, depending on how much you have in your account. This will be the
end of the study and the account balances will be final. The other person
has in her account 20 Euros minus the amount she transferred to you
plus the amount you transferred back. You have 20 Euro plus the tripled
amount of what the other person transferred to you minus the amount
you transferred back to her. We would like to know how much you would
choose to transfer back to the other person, for a given transfer of her to
you.
Suppose the other person transfers 5/10/15/20 Euro to your account.
After the first stage you then own 20+3*5/10/15/20=35/50/65/80 Euro,
the other person owns 20-5/10/15/20=15/10/5/0 Euro. What amount do
you choose to transfer back?
(b) Imagine the following situation: you are shopping in an unfamiliar city
and realize you lost your way. You ask a stranger for directions. The
stranger offers to take you with their car to your destination. The ride
takes about 20 minutes and costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total.
The stranger does not want money for it. You carry six bottles of wine
with you. The cheapest bottle costs 5 Euro, the most expensive one 30
Euro. You decide to give one of the bottles to the stranger as a thank-you
gift. Which bottle do you give?
Respondents can choose from the following options: The bottle for 5, 10,
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15, 20, 25, or 30 Euro)
6. Negative Reciprocity
(a) Imagine the following situation: together with a person whom you do not
know you won 100 Euro in a lottery. The rules stipulate the following:
One of you has to make a proposal about how to divide the 100 Euro
between you two. The other one gets to know the proposal and has to
decide between two options. He or she can accept the proposal or reject
it. If he or she accepts the proposal, the money is divided according to
the proposal. If he or she rejects the proposal, both receive nothing.
Suppose that the other person offered the following split: 50 Euro for you
and 50 Euro for himself/herself. Do you accept this split? If you do, you
will receive 50 Euro and the other person will receive 50 Euro. If you
reject, both of you receive 0 Euro.
Note that individuals answered a total of 5 questions that use the same
wording but vary the amount that was offered by the other person. These
amounts were 50, 40, 30, 20, and 10.
(b) How do you see yourself: Are you a person who is generally willing to
punish unfair behavior even if this is costly? Please use a scale from 0
to 10, where 0 means you are “not willing at all to incur costs to punish
unfair behavior” and a 10 means you are “very willing to incur costs to
punish unfair behavior”. You can also use the values in-between to indicate
where you fall on the scale.
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Table 3.5: The Preference Module
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk Time Trust Altruism Pos. Reciprocity Neg. Reciprocity
risk quant 0.276∗∗∗
(0.051)
risk qual 0.203∗∗∗
(0.051)
time quant 0.485∗∗∗
(0.048)
time qual -0.171∗∗∗
(0.048)
trust quant 0.629∗∗∗
(0.039)
trust qual 0.133∗∗∗
(0.038)
altr quant 0.185∗∗∗
(0.053)
altr qual 0.321∗∗∗
(0.050)
posrecip quant1 0.486∗∗∗
(0.046)
posrecip quant2 0.164∗∗∗
(0.047)
negrecip quant 0.328∗∗∗
(0.049)
negrecip qual 0.148∗∗∗
(0.050)
Constant -0.00125 -0.00821 0.00425 0.0118 0.0289 0.0112
(0.047) (0.042) (0.038) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049)
Observations 382 382 382 382 360 360
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.340 0.452 0.175 0.329 0.134
F 37.81 99.15 158.4 41.41 89.15 28.83
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses. OLS Regressions of the standardized behavioral measure (obtained from
incentivized experiments) on the two standardized items that were selected for the preference module.
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Table 3.6: Test-Retest Correlation
Risk Time Trust Altruism Pos. Reciprocity Neg. Reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk (Retest) 0.508∗∗∗
(0.107)
Time (Retest) 0.780∗∗∗
(0.084)
Trust (Retest) 0.730∗∗∗
(0.092)
Altruism (Retest) 0.586∗∗∗
(0.106)
Pos. Reciprocity (Retest) 0.608∗∗∗
(0.107)
Neg. Reciprocity (Retest) 0.636∗∗∗
(0.110)
Constant 5.800∗∗∗ 2.229∗ 83.25∗∗∗ 50.10∗∗ 148.3∗∗∗ 1.29e-08
(1.107) (1.306) (24.841) (24.570) (24.723) (0.087)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.664 0.589 0.406 0.420 0.431
F 22.31 85.85 62.64 30.45 32.15 33.62
Standard errors in parentheses OLS Regressions: Test-Retest Correlations. The dependent variables are the prefer-
ence measures obtained from behavior in the experiments in the first week. These are regressed on the preference
measures obtained from behavior in the respective experiments in the second week. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
3.7.4 Regression Tables
3.7.5 Highest Correlations between Experimental and Sur-
vey Measures
Risk Taking
Table 3.7: Highest Correlations: Risk Taking
Item Item Description Correlation
2 List of hypothetical choices: lottery vs. varying safe options 0.4095
3 General willingness to take risks 0.3524
1 Staircase measure: 5 interdependent choices between a lottery and varying safe options 0.3356
7 (k) Likelihood of spending a day’s income on poker with high stakes 0.3115
11 Estimation of certainty equivalent (safe amount necessary to give up lottery) 0.3070
7 (c) Likelihood of spending a day’s income on betting at horse races 0.3043
6 (a) Willingness to take risks: financial investments 0.2937
The detailed wording of each item can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The first column displays the item number as
given in Appendix 3.7.2. The third column displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey item
and the experimental measure. All correlations are significant at the 1-percent level.
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Time Discounting
Table 3.8: Highest Correlations: Time Discounting
Item Item Description Correlation
2 List of hypothetical choices: early vs. delayed amounts of money 0.5826
1 Staircase measure: 5 interdependent choices between an early and delayed amount of money 0.5547
3 General willingness to abstain from something today -0.4091
4 General willingness to abstain from something today: in comparison to others -0.4039
6 (a) General willingness to abstain from something today: financial decisions -0.3802
5 General willingness to abstain from something today: how others assess you -0.2712
9 (a) Hypothetical scenario of winning a vacation in a lottery: how many extra days of vacation would 0.2606
you ask for to be willing to delay the vacation
10 (b) I abstain from something today so that I can afford more tomorrow. -0.2454
The detailed wording of each item can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The first column displays the item number as
given in Appendix 3.7.2. The third column displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey item
and the experimental measure. All correlations are significant at the 1-percent level.
Trust
Table 3.9: Highest Correlations: Trust
Item Item Description Correlation
16 (e) First mover decision in a hypothetical trust game 0.6201
4 (d) General willingness to trust: strangers 0.3477
5 Hypothethical scenario: willingness to lend money to a stranger 0.2848
7 (d) As long as I am not convinced otherwise I assume that people have the best intentions. 0.2829
4 (a) General willingness to trust: towards people in your city. 0.2778
8 In general one can trust other people. 0.2756
1 General willingness to trust 0.2672
2 General willingness to trust: in comparison to others. 0.2592
The detailed wording of each item - except for item 16 (e) - can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The first column
displays the item number as given in Appendix 3.7.2. Item 16 (e) can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The third
column displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey item and the experimental measure. All
correlations are significant at the 1-percent level.
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Altruism
Table 3.10: Highest Correlations: Altruism
Item Item Description Correlation
5 Hypothetical donation 0.3913
4 (g) General willingness to share: charitable purposes 0.3845
6 (b) I am willing to spend time and money on a charitable purpose, even if I don’t profit from 0.3171
that directly.
6 (c) I am willing to help others even if I presume that I will never meet them again. 0.2658
6 (f) I do not comprehend why some people spend their lifetime fighting for a cause which they -0.2612
do not benefit from directly.
2 General willingness to share: in comparison to others. 0.2268
4 (f) General willingness to share: towards people in need 0.2186
The detailed wording of each item can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The first column displays the item number as
given in Appendix 3.7.2. The third column displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey item
and the experimental measure. All correlations are significant at the 1-percent level.
Positive Reciprocity
Table 3.11: Highest Correlations: Positive Reciprocity
Item Item Description Correlation
16 (a)-(d) Second mover decision in a hypothetical trust game. 0.5560
13 Hypothetical scenario: willingness to pay for a thank-you-gift 0.3530
17 (a) When someone does me a favor, I am willing to return it. 0.2970
17 (d) I go out of my way to help someone who has helped me before. 0.2175
18 (a) Hypothetical scenario: willingness to pay for a thank-you-gift 0.2137
4 (d) General willingness to return a favor: towards strangers. 0.2082
14 Hypothetical scenario: willingness to pay for a thank-you-gift. 0.2032
The detailed wording of each item can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The first column displays the item number as
given in Appendix 3.7.2. The third column displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey item
and the experimental measure. All correlations are significant at the 1-percent level.
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Negative Reciprocity
Table 3.12: Highest Correlations: Negative Reciprocity
Item Item Description Correlation
12 (a) Minimum acceptable offer in a hypothetical ultimatum game. 0.3416
5 General willingness to punish unfair behavior 0.1609
17 (p) You sometimes have to play tough in order not to be taken advantage of. 0.1487
8 (b) General willingness to punish: people among your circle of friends. 0.1436
6 General willingness to punish: in comparison to others. 0.1422
7 General willingness to punish: how others assess you 0.1349
17 (j) If someone behaves unfairly towards me in sports, I will also behave unfairly towards them. 0.1343
The detailed wording of each item can be found in Appendix 3.7.2. The first column displays the item number as
given in Appendix 3.7.2. The third column displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between the survey item
and the experimental measure. All correlations are significant at the 1-percent level.
3.7.6 Staircase Risk
The staircase procedure for eliciting risk preferences consists of a sequence of lottery
choices. Everybody starts with the same first question. The choice for the lottery
or the safe payment option then determines the next question in the sequence. This
procedure is repeated four times. Subjects were instructed as follows:
Please imagine the following situation: You can choose between a sure payment
and a lottery. The lottery gives you a 50 percent chance of receiving 300 Euro. With
an equally high chance you receive nothing. Now imagine you had to choose between
the lottery and a sure payment. We will present to you five different situations. The
lottery is the same in all situations. The sure payment is different in every situation.
1. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 160 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 17
(b) sure payment → go to question 2
2. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 80 Euro as a sure payment?
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(a) lottery → go to question 10
(b) sure payment → go to question 3
3. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 40 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 4
(b) sure payment → go to question 7
4. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 60 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 5
(b) sure payment → go to question 6
5. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 70 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
6. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 50 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
7. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 20 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 8
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(b) sure payment → go to question 9
8. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 30 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
9. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 10 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
10. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 120 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 14
(b) sure payment → go to question 11
11. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 100 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 13
(b) sure payment → go to question 12
12. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 90 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
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13. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 110 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
14. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 140 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 15
(b) sure payment → go to question 16
15. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 150 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
16. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 130 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
17. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 240 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 25
(b) sure payment → go to question 18
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18. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 200 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 22
(b) sure payment → go to question 19
19. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 180 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 20
(b) sure payment → go to question 21
20. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 190 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
21. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 170 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
22. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 220 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 23
(b) sure payment → go to question 24
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23. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 230 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
24. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 210 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
25. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 280 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 29
(b) sure payment → go to question 26
26. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 260 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 27
(b) sure payment → go to question 28
27. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 270 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
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28. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 250 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
29. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 300 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery → go to question 31
(b) sure payment → go to question 30
30. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 290 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
31. What would you prefer: a 50 percent chance of winning 300 Euro when at the
same time there is 50 percent chance of winning nothing, or would you rather
have the amount of 310 Euro as a sure payment?
(a) lottery
(b) sure payment
The staircase procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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3.7.7 Staircase Time
Start with the first question. Depending on whether the participant chooses the earlier
or the delayed option, go to the respective next question. This procedure is repeated
four times.
Suppose you were given the choice between the following: receiving a payment today
or a payment in 12 months. We will now present to you five situations. The payment
today is the same in each of these situations. The payment in 12 months is different
in every situation. For each of these situations we would like to know which you
would choose.
1. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 153.8 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 17
(b) in 12 months → go to question 2
2. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 125.4 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 10
(b) in 12 months → go to question 3
3. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 112.4 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 7
(b) in 12 months → go to question 4
4. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 106.1 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 6
(b) in 12 months → go to question 5
5. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 103.0 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
6. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 109.2 Euro in 12 months?
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160
80
40
20
10
implied switching row=1B
Implied switching row=2A
B
30
Implied switching row=3B
Implied switching row=4A
AB
60
50
Implied switching row=5B
Implied switching row=6A
B
70
Implied switching row=7B
Implied switching row=8A
A
A
B
120
100
90
Implied switching row=9B
Implied switching row=10A
B
110
Implied switching row=11B
Implied switching row=12A
AB
140
130
Implied switching row=13B
Implied switching row=14A
B
150
Implied switching row=15B
Implied switching row=16A
A
A
A
B
240
200
180
170
Implied switching row=17B
Implied switching row=18A
B
190
Implied switching row=19B
Implied switching row=20A
AB
220
210
Implied switching row=21B
Implied switching row=22A
B
230
Implied switching row=23B
Implied switching row=24A
A
A
B
280
260
250
Implied switching row=25B
Implied switching row=26A
B
270
Implied switching row=27B
Implied switching row=28A
AB
300
290
Implied switching row=29B
Implied switching row=30A
B
310
Implied switching row=31B
Implied switching row=32A
A
A
A
A
Figure 3.2: Decision Tree for the Staircase Task for Risk Taking.
Notes. Numbers represent sure payments. ”A” denotes the choice of the sure payment, ”B” denotes
the choice of the lottery. The staircase procedure worked as follows. First, each respondent was
asked whether they would prefer to receive 160 euros for sure or whether they preferred a 50:50
chance of receiving 300 euros or nothing. In case the respondent opted for the safe choice (“B”),
the safe amount of money being offered in the second question decreased to 80 euros. If, on the
other hand, the respondent opted for the gamble (“A”), the safe amount was increased to 240 euros.
Working further through the tree follows the same logic.
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(a) today
(b) in 12 months
7. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 118.8 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 8
(b) in 12 months → go to question 9
8. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 122.1 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
9. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 115.6 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
10. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 139.2 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 14
(b) in 12 months → go to question 11
11. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 132.3 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 13
(b) in 12 months → go to question 12
12. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 128.8 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
13. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 135.7 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
14. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 146.4 Euro in 12 months?
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(a) today → go to question 16
(b) in 12 months → go to question 15
15. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 142.8 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
16. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 150.1 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
17. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 185.0 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 18
(b) in 12 months → go to question 25
18. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 201.6 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 22
(b) in 12 months → go to question 19
19. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 193.2 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 20
(b) in 12 months → go to question 21
20. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 197.4 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
21. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 189.1 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
22. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 210.3 Euro in 12 months?
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(a) today → go to question 23
(b) in 12 months → go to question 24
23. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 214.6 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
24. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 205.9 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
25. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 169.0 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 29
(b) in 12 months → go to question 26
26. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 161.3 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 28
(b) in 12 months → go to question 27
27. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 157.5 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
28. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 165.1 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
29. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 176.9 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today → go to question 31
(b) in 12 months → go to question 30
30. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 172.9 Euro in 12 months?
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(a) today
(b) in 12 months
31. Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 180.9 Euro in 12 months?
(a) today
(b) in 12 months
The staircase procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Decision Tree for the Staircase Task for Time Discounting
Notes. Numbers represent payments in 12 months. ”A” denotes the choice of “100 euros today”,
”B” denotes the choice of “x euros in 12 months”. The staircase procedure worked as follows. First,
each respondent was asked whether they would prefer to receive 100 euros today or 154 euros in
12 months from now (leftmost decision node). In case the respondent opted for the payment today
(“A”), in the second question the payment in 12 months was adjusted upwards to 185 euros. If, on
the other hand, the respondent chose the payment in 12 months, the corresponding payment was
adjusted down to 125 euros. Working further through the tree follows the same logic.
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3.7.8 Refined Version of the Preference Module Used to Col-
lect Global Preference Data in Gallup World Poll 2012
1. Please tell me, in general, how willing or unwilling you are to take risks.
Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are ”completely unwilling
to take risks” and a 10 means you are ”very willing to take risks”. You can
also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale,
like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
completely very
unwilling willing
to take risks to take risks
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. We now ask for your willingness to act in a certain way in four different areas.
Please again indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you
are ”completely unwilling to do so” and a 10 means you are ”very willing to
do so”. You can also use any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you
fall on the scale, like 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
completely very
unwilling willing
to do so to do so
How willing are you to give up 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
something that is beneficial for you
today in order to benefit more from
that in the future?
How willing are you to punish 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
someone who treats you unfairly,
even if there may be costs for you?
How willing are you to punish 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
someone who treats others unfairly,
even if there may be costs for you?
How willing are you to give to good 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
causes without expecting anything
in return?
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3. How well do the following statements describe you as a person?
Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means ”does not
describe me at all” and a 10 means ”describes me perfectly”. You can also use
any numbers between 0 and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, like 0,
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
does not describe describes me
me at all perfectly
When someone does me a favor 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I am willing to return it.
If I am treated very unjustly, I will 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
take revenge at the first occasion,
even if there is a cost to do so.
I assume that people have only 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
the best intentions.
4. Please imagine the following situation: You can choose between a sure payment
of a particular amount of money, or a draw, where you would have an equal
chance of getting 300 Euro or getting nothing. We will present to you five
different situations.
4.1 What would you prefer: a draw with a 50 percent chance of receiving 300
Euro, and the same 50 percent chance of receiving nothing, or the amount
of 160 Euro as a sure payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.17
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.2
4.2 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 80 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.10
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.3
4.3 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 40 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.4
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.7
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4.4 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 60 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.5
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.6
4.5 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 70 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.6 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 50 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.7 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 20 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.8
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.9
4.8 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 30 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.9 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 10 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.10 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 120 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.14
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.11
4.11 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 100 Euro as a sure
payment?
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= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.13
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.12
4.12 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 90 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.13 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 110 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.14 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 140 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.15
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.16
4.15 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 150 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.16 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 130 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.17 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 240 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.25
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.18
4.18 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 200 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.22
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= Sure payment → Go to question 4.19
4.19 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 180 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.20
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.21
4.20 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 190 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.21 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 170 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.22 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 220 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.23
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.24
4.23 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 230 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.24 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 210 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.25 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 280 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.29
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.26
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4.26 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 260 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.27
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.28
4.27 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 270 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.28 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 250 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.29 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 300 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 4.31
= Sure payment → Go to question 4.30
4.30 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 290 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
4.31 Would you prefer the 50/50 chance or the amount of 310 Euro as a sure
payment?
= 50/50 chance → Go to question 5
= Sure payment → Go to question 5
5. Please think about what you would do in the following situation.
You are in an area you are not familiar with, and you realize that you lost your
way. You ask a stranger for directions. The stranger offers to take you to your
destination. Helping you costs the stranger about 20 Euro in total. However,
the stranger says he or she does not want any money from you. You have 6
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presents with you. The cheapest present costs 5 Euro, the most expensive one
costs 30 Euro. Do you give one of the presents to the stranger as a ”thank-
you”-gift? If so, which present do you give to the stranger?
no present
the present worth 5 Euro
the present worth 10 Euro
the present worth 15 Euro
the present worth 20 Euro
the present worth 25 Euro
the present worth 30 Euro
6. Imagine the following situation: Today you unexpectedly received 1,000 Euro.
How much of this amount would you donate to a good cause? (Values between
0 and 1,000 are allowed)
7. Suppose you were given the choice between receiving a payment today or a
payment in 12 months. We will now present to you 5 situations. The payment
today is the same in each of these situations. The payment in 12 months is
different in every situation. For each of these situations we would like to know
which you would choose. Please assume there is no inflation, i.e. future prices
are the same as today’s prices.
7.1 Please consider the following: would you rather receive 100 Euro today
or 154 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.17
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.2
7.2 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 125 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.10
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.3
7.3 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 112 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.7
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= In 12 months → Go to question 7.4
7.4 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 106 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.6
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.5
7.5 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 103 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.6 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 109 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.7 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 119 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.8
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.9
7.8 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 122 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.9 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 116 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.10 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 139 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.14
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.11
7.11 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 132 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.13
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.12
7.12 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 129 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
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7.13 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 136 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.14 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 146 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.16
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.15
7.15 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 143 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.16 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 150 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.17 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 185 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.18
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.25
7.18 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 202 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.22
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.19
7.19 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 193 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.20
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.21
7.20 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 197 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.21 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 189 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.22 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 210 Euro in 12 months?
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= Today → Go to question 7.23
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.24
7.23 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 215 Euro in 12 months?
= [Final question]
= [Final question]
7.24 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 206 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.25 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 169 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.29
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.26
7.26 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 161 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.28
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.27
7.27 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 158 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.28 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 165 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.29 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 177 Euro in 12 months?
= Today → Go to question 7.31
= In 12 months → Go to question 7.30
7.30 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 173 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
7.31 Would you rather receive 100 Euro today or 181 Euro in 12 months?
= Today [Final question]
= In 12 months [Final question]
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3.7.9 The Preference Module: Original Wording
1. Risk Taking
(a) Wie scha¨tzen Sie sich perso¨nlich ein? Sind Sie im Allgemeinen ein risikobere-
iter Mensch oder versuchen Sie, Risiken zu vermeiden? Bitte klicken Sie
ein Ka¨stchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet “gar nicht
risikobereit”, und der Wert 10 bedeutet “sehr risikobereit”. Mit den
Werten dazwischen ko¨nnen Sie Ihre Einscha¨tzung abstufen.
(b) Liste mit 31 hypothetischen Entscheidungen: Stellen Sie sich bitte fol-
gende Situation vor: Sie haben die Wahl zwischen einer sicheren Auszahlung
und einer Lotterie. Bei der Lotterie erhalten Sie mit 50 Prozent Chance
300 Euro, und mit 50 Prozent Chance erhalten Sie nichts. Bitte stellen
Sie sich nun vor, Sie mu¨ssten sich zwischen der Lotterie (die immer gleich
bleibt), und einer sicheren Auszahlung (die sich von Situation zu Situation
unterscheidet), entscheiden. Auf dem folgenden Bildschirm werden Ihnen
verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen angezeigt. Anschliessend bitten
wir Sie, fu¨r jede dieser hypothetischen Situationen einzeln Ihre Entschei-
dung zwischen der Lotterie und der sicheren Auszahlung anzugeben.
Bitte u¨berlegen Sie: Was ha¨tten Sie lieber: eine 50-prozentige Chance
300 Euro zu gewinnen bei gleichzeitiger 50-prozentiger Chance nichts zu
gewinnen, oder einen Geldbetrag von 33 Euro als sichere Auszahlung?
2. Time Discounting
(a) Sind Sie im Vergleich zu anderen im Allgemeinen bereit, heute auf etwas
zu verzichten, um in der Zukunft davon zu profitieren, oder sind Sie im
Vergleich zu anderen dazu nicht bereit? Bitte klicken Sie ein Ka¨stchen
auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet “gar nicht bereit”, und der
Wert 10 bedeutet “sehr bereit”. Mit den Werten dazwischen ko¨nnen Sie
Ihre Einscha¨tzung abstufen.
(b) Liste mit 25 hypothetischen Entscheidungen: In diesem Teil des Exper-
iments bitten wir Sie, sich Folgendes vorzustellen: Nehmen Sie an, Sie
33Compare Section 3.7.2
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ha¨tten folgende Wahl: eine Auszahlung heute oder eine Auszahlung in 12
Monaten. Im Folgenden werden Ihnen verschiedene Situationen pra¨sen-
tiert. In jeder Situation ist die heutige Auszahlung dieselbe, die Auszahlung
in 12 Monaten ist jedoch in jeder Situation anders. Wir mo¨chten fu¨r jede
dieser Situationen wissen, wie Sie sich entscheiden wu¨rden.
Bitte u¨berlegen Sie: Wu¨rden Sie lieber 100 Euro heute bekommen oder
34 Euro in 12 Monaten?
3. Trust
(a) (after reading the instructions for the Trust Game, see paragraph on
Positive Reciprocity) Angenommen, Sie sollen den Vorschlag u¨ber die
Aufteilung machen. Welchen Betrag wu¨rden Sie der anderen Person an-
bieten?
(b) Wie sehr trifft die folgende Aussage auf Sie zu? Solange man mich nicht
vom Gegenteil u¨berzeugt, gehe ich stets davon aus, dass andere Menschen
nur das Beste im Sinn haben. Bitte klicken Sie ein Ka¨stchen auf der
Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet “trifft gar nicht zu”, und der Wert
10 bedeutet “trifft voll zu”. Mit den Werten dazwischen ko¨nnen Sie Ihre
Einscha¨tzung abstufen.
4. Altruism
(a) Wie scha¨tzen Sie Ihre Bereitschaft mit anderen zu teilen, ohne dafu¨r eine
Gegenleistung zu erwarten, in Bezug auf den folgenden Bereich ein: wenn
es um gemeinnu¨tzige Zwecke geht? Bitte klicken Sie ein Ka¨stchen auf der
Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet “gar nicht bereit zu teilen ohne eine
Gegenleistung zu erwarten”, und der Wert 10 bedeutet “sehr bereit zu
teilen ohne eine Gegenleistung zu erwarten”. Mit den Werten dazwischen
ko¨nnen Sie ihre Einscha¨tzung abstufen.
(b) Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Sie haben in einem Preisauss-
chreiben 1.000 Euro gewonnen. Wie viel wu¨rden Sie in Ihrer momentanen
34Compare Section 3.7.2
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Situation fu¨r einen gemeinnu¨tzigen Zweck spenden? (Values between 0
and 1000 are allowed)
5. Positive Reciprocity
(a) U¨berlegen Sie bitte, was Sie in folgender Situation tun wu¨rden: Sie und
eine andere Person, die Sie nicht kennen, treffen beide eine Entscheidung
u¨ber die Verwendung von Geld und erzielen zusammen ein Ergebnis. Die
Regeln gehen so: Jeder Teilnehmer erha¨lt ein Konto mit 20 Euro. Am An-
fang haben Sie und die andere Person also jeweils 20 Euro auf dem Konto.
Zuerst entscheidet die andere Person. Sie kann Ihnen Geld auf Ihr Konto
u¨berweisen. Sie kann Ihnen einen beliebigen Eurobetrag u¨berweisen, also
0 Euro, 1 Euro, 2 Euro usw. bis 20 Euro. Jeder Euro, den die andere
Person an Sie u¨berweist, wird von den Leitern der Studie verdreifacht
und Ihrem Konto gutgeschrieben. Nach dem ersten Schritt sind also auf
dem Konto der anderen Person 20 Euro minus der U¨berweisung an Sie.
Auf Ihrem Konto sind 20 Euro plus dem Dreifachen der U¨berweisung an
Sie. Jetzt entscheiden Sie: Sie haben die Mo¨glichkeit, der anderen Per-
son Geld zuru¨ck zu u¨berweisen. Sie ko¨nnen jeden beliebigen Eurobetrag
zuru¨ck u¨berweisen, also 0, 1, 2, 3, usw. bis 80 Euro, je nachdem, wie viel
Geld Sie insgesamt auf Ihrem Konto gutgeschrieben haben, nachdem Sie
die U¨berweisung der anderen Person erhalten haben. Damit ist die Studie
beendet. Die endgu¨ltigen Kontosta¨nde sind erreicht. Auf dem Konto der
anderen Person sind jetzt 20 Euro minus der U¨berweisung an Sie plus Ihrer
Ru¨cku¨berweisung. Auf Ihrem Konto sind jetzt 20 Euro plus das Dreifache
der U¨berweisung an Sie minus Ihrer Ru¨cku¨berweisung. Wir mo¨chten nun
von Ihnen wissen, welche Ru¨cku¨berweisung Sie wa¨hlen wu¨rden, wenn die
andere Person Ihnen einen bestimmten Betrag u¨berweist.
Angenommen, die andere Person u¨berweist Ihnen 5(10/15/20) Euro. Sie
haben dann nach dem ersten Schritt 20+3*5(10/15/20)=35(50/65/80)
Euro, die andere Person hat 20-5(10/15/20)=15(10/5/0) Euro. Wie hoch
ist Ihre Ru¨cku¨berweisung?
(b) Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Sie sind beim Einkaufen unterwegs
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in einer fremden Stadt, und merken, dass Sie sich verlaufen haben. Sie
fragen eine fremde Person nach dem Weg. Die Person bietet Ihnen an,
Sie mit dem Auto zu Ihrem Ziel zu fahren. Die Fahrt dauert etwa 20
Minuten, und kostet die fremde Person alles in allem etwa 20 Euro. Die
fremde Person will aber kein Geld dafu¨r. Sie haben 6 Flaschen Wein
dabei. Die billigste Flasche kostet 5 Euro, die teuerste kostet 30 Euro.
Sie entscheiden, der fremden Person eine Flasche Wein als Dankescho¨n zu
geben. Welche Flasche schenken Sie? [Die Flasche fu¨r 5/10/15/20/25/30
Euro]
6. Negative Reciprocity
(a) Sind Sie jemand, der im Allgemeinen bereit ist, unfaires Verhalten zu
bestrafen, auch wenn das fu¨r Sie mit Kosten verbunden ist? Bitte klicken
Sie ein Ka¨stchen auf der Skala an, wobei der Wert 0 bedeutet ”gar nicht
bereit Kosten auf sich zu nehmen um zu bestrafen”, und der Wert 10
bedeutet ”sehr bereit Kosten auf sich zu nehmen um zu bestrafen”. Mit
den Werten dazwischen ko¨nnen Sie ihre Einscha¨tzung abstufen.
(b) Stellen Sie sich folgende Situation vor: Zusammen mit einer anderen
Person, die Sie nicht perso¨nlich kennen, haben Sie 100 Euro bei einem
Preisausschreiben gewonnen. Die Regeln besagen nun Folgendes. Einer
von Ihnen soll einen Vorschlag daru¨ber machen, wie die 100 Euro aufgeteilt
werden. Der andere erfa¨hrt den Vorschlag, und hat dann zwei Mo¨glichkeiten.
Er kann die Aufteilung annehmen oder ablehnen. Wenn er den Vorschlag
annimmt, wird das Geld so aufgeteilt, wie die andere Person es vorgeschla-
gen hat. Wird die Aufteilung abgelehnt, gehen beide leer aus. Angenom-
men, die andere Person macht einen Vorschlag u¨ber die Aufteilung. Sie
wiederum sollen entscheiden, ob Sie den Vorschlag annehmen oder ablehnen.
Welchen Betrag muss die andere Person Ihnen mindestens anbieten, damit
Sie bereit sind, den Vorschlag u¨ber die Aufteilung anzunehmen?
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Chapter4
Cultural Origins of Cross-Country
Variation in Economic Preferences
4.1 Introduction
Empirical research on preference formation during the last decades has uncovered
a wide variety of sources of heterogeneity in preferences across individuals - among
them age, gender, height, parental socioeconomic status, early life circumstances,
hormones, political regimes and cognitive ability.1 While several studies have docu-
mented cross-country heterogeneity in economic behavior and preferences, the task of
determining a cultural component has remained difficult as these studies had to rely
on non-representative population samples or a small number of countries or both.2
The novel dataset presented in Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde
(2015) is ideally suited to shed light on this question. It contains economic preference
measures for representative population samples from 76 countries worldwide, with a
total of more than 80,000 observations. We show that the variation in preferences
across countries and across individuals is systematic in the cultural backgrounds by
1Compare, for example, Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007), Burks, Carpenter, Goette, and
Rustichini (2009), Croson and Gneezy (2009), Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner
(2011), Falk and Kosse (2012) and Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, and Fehr (2005).
2Compare, for example, Henrich (2000) and Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991)
for differences in bargaining behavior in two and four countries, respectively, Henrich, Boyd, Bowles,
Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath (2001) for ultimatum game behavior across 15 small-scale
societies, Vieider, Lefebre, Bouchouicha, Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk, and Martinsson (2015) for
a comparison of risk attitudes across 30 countries, and Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2016) for evidence
on time preferences from 45 countries.
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using a specific feature of languages as a proxy for culture.
While it has remained unclear whether culture is a driver of differences in prefer-
ences, research has increasingly focused on its role across a wide range of economically
important domains.3 For example, Alesina and Giuliano (forthcoming) examine the
relationship between culture and institutions. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013)
investigate the origins of gender roles and document a correlation between contem-
porary female labor force participation and female participation in agriculture in
the pre-industrial era, originating in different agricultural technologies back then.
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011a) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011b) look
at individualism, one of the cultural dimensions as introduced by Hofstede (2001),
and show that countries which score higher on the individualism dimension have
higher levels of innovation, are more productive and have higher long-run growth
than more collectivist countries. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) use religion
as a proxy for culture and find cultural differences in preferences for redistribution,
which in turn affect actual levels of redistribution at the U.S. state level. Ferna´ndez
and Fogli (2009) document the impact of cultural beliefs regarding the appropriate
role of women in society on female labor force participation and fertility decisions.
Several studies have used language to proxy for culture. Fearon (2003) employs
structural distance between languages as a proxy for cultural distance between groups
in a given country to construct an index of cultural fractionalization. Desmet,
Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, and Weber (2009) proxy cultural diversity with linguistic diversity
to show its effect on redistribution at the country level. Licht, Goldschmidt, and
Schwartz (2007) identify a causal effect of a culture’s emphasis on autonomy versus
embeddedness on countries’ rule of law, corruption, and democratic accountability
by using the grammatical feature of pronoun drop (whether a language allows to
drop the pronouns ”I” or ”you”) as an instrument. Kashima and Kashima (1998)
document an association between pronoun drop and cultural dimensions such as In-
dividualism and Power Distance (Hofstede, 2001). Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015)
link cultural distance to genetic distance and document a strong association with
linguistic distance, corroborating the validity of language as a proxy for culture.
3A notable exemption is Galor and O¨zak (2014), who show that differences in agricultural
conditions on the pre-industrial era explain differences in time preferences today.
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In a recent paper, Chen poses what he calls a ”linguistic-savings hypothesis”
(Chen, 2013). He argues that languages which require its speakers to make a gram-
matical distinction between the present and the future also induce less future-oriented
behavior. In line with his hypothesis, he shows that individuals who speak languages
which require a future-time reference (”strong FTR languages”) save less, retire with
less wealth, smoke more, are less likely to practice safer sex, and are more likely to
be obese than individuals who speak languages that allow to use the present tense
when talking about future events (”weak FTR languages”).4
In this chapter we also abstract from concrete concepts of culture, such as the
cultural dimensions by Hofstede, and use the FTR-criterion as employed by Chen
(2013) to proxy differences in individuals’ cultural backgrounds. Replicating Chen’s
findings for direct preference measures, we show that speakers of weak FTR languages
are more patient. Moreover, we hypothesize that weak FTR languages should foster
future orientation in other preference domains as well, such as prosociality or negative
reciprocity. Indeed, we find that at the country level the fraction of people speaking
a weak FTR language is positively associated with patience, positive reciprocity and
trust. We do not find an association with altruism or negative reciprocity. For
patience, positive reciprocity and trust we find the same results within countries as
well. In addition, we also find an association between the FTR criterion and altruism
at the individual level. Our results indicate that part of the cross-country variation
in preferences across the globe reflects differences in cultural heritage.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
from the Global Preference Survey as well as the language data. Section 4.3 presents
our hypotheses and Section 4.4 the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4Sutter, Angerer, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, and Lergetporer (2015) elicit children’s time preferences in
a bilingual city in Northern Italy and find that children who speak Italian (strong FTR) are less
patient than children who speak German (weak FTR).
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4.2 Data
4.2.1 The Global Preference Survey
The Global Preference Survey (GPS) is a new globally representative survey designed
to measure six key economic preferences: risk taking, time discounting, altruism,
trust, positive and negative reciprocity. The GPS data were collected within the
framework of the Gallup World Poll, which surveys representative population samples
in a large number of countries about social and economic issues on an annual basis.
In 2012, we added the GPS to the World Poll’s questionnaire in 76 countries.
In each country, we obtained preference measures for representative population
samples. The median sample size was 1,000 participants per country. Respondents
were selected through probability sampling. Ex-post representativeness of the data
was achieved by using the weights provided by Gallup.5 In total, we collected pref-
erence measures for more than 80,000 participants worldwide.
The countries were selected to maximize geographical representativeness. Our
sample of 76 countries is not restricted to Western industrialized nations, but covers
all continents, various cultures, and different levels of development. Our sample
includes 15 countries from the Americas, 25 from Europe, 22 from Asia and the
Pacific, as well as 14 from Africa, 11 of which are Sub-Saharan. This set of countries
covers about 90% of the world population and of global income.
Our preference measures were selected using a rigorous ex-ante experimental vali-
dation and selection procedure as described in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The procedure
is described in detail in Sections 3.3 and 3.5. The survey items are found in Section
3.7.8.
The survey items were translated into the different interview languages back and
forth in an iterative process using Gallup’s regular translation scheme.6 All monetary
values were calibrated in relation to the median household income for each country,
5The weights are constructed to render the observations representative in terms of age, gender,
income, education, and geographic location.
6The translation process is very careful. It starts with one translator, who is proficient in two
languages, e.g. English and Swahili, who will complete the first step of the translation process, e.g.
from English into Swahili. Two translators, who are proficient in the same languages, will then do
a back-translation (from Swahili to English). A fourth translator will then compare the resulting
versions. This process is iterated until all translators agree on the same version.
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using the relationship of monetary values used in the validation study to the German
median household income as a benchmark.7
4.2.2 Language Data
We make use of the language classification and the respective data presented in Chen
(2013). Chen applies the classification in EUROTYP8, Dahl (2000), and Thieroff
(2000), and extends their classification to further languages using corresponding
cross-linguistic studies (compare the detailed description and sources provided in
the Appendix of Chen (2013)).
In particular, Chen’s classification divides languages into two sets according to a
structural feature called future-time reference (FTR): those, who require its speak-
ers to grammatically mark future events (strong FTR languages) and those who
allow its speakers to use the present tense when talking about the future (weak
FTR languages). As an illustration: strong FTR languages, like English, require
its speakers to explicitly distinguish between the present and the future by making
use of constructions such as ”Tomorrow I will submit my thesis”, whereas in weak
FTR languages, such as German, it is possible to use the present tense when talking
about the future (”Morgen reiche ich meine Dissertation ein” which would literally
correspond to ”Tomorrow I submit my thesis”).
Applying Chen’s classification to our dataset we arrive at a set of 55 coded lan-
guages. In addition, we were able to code four additional languages ourselves using
the methodology outlined in Chen (2013).9 In sum, this gives us 59 classified lan-
7Since monetary amounts used in the validation study with the German student sample were
round numbers to facilitate easy calculations (e.g., the expected return of a lottery with equal
chances of winning and losing) and to allow for easy comparisons (e.g., 100 Euro today versus
107.50 in 12 months), we also rounded monetary amounts in all other countries to the next ”round”
number. While this necessarily resulted in some (minor) variations in the real stake size between
countries, it minimized cross-country differences in the understanding of the quantitative items due
to otherwise arising difficulties in assessing the involved monetary amounts.
8See https://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/tools-at-lingboard/questionnaire/eurotypdescription.php:
EUROTYP was a large-scale project of the European Science foundation aimed at examining the
range of typological variation found in the languages of Europe with tense and aspect being one
grammatical area under examination.
9These languages are Fulfulde (weak FTR), Khmer (strong FTR), Moroccan Arabic (weak
FTR), and Dari (strong FTR). In addition, we changed one of Chen’s classification after corre-
sponding with him. He classified Persian (Farsi) as strong FTR, while it is in fact weak FTR. None
of our results (and neither his) depend on how we code Persian.
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guages for a total of 75,224 respondents.10
4.3 Hypotheses
As Chen (2013) posits, a grammatical separation of the future from the present
makes the speaker perceive the future as more distant compared to when there is
no such grammatical separation. This might lead to a devaluation of the future and
thus to less future-orientation in decision-making.11
Analogously with Chen (2013) we therefore expect speakers of strong FTR lan-
guages to exhibit less future-orientation in our preference measures for time discount-
ing. This would show that Chen’s results also hold true for a very direct measure of
how people trade off current and future rewards.
One can argue in a similar way for positive and negative reciprocity. The ten-
dency to reciprocate can incorporate repeated interaction motives (e.g. in relational
contracts settings). As such, negative reciprocity can be described as the willingness
to punish unfairness or norm violation so as to enforce fair behavior or norm adher-
ence (in the future). Similarly, positive reciprocity can be described as the tendency
to reward kind, cooperative or fair actions so as to foster such a behavior (in the
future).12 We therefore expect speakers of weak FTR to be more future oriented in
the reciprocity domains, i.e. to have stronger positive as well as stronger negative
reciprocal inclinations. An immediate consequence from our hypothesis on the asso-
ciation between the FTR criterion and positive reciprocity is that we should expect
the same association for trust, since the tendency to reciprocate positively naturally
fosters trust.
We do not expect a correlation between the FTR criterion and risk attitudes or
altruism.
10We could not code 23 languages, which are mostly spoken by small minorities (5,113 respon-
dents in total).
11More precisely, Chen derives his linguistic-savings hypothesis from two different channels: on
the one hand, speaking about the future using the present tense might bias beliefs such that the
future feels less distant. On the other hand and leading to the same conclusion, not explicitly
marking the future might introduce uncertainty about the timing of future rewards, which would
similarly facilitate future-orientation if some probability is put on the future occurring sooner.
12See Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009) for a discussion and empirical evidence.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Cross-Country Analysis
For each country, we compute the country-level fraction of people whose language
corresponds to weak as opposed to strong FTR. Then, we regress average preferences
in a given country on this fraction. To take into account that we can classify only
a subset of respondents in some countries (making the fraction speaking weak FTR
languages a less precise estimate of the true population counterpart), our regressions
weigh all observations by the fraction of people whose language can be classified.
Thus, countries in which we can classify a larger fraction of respondents receive
higher weight, as should be the case from a measurement error perspective.13
Table 4.1 presents the results. For each preference, we report two specifications,
one without covariates and one with control variables commonly employed in cross-
country regressions, i.e., continent fixed effects, (log) per capita income, distance to
the equator, longitude, the fraction of the population that is at risk of contracting
malaria, and average precipitation. Results show that, across countries, weak FTR is
significantly correlated with average patience (columns (1)-(2)). As columns (5)-(6)
and (11)-(12) show, similar patterns obtain for positive reciprocity and trust. In con-
trast, altruism, risk taking, and negative reciprocity are not significantly correlated
with the fraction speaking weak FTR languages.
4.4.2 Within-Country Analysis
In a second step of the analysis, we exploit within-country variation in preferences
and FTR. Such analyses are arguably better suited to identify cultural origins of
preferences because they can account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country
level.
In many countries in our sample, we observe some variation in interview lan-
guages. However, variation in language does not necessarily mean variation in FTR.
In fact, only in Estonia, Nigeria, and Switzerland (2,925 respondents in total) do
13Appendix 4.6 confirms that virtually identical results are obtained when running unweighted
OLS regressions, suggesting that measurement error in the fraction speaking weak FTR languages
is weak.
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Table 4.1: Preferences and FTR: Cross-country results
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fraction of population speaking weak FTR 0.37*** 0.24*** -0.14* -0.0080 0.13* 0.16** -0.024 -0.088 0.043 0.099 0.17** 0.18**
(0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 0.15*** 0.032 -0.072* 0.058 -0.078* -0.00072
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Distance to equator 0.010* 0.0017 -0.0069 -0.0081 -0.0022 -0.0072
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Longitude -0.0019 0.0023 0.0022 0.00091 0.0025 -0.000039
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% at risk of malaria 0.25 -0.14 -0.27 -0.13 -0.71** -0.16
(0.21) (0.23) (0.29) (0.17) (0.27) (0.19)
Average precipitation -0.00024 -0.00092 0.00065 -0.0011 0.0031** -0.0011
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.055 -1.42*** 0.034 -0.041 -0.047 1.39*** 0.020 -0.13 -0.049 1.27** -0.047 0.56
(0.04) (0.51) (0.04) (0.36) (0.05) (0.43) (0.04) (0.50) (0.05) (0.50) (0.04) (0.38)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74
R2 0.146 0.636 0.031 0.442 0.022 0.253 0.001 0.271 0.002 0.334 0.053 0.408
WLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. All observations are weighted by the fraction of respondents whose language can be classified as weak or
strong FTR. The regressions exclude Haiti for which no respondent could be classified. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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interview languages vary across respondents such that we observe within-country
variation in FTR. Thus, we proceed by regressing individual-level preferences on a
dummy for whether a respondent speaks a weak or a strong FTR language, condi-
tional on country fixed effects and age, age squared, gender, and our cognitive skills
proxy. Columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) of Table 4.2 present the results.
Consistent with the cross-country evidence, we find that individuals speaking weak
FTR languages are more patient, more positively reciprocal, and more trusting. In
addition, these people are also significantly more altruistic.14 We do not find signif-
icant relationships between FTR and risk taking or negative reciprocity. For each
preference, a second column adds further controls, i.e., regional (state or province)
fixed effects, religion fixed effects, household income, health, and subjective insti-
tutional quality. Despite this comprehensive set of covariates, and only exploiting
within-region variation in FTR and preferences, we obtain almost identical results.
In sum, the results at the subnational level closely mirror those obtained in
cross-country analyses, the one exception being altruism.15 Thus, across levels of
aggregation, weak FTR is predictive of higher patience and higher levels of the
prosocial traits positive reciprocity, altruism, and trust.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Using a specific linguistic feature as a proxy for cultural heritage, we examine whether
the variation in economic preferences across countries and across individuals has a
cultural component. In line with our hypotheses we find an association between
the FTR criterion of languages and time discounting, positive reciprocity, and trust.
Speakers of weak FTR languages are more future oriented than speakers of strong
FTR languages in that they are more patient and more positively reciprocal. They
also exhibit higher levels of trust.
14When we restrict the sample to those countries with within-country variation in FTR and
regress the respective preference only on the FTR indicator as well as country fixed effects, the
resulting coefficient is always positive and statistically significant at the 10% level for patience
and at the 1% level for positive reciprocity, trust, and altruism. In Appendix 4.6, we report the
coefficient on FTR separately for each country in which we observe within-country variation.
15Note that the correspondence between within- and across-country results is in no way me-
chanical, i.e., it need not necessarily be the case that individual- and country-level correlations are
aligned.
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Table 4.2: Preferences and FTR: Individual-level results
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1 if weak FTR 0.095** 0.053*** 0.067 0.0079 0.18*** 0.11*** -0.073* -0.0037 0.24*** 0.19** 0.33*** 0.32**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13)
Age 0.76*** 0.80*** -0.098 0.49** 1.07*** 0.92*** -0.39*** -0.25 0.032 0.074 0.42*** 0.045
(0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.21) (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.20) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)
Age squared -1.51*** -1.48*** -1.21*** -1.80*** -1.22*** -1.09*** -0.44*** -0.63*** -0.017 -0.21 -0.0044 0.27
(0.11) (0.21) (0.11) (0.21) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.16)
1 if female -0.061*** -0.040*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 0.045*** 0.054*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.100*** 0.093*** 0.069*** 0.053***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Subj. math skills 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log [Household income p/c] 0.037*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.012 0.046*** -0.0083
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Subj. health index 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.062*** -0.028 0.084*** 0.053***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Subj. law and order index 0.065*** 0.054** 0.0041 -0.075*** 0.022 0.19***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant -0.49*** -0.88*** 0.15*** -0.79*** -0.13** -0.51*** 0.60*** 0.16 -0.17*** -0.40*** -0.46*** -0.74***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.16)
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Region FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 73460 52628 73414 52610 73811 52862 72501 52003 73580 52675 72811 52159
R2 0.166 0.215 0.172 0.254 0.127 0.230 0.117 0.200 0.137 0.199 0.113 0.167
OLS estimates, robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in parentheses. For the purposes of this table, age is divided by 100. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Unlike what we hypothesized, we do not find a correlation between the FTR crite-
rion and negative reciprocity. We can only speculate about why this is the case. One
potential explanation is that negative reciprocity does not only capture a strategic
(future-oriented) aspect of punishment with the goal of, e.g., norm enforcement, but
also a more emotional and non-strategic aspect of ”getting even” or taking revenge
when treated unfairly. This rather impulsive or affective motivation does not neces-
sarily bear rational considerations about potential future payoffs. This would render
finding an association with the FTR criterion less likely.
For altruism, our results at the country level are in line with our hypothesis as
we do not find a relation between the countries’ average level of altruism and their
fraction of weak FTR languages speaking inhabitants. However, at the individual
level we do find an association: speakers of weak FTR languages are more altruistic
than speakers of strong FTR languages. This might not so much result from a direct
association between altruism and the FTR criterion, but rather mirror the strong
association between positive reciprocity and trust on the one hand and altruism on
the other, reflecting pro-sociality in its different facets.
In line with the work by Chen (2013), our results lend themselves to two in-
teresting interpretations. First, speaking a weak FTR language may actually cause
patience and cooperation-enhancing pro-sociality.16 Second, the historical evolution
of linguistic features and the formation preferences may both be a product of some
other very deep cultural trait. Regardless of the precise interpretation adopted, our
results highlight that the contemporary preference variation may have very deep
historical roots,17 and that the GPS data are well-suited to identify such effects.
16The idea that language might influence our thought, the way we perceive the world and
ultimately our behavior and decision making has been brought up a quite some time ago and has
become well-known as the Sapir-Whorf-hypothesis (Whorf, 1956). Among the evidence arguing in
favor of such a hypothesis is, for example, Fausey and Boroditsky (2011) who find cross-linguistic
differences in eye-witness memory.
17As discussed by Chen (2013), variation in future-time reference is at least several hundred
years old.
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4.6 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.6.1 Individual-Level Regressions Separately by Country
Table 4.3: Preferences and FTR: Within-country results
Country Weak FTR Strong FTR Patience Pos. reciprocity Trust Altruism
Estonia Estonian Russian 0.05 0.13∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
Nigeria Yoruba English, Hausa, Igbo -0.08 0.54∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ -0.11
Switzerland German French, Italian 0.17∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
OLS estimates, robust standard errors. The regressions report the coefficient on FTR in univariate
regressions for each country in which we observe within-country variation in FTR. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
4.6.2 Country-Level Regressions: Robustness
While the main text reported WLS estimates, Table 4.4 reports OLS estimates.
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Table 4.4: Preferences and FTR: Cross-country results
Dependent variable:
Patience Risk taking Pos. reciprocity Neg. reciprocity Altruism Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Fraction of population speaking weak FTR 0.36*** 0.23** -0.11 0.015 0.15* 0.17** -0.018 -0.082 0.061 0.11 0.19** 0.19**
(0.13) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Log [GDP p/c PPP] 0.16*** 0.032 -0.073* 0.052 -0.077* -0.0055
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Distance to equator 0.010* 0.0015 -0.0078 -0.0054 -0.0033 -0.0057
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Longitude -0.0018 0.0024 0.0021 0.00043 0.0028 0.000065
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% at risk of malaria 0.25 -0.15 -0.33 -0.089 -0.72*** -0.092
(0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.17) (0.26) (0.19)
Average precipitation -0.00013 -0.00081 0.00055 -0.0010 0.0031*** -0.0011
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.067 -1.42** 0.034 -0.51 -0.053 0.56 0.014 -0.019 -0.043 0.25 -0.058 0.39
(0.04) (0.56) (0.04) (0.45) (0.05) (0.67) (0.04) (0.50) (0.05) (0.61) (0.04) (0.48)
Continent FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74 75 74
R2 0.141 0.641 0.021 0.381 0.029 0.280 0.001 0.246 0.005 0.356 0.072 0.420
OLS estimates, robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions exclude Haiti for which no respondent could be classified. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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